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Functions and Powers of Zila Nazim

- Provide vision for district-wide development, and leadership and direction for efficient functioning of the DG.
- With the assistance of the DA develop strategies and timeframe for accomplishment of the relevant goals approved by the ZC.
- Perform functions relating to law and order in the district.

Legislative. The Legislative functions include:

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- Levying of taxes as per list of district taxes given in the LGO 2000.
- Raising or lowering existing taxes.
- Making bylaws, rules and procedures applicable to DG.

Approval of Budget and Development Plans. The ZC has to approve district annual development plans as well as the budget presented by the DA under the direction of the ZN.

The DA has to perform the following functions

- a. Prepare plans and budgets for submission to the ZN, and upon approval by him or her and passage by the ZC, and implement them.

- b. Formulate district rules and regulations for approval by the ZC.
- c. Apply federal and provincial laws, rules, and regulations in areas covered by the administration.
- d. Undertake executive oversight of the execution of district policies.
- e. Provide information and co-operate with the legislative monitoring of the ZC, Tehsil and Union Monitoring Committees (TUMC) and Citizen Community Boards (CCB).
- f. Use the information collected through the information and evaluation system from all levels of monitoring.

CCB has been created to enable the proactive elements of society to participate in community work and development-related activities in both rural and urban areas. ZC and its relevant committee have facilitated the creation of such CCB, or in some cases the citizens themselves have created them. In addition, the existing Community Based Organization (CBO) has also been continuing their work. CCBs have been able to mobilize communities and raise funds to solve local problems, such as the lack of health services, water supply, and agricultural extension at the district level. CCBs have kept their door open to new entrants to obviate negative competition and promote synergy. As voluntary organizations the CCBs have already organized themselves and have determined their own form of functioning, creating their own leaders through the mechanism they have set. The CCBs have been seen to represent a powerful enabling environment for citizen participation. Citizens of each community have taken advantage of this opportunity (Khan, 2006a). CCB has a general body of its members who elects a Chairman, an Executive Committee and a Secretary for carrying out its functions. Their term of office is one year. The CCBs are not registered as legal entities but are controlled by the general body. The CCB decisions are made through its elected general body and the community. CCBs prepare their projects and after approval by the council execute them. The maximum share of the development funds for the LG cannot exceed 75% and the community share for CCBs must not be less than 25%.

In the past, LGs used to receive 10 to 15 percent fiscal transfers from provincial sources. There was no formula for distribution of funds to districts and provincial budgets did not specify district expenditures. In order to accomplish a transparent, credible and fair system of transferring funds to the district level, a

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During the last one and half decades, there has been wide scale debate and discourses on policy on the issue of decentralization and development. Theorists and practitioners combinedly argued that a truly designed decentralization policy can ensure and provide much expected public goods and services to decentralized units in an accountable, transparent and participatory way (Shotton, 2004). Decentralization will also create an institutional structure to test the policy. The national government and policy-making bodies with the local government units at the periphery (Aminuzzaman, 2006). Researchers further argue that a well-designed decentralization scheme will further ensure growing and nascent democracies in various third world countries (Siddique, 2001, Aminuzzaman, 2007). However, it is unfortunate that a comprehensive model of decentralization is yet to emerge. Various international agencies like World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) have been working on decentralization in various developing countries. Pakistan is one such country where under the initiatives of the World Bank a 'Big Bang' approach of decentralization was implemented in the early 2000. The 'Big Bang' model of Pakistan installed a radically different model and institutional set-up at the district level administration and governance system. This study therefore aims to explore the experiences of Pakistan with particular emphasis to district level decentralization exercises and institutional building. The prime purpose of the study is to examine and analyze whether Bangladesh can learn about the experiences of Pakistan with particular emphasis to the role of participants with reference to district level administration and local government. It is to be noted that other tiers of decentralization has not been covered in this study.

Pakistan's decentralization plan addresses major issues of good governance and local democracy and introduces a model described as 5Ds i.e. **Devolution of Political Power, Decentralization of Administrative Authority, De-concentration of Management Functions, Diffusion of the Power-Authority Nexus and Distribution of Resources**. The new Local Government System (LGS) was installed on 14 August 2001, after holding of elections. It has a three-tier structure: District Government (DG), Tehsil Government (TG) and Union Government (UG). The new system has concentrated on moving from a bureaucracy to a political system.

DG has the tax collection machinery at its disposal. The specified schedule of local taxes has also come under the control of DG. A formula for provincial fiscal transfers (i.e. population, under-development, fiscal efforts, areas, revenue generation capacity and expenditure requirement has been devised and implemented. The objectives of fiscal transfers are to provide baseline levels for essential services, to boost revenue generation efforts, to encourage spending in priority areas, and to provide efficient spending/expenditure. The model provincial formula has become part of the new provincial finance awards. The resultant change in development in conjunction with the provincial government is subject to the change in similar policies as the national finance awards (GOP, 2000; Chaudhry, Khwaja and Qadir, 2005). Fiscal autonomy was the critical part of devolution. Under the LGO, the ZC had the power to levy certain taxes. The council may increase, reduce, suspend, abolish or exempt the levy of any tax for such period as may be specified by it. The procedure for levying new taxes has been made transparent. No tax can be levied without inviting public objections (GOP, 2000). However, all taxes before levied have to be vetted by provincial governments.

Structure and Composition

Pakistan. The DG is the highest and most important tier in the structure of LGS. The DG is composed of the ZN and NZN, the ZC and the DA. The Union Councillors of the district elect the ZN and NZN as joint candidates. An Union Nazim (UN) who is directly elected becomes a member of the ZC. Each Union therefore, send one representative to the ZC. The number of general seats in the ZC varies depending on the number of unions in the district. In addition to the general seats, the ZC is to have 33% seats (33% total number of Union Councils within the district) reserved for women, 5% (5% of total number of Union Councils within the district) reserved for workers/pastants and minorities (Ministry of Local Government, 2000). A total of 100 members of the ZC are elected. The Members of the Union Councils of the entire district also serve as the Electoral College for the election of candidate to reserved seats. No ZN or NZN can hold the same office for more than two terms. The Structure of the DG is shown below in a flow-chart:

DISTRICT GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN

Local Government Ordinance (LGO) has defined the authority of the DG, which comprises the operation, management and control of the offices of the departments, which have been decentralized to it. The DG exercises such authority within the district in accordance with the general policy of the Government. The DG is responsible to the people and the Government for improvement of governance and delivery of services within the ambit of the authority decentralized to it under the LGO (GOP, 2006). The Zila Nazim (ZN) as the head of the DG performs such functions and exercises such powers as have been assigned to him under the Ordinance. He has to ensure that the business of the DG is carried out in accordance with the provisions of the LGO and other laws in force for the time being.

Zila Nazim. The ZN provides political leadership for the development of the district influences the policies that can improve both the current quality of life and the future development prospects of a district. The ZN has to create a development vision for the district, integrating the roles and resources of the administration, private sector, civil society organizations and local level institutions (GOP, 2006). The vision is realized through the development plans and budget that the ZN is required to submit to the Zila Council (ZC) for approval.

District Government Structure and Staffing

District establishments are composed of federal and provincial civil servants, the employees of defunct ZC, and staff of all group of offices devolved to the DG. A District Coordination Officer (DCO) who is a civil servant coordinator has been coordinating the activities of the District Administration (DA). The administration



Bangladesh. Out of three tier LGs structure for rural areas in Bangladesh, ZP stands at the apex. It has been subjected to many changes in terms of its structure and composition. Now a ZP comprises a Chairman, 15 members and 5 women members in the reserved seats (Siddiqui, 2005). The Chairman and members including women members, are elected by the members of an electoral college consisting of the Mayor and Commissioners of City Corporation, Upazila Parishad (UZP) Chairmen, Pourashova Chairmen and Commissioners, Union Parishad (UP) Chairmen and members within the jurisdiction of the district.

Fundamental Functions

Pakistan. The DG is responsible to the people and the Government for improvement of governance and delivery of services. The DG has to take the responsibility for agriculture, health, education, community development, information technology, law, literacy, revenue, works and services, finance and planning (Alam, 2004, GOP, 2006).

Bangladesh. ZPs have been given 12 compulsory and 68 optional functions. Compulsory functions of the ZPs are mainly concerned with infrastructure building while optional functions mainly relate to the promotion of education, culture, social development, public health, public works, local economy, religious institutions etc (Siddiqui, 2005).

Financial System

Pakistan. PFC has been constituted for allocation of resources from the provinces to districts, based on population, fiscal capacity, fiscal effort and specific needs etc of the districts (GOP, 2006). The DG has been provided a list of taxes in line with its functions. The funds are provided in accordance with the expenditure and revenue assigned to it and they are transferred as a single line item. Despite financial decentralization, DGs remain reliant on provincial and ultimately federal funds (Khan, 2006a).

Bangladesh. The ZPs are required to prepare their budgets annually and sanction their own budgets. The ZPs are empowered to levy taxes, rates and fees on 8 items. The ZPs are authorized to collect a community tax from adult males for the construction of public works of general utility (Siddiqui, 2005). The annual statements of account of ZPs are to be forwarded to the government which is the prescribed authority. These are to be audited by the Comptroller and Auditor-General in such a manner as he deems fit.

Personnel System

Pakistan. The DG is comprised of both federal and provincial civil officers and staffs as well as employees of respective council. The provincial government

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has created district service cadre comprising all posts of DG for decentralized functions with adequate monetary benefits and incentives for promotion and performance. As regards the employees of non-decentralized departments, DG is authorized to coordinate their functions (GOP, 2006).

Bangladesh. Every ZP has an organogram with two wings i.e. Technical wing that and Administrative wing that is approved by the government. It has 25 employees of 4 categories. A Chief Executive Officer (CEO), a senior-level government officer of the rank of Deputy Secretary (DS) and a Secretary, a mid-level government officer of the rank of Senior Assistant Secretary of the Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration), have been posted on deputation to run each of the ZP (Khalequzzaman, 1995, Ali, 2003). Employees other than Class I are appointed or promoted by the ZP after taking clearance and approval from the government.

Analysis of Zila Parishad of Bangladesh

Articles 9, 11, 59 and 60 of the Bangladesh constitution provide us an outline of a LGS with the elected representatives for effective participation of the people at each administrative unit of the Government. After independence, the Bangladesh Government renamed all the rural local bodies through the promulgation of President's Order number 7 of 1972. It has declared the Union, Upazila and Zila as administrative units for the purpose of carrying out constitutional provisions (Siddiqui, 2005). The district level LG has undergone major changes in terms of structure, composition, functions, financial resources and personnel system. The name District Council, was changed to Zila Board, and then to ZP. From the time of their inception, ZPs in Bangladesh have been placed under the DC and he/she continued to work as its Chairman. The term of ZP has been made 5 years but no election has been held for ZP so far. At present LGS in rural areas of Bangladesh provides three levels of structure: UP, UZP and ZP. People's perception about the role and functions of ZP, and their analytical/critical views in regards to its weaknesses are given in subsequent paragraphs.

Perceived as Threat. A strong urge to bring pragmatic changes in the ZP is lacking because a strong ZP is perceived by civil servants, political leaders and major political parties as a threat to their existing power. They do not wish to see a strong ZP due to the fear of losing their political power base (Siddiqui, 2005). On an average, in a district, there are four to five parliamentary constituencies. It is likely that an elected ZP Chairman would demand a protocol equivalent to that of a Minister that would bring the ZP Chairman into conflicts with the interests of the MPs of the district.

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Lack of Political Commitment. ZPs have not been given the chance to act as a working organization even after the emergence of Bangladesh. ZPs, as wheels of democracy and providers of services and contributors to local economy, have been adversely affected by the broad-scale changes made in the administrative from time to time. During democratic governments no real effort was taken to restore the ZP, precisely because of the Members Parliament (MP), cutting across the political divide, did not want any rivals in their constituencies. Therefore, no government since independence has shown any genuine interest and commitment to revive ZP as a feeder institution to promote future national leadership from the local level and also to provide good governance to locals.

Considered as Part of Bureaucracy and Emergence of UZP. Elections to the ZPs have not been held for a long time even after the passing of the ZP Act, 2000. So long ZPs have been functioning under the executive orders of the government and have therefore turned into bureaucratic agencies (Siddiqui, 2005:299). With the emergence of the UZP system as a strong body within the LGS, the importance of the ZP has further deteriorated. UZP has also been carrying out many functions that used to be performed by the ZP. Now the question has been raised by people whether this tier i.e. ZP, is at all necessary.

Lack of Adequate Fund. ZP is expected to develop the communication networks that connect the growth centres, market places, etc for easy and early traffic of goods and commodities that is a vital precondition to economic growth. Unfortunately, the role played by ZP has been rather limited because of paucity of funds and lack of autonomy (Ahmed, 1979). ZPs have to primarily depend upon government grants, which have been mostly inadequate in meeting the overall needs (Quddus, 2008).

Lack of Leadership. The ZP has never taken up many crucially important functions and services since its establishment. The reason behind this was not so much associated with financial constraints as it was with lack of leadership and initiative (Ahmed, 1984:83). It appears to that the absence of elected representation i.e. local leadership for years together, has been a major factor responsible for its poor performance.

Increased Role of Engineering Department vis-a-vis Diminished Role of ZP. After the independence of Bangladesh, the government established an Engineering Advisory Body (EAB) in each ZP. It was entrusted with the responsibility of assisting ZP and other LG bodies as well as evaluating the implementation of projects. Role of EAB as a provider of technical advisory services to the LG bodies began to increase. It was upgraded into the Local

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Government Engineering Bureau (LGEb) and later on, turned into the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED). Its responsibilities' roles began to expand from technical services to construction and maintenance of feeder roads, most of which previously belonged to ZP (Siddiqui, 2005). ZP had a large Engineering Set-Up, with the District Engineer (DE) at the top, which basically provided engineering services within the district. This moribund situation of ZP has provided the opportunity to LGED to expand rapidly and work at the nook and corner of district. At present, some amount of local level planning is also going on under the auspices of LGED. The involvement of local elected functionaries in this planning is generally of token nature.

Absence of Physical Presence of ZP in Local Areas. Beside LGED, almost every development ministry has got its line Engineering Departments (Public Works Department, Education Engineering Department, Public Health Engineering Department, Roads and Highways Department, Water Development Board Engineering Department etc) at the District and Upazila level. There are involved in infrastructural development activities in rural areas such as construction of educational institutions, roads, culverts, bridges, embankments, hospitals, health clinics etc. All these departments of the national government have become very well-established and sustainable departments with huge technical personnel and branches/wings stretching all over Districts and Upazilas (Siddiqui, 2005). At the moment instead of ZP, various government-engineering departments are performing the tasks of infrastructure and communication development at the district level. As a consequence, ZP is becoming less effective and people are getting fewer opportunities to participate in the development activities of their districts. For a long time, people have not seen any infrastructure and communication development works being undertaken by ZP. In other words, presence of ZP through its physical activities and through the eyes of the rural people has been conspicuously missing. As a result, people have lost interest in ZP.

Number of Tiers. Political analysts and researchers firmly believe that the number of tiers of government has important financial, administrative and political implications an underdeveloped country like Bangladesh cannot ignore (Siddiqui, 2005). Having three or more LG tiers in Bangladesh can impose great constraints on the government budget and restrict funds and grants, and result in stiff competition among the tiers for money, resources or taxes. Researchers also opine that confusion in regard to the roles of the LGs, functional overlaps, or overlapping of responsibilities, lack of coordination and strained relations among the tiers are most likely to develop if there are three-tiered or more LGs. It is worth mentioning here that the UP has a long heritage and has acted as a LG for over a century in

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Bangladesh (Ahmed, 1979). Under the reorganized set-up in the early eighties, each Upazila had an elected UZP that also generated tremendous amount of interests among the local people who considered it to be the focal point of all development activities. Rural people have a strong belief that both the UZP and UP as LGs could serve them adequately and they therefore are very comfortable with the UZP and UP system. As the UZP and UP function at the grass root level, the problems faced by rural communities can be easily identified and Parishad members can take measures to resolve them. On the other hand, ZP covers a wide area, people in villages or rural areas cannot identify themselves with the ZP. According to them, it hardly qualifies as a rural LG body (Siddiqui, 2005). Moreover, national government organizations directly administer all technical and development services under the integrated administrative system at the district level. For this reason, there is scope for ZP to get effective control over government activities or development activities in an area. Since ZP members are usually from the upper strata of the society and have no connection with the masses, people have shown no urge to strengthen it. They firmly believe that district can prove, coordinating and supervisory roles for the development and welfare of the people of the district.

Lessons Drawn From Pakistan District Government.

The lessons procedural by the Pakistan experience/exercise is summarized below:

- As head of the DG and elected people's representative, ZN enjoys supreme authority. Keeping in view 'Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely', the role and functions of ZN have been placed under scrutiny through various checks and balances.
- ZC has been made truly representative, having the provision for elected women, peasants, workers and minorities' representations in the body. ZC has been working as people's mini-parliament at the district level, like the National Parliament at the national level.
- ZC has a number of committees through which functions and performances of the elected representatives and officials of the DA are being observed, monitored and evaluated. ZC also ensures that the role, functions and activities of the ZN are much more democratic, transparent and responsive to the needs of the people.
- People's rights to information and their active participation in the decision-making process to take up development projects and plans of the district have been institutionalized through the formation of CCBs and CBOs.

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'Development of the people, by the people and for the people', in view CCBs have been formed in all Districts of Pakistan.

e. In respect of coordination among LGs of different tiers and intra-district coordination among the various departments/agencies, DG has got the authority to monitor and supervise activities of both elected representatives and officials of the administrations of the TG and UG. The Institution of ZMC is a unique idea and it has been very successful in ensuring proper resource management through mustering and coordinating limited resources for the balanced planning and development of a district.

f. Planning, mutual assignment of functions and fiscal transfers i.e. mutual adjustment of funds between and among the various tiers has been very effective in terms of facilitating/adopting a rational approach for the overall development of the district through linking different stakeholders of the society. As a result, complementary relationships between and among the various tiers have developed and a spirit of mutual respect, accommodation, better understanding, cooperation and above all a democratic culture has been established.

g. Allotment of adequate and fixed time-slot for extensive consultations and discussions prior to the preparation of the budget has been very productive, pragmatic and rewarding. This concept of draft budget has allowed the voice of the local people to be heard for the first time before the placement of the draft budget to the ZC for its review and final approval. Budgetary and fiscal transfers from the provincial government to the DG does not lapse or expire within a financial year and allotted funds can be retained by the DG until the completion of the development or project work (GOP, 2006).

h. Because of the bottom-up strategy instead of top-down approach for undertaking development plans and projects within the district, ZG as a LGI enjoys much more authority and executive power to approve and allocate funds for the projects without being dictated and suffering interference from the national government (Khan, 2006a).

j. DA has been thoroughly reorganized and restructured, and dovetailed to meet the requirements of the common people and placed under the people's representative to ensure accountability and transparency. Grouping of various district offices under an executive has been found to be more effective and target-oriented in terms of achievements made against the target and timely delivery of services to locals.

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LOCAL GOVERNANCE AT DISTRICT LEVEL FOR BANGLADESH: SOME ALTERNATIVE MODELS

Description of Model A

Characteristics/Striking Features.

- Name. Zila Government.
- Structure. There will be three-tiered LGIs for rural areas. Zila Government (ZG) stands at the apex and is, to be headed by a Zila Mayor (ZM) and to be deputized by a Zila Deputy Mayor (ZDM). Upazila Government (UZG) at the middle is to be headed by an Upazila Mayor (UZM) and Union Government (UG) at the bottom by a Union Mayor (UM). However, there will also be a Union Deputy Mayor (UDM) at the union level. Both UM and UDM will be elected on a joint ticket.
- Composition of Zila Government. ZG will be composed of Zila Council (ZC) and Zila Administration (ZA). ZDM will be the speaker of the ZC.
- Composition of Zila Council. UZMs, UMs and Mayors of all Municipalities within the district will be members of the ZC. The number of seats in the ZC will vary, depending on the number of the Upazilas, Unions and Municipalities in the district. A Number of seats will be reserved in the ZC for representation of disadvantaged groups (women, peasants, workers and minorities) from various Upazilas within the district.
- Election. ZM, ZDM and all the members of reserved seats will be indirectly elected through the Electoral College.
- Electoral College. The Mayor and Councillors of City Corporation, UZMs, Mayors and Councillors of Municipalities and members of Union Councils within the district will constitute the electoral.
- Zila Administration. The post of Zila Nirbahi Officer (ZNO) will be created to work as co-ordinating head of the DA abolishing the existing post of DC. There are more than 50 offices functioning at the district level (Ali, 2003, Khalequzzaman, 1995). These may be grouped suitably to bring synergy in their activities and each is to be headed by an Executive District Officer. ZA will be placed under the elected representative i.e. ZM and ZC.
- Functions and Funds. Fundamental functions of the ZG will be legislative. He will monitor, and approve the budget and development plans. Adequate funds should be earmarked and allotted for the ZG to reduce dependence on the national government, to enable it to promote good governance and become an effective service delivery system.

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j. Employment of Personnel. The personnel management system is to be placed at the hands of the ZG and there should be a separate service called the Local Government Service for employees of the ZC.

Analysis

- The ZG will be functioning as a more authoritative and empowered LGI than any other LG. It will also work as a democratic LG at the district level headed by an elected ZM.
- ZC will be truly represented by various sections of the society thus making it a focal point/hub of all activities of the district. ZDM will become the speaker of the ZC.
- ZC will be regrouped and reorganized under an executive officer and the post of DC will be renamed as ZNO who will have a coordinating role to perform.
- ZG will be composed of ZM, ZDM, ZC and ZA. It will have the planning and coordinating functions for the socio-economic and infrastructure development of the district. In addition, it will also have monitoring and supervisory roles over the UZG and UG.
- ZG can only be effective if other LGIs at the Union and Upazila level are restructured simultaneously. A holistic approach/view to decentralize the total LGS has to be considered. Otherwise restructuring only one tier will not bring about the desired results and changes in terms of providing good governance and essential services to locals.
- With its three tiers, LG would create a greater burden on the national government exchequer in providing grants and financial resources. This will create stiffer competition among the tiers for the limited resources (derived from taxation or revenue collection. With three tiers, functional overlap, lack of coordination and strained relations among the tiers are most likely to develop.

Description of Model B

Characteristics/Striking Features.

- Name. Zila Parishad.
- Structure. There will be three-tiered LGIs for rural areas. Zila Parishad (ZP) will be the highest tier to be headed by a Zila Mayor (ZM), Upazila Parishad (UZP) will be the second tier and will be headed by an Upazila Mayor (UZM), Union Parishad (UP) is to be the lowest tier and is to be headed

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by a Union Mayor (UM). However, ZA will be placed under the administrative control of the ZM.

c. Composition of Zila Parishad. All UZMs and Mayors of Class 1 Municipalities within the district will be members of the ZP. Number of seats in the ZP will vary, depending on the number of Upazilas and Class 1 Municipalities in the district. Few seats will be reserved in the ZP for representation of disadvantaged groups (women, peasants, workers and minorities) from various Upazilas within the district. Zila government officials will also be official members of the ZP.

d. Election. ZM and all members of reserved seats will be indirectly elected through the Electoral College.

e. Electoral College. The Mayor and Councilors of City Corporation, UZMs, Mayors and Councilors of Municipalities, UMs and members of the Union Councils within the district would constitute the college.

f. Zila Administration. The post of Zila Nirbahi Officer (ZNO) will be created. He will work as head of the ZA and he/she will also act as Member-Secretary of the ZP. ZA will be made accountable and responsible to the elected head i.e. ZM and the elected body i.e. ZP.

g. Functions and Funds. A major function of the ZP will be to prepare a Zila Development Plan, reflecting the potentials and needs of all Upazilas within the district. The ZP will also ensure the implementation of projects by concerned departments and coordination among departmental activities. Other functions of the ZP will be as follows:

- (1) Monitor the activities of the UZP.
- (2) Supervise and monitor the activities of colleges and other educational institutions located at the district level.
- (3) Identify and implement projects for inter-upazila connecting roads and bridges in the Zila Plan, etc. through concerned departments.
- (4) Supervise and monitor government hospitals and clinics at the district level.
- (5) Assist in the implementation of programmes undertaken by the national government and maintain contact with different ministries.
- (6) Provide assistance for expansion of trade and industries.
- (7) Maintain law and order, and formulate measures for prevention of terrorism and supervise the activities of the Police.

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Since 1971, LGS has kept on changing with every change of government. Unfortunately, the ZP in Bangladesh has always been in a moribund state and has been dysfunctional in terms of its democratization and delivery of good governance and essential services to locals (Siddiqui, 2005). The ZP's fact credibility has declined so much that people have shown much more interest in UZP and UP than in ZP.

From the in-depth analysis of the administrative and governance structure existing at the district level in Pakistan and Bangladesh, three alternative models of administration and governance structure have emerged which could be fitted into our system, provided we undertake decentralization and restructuring of our prevailing local governance at the district level. Having studied at length the comparative advantages of each model on the basis of the political, constitutional and administrative structure and character of the government, socio-political and economic realities of Bangladesh, this paper recommends, Model C, i.e. Zila Development and Coordination Committee for active consideration for Bangladesh.

GLOSSARY

Abbreviation	Meaning
CBO-	Community Based Organization
CCB-	Citizen Community Board
CEO-	Chief Executive Officer
DA-	District Administration
DC-	Deputy Commissioner
DCO-	District Coordination Officer
DDO-	Deputy District Officer
DFID-	Department for International Development
DG-	District Government
DM-	District Magistrate
DO-	District Officer
DPO-	District Police Officer
DPSC-	District Public Safety Committee

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h. The staffs and employees working at present in the ZP may be retained and should continue to function under the new system. There should be a separate service for the staffs and employees of the ZP to be called Local Government Service.

Analysis

a. Elected ZM will head the ZP and it will be comprise of both people's representatives and nominated government officials. For balanced representations in the ZP, disadvantaged groups of the society like women, peasants, workers and minorities will also be members of the ZP.

b. On the other hand ZP will enjoy more authority and exercise power over the administrative, operational and management aspects of various activities within the district.

c. Although ZA will not be the part of the ZP, ZM and ZP will have absolute administrative control over the functionaries/officials of the ZA. ZNO will be the coordinating head of the ZA. Through him/her, all district officials will be made answerable and accountable to the ZM and ZP. ZNO will assist the ZM and ZP and work in the capacity of Member-Secretary of the ZP.

d. ZP will have monitoring and supervisory roles over the activities/functions of the UZP and UP and their relationships will be complimentary to each other.

e. Because of its three tiers, LG will undoubtedly increase the administrative cost of the national government. Too many tiers create confusions and most of the time result in overlap of activities, jurisdictions and responsibilities of respective local bodies. There is a saying 'everybody's job is nobody's business' and this could happen if too many tiers exist in the LGS.

Description of Model C

Characteristics/Striking Features.

- a. Name. Zila Development and Coordination Committee (ZDCC).
- b. Structure. There will be two-tiered LGs for rural areas. Upazila Parishad (UZP) at the top will be headed by an Upazila Mayor (UZM). The Union Parishad (UP) at the bottom will be headed by a Union Mayor (UM). However, a ZDCC at the district level will be established. This is to be headed by a ZM, abolishing the existing ZP.
- c. Composition of Zila Development and Coordination Committee. All UZMs and Mayors of Class 1 Municipalities will be members of the ZDCC.

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DS-	Deputy Secretary
EAB-	Engineering Advisory Body
EDO-	Executive District Officer
GOP-	Government of Bangladesh
GOP-	Government of Pakistan
IPITT-	Immovable Property Transfer Tax
LG-	Local Government
LGC-	Local Government Commission
LGEB-	Local Government Engineering Bureau
LGED-	Local Government Engineering Department
LGI-	Local Government Institution
LGO-	Local Government Ordinance
LGS-	Local Government System
NZN-	Nalib Zila Nazim
PFC-	Provincial Finance Commission
PSC-	Public Safety Commission
RWP-	Rural Works Programme
TG-	Tehsil Government
TMA-	Tehsil Municipal Administration
TMO-	Tehsil Municipal Officer
TN-	Tehsil Nazim
TRO-	Technical Reporting Officer
TUMC-	Tehsil and Union Monitoring Committee
UA-	Union Administration
UDM-	Union Deputy Mayor
UG-	Union Government
UM-	Union Mayor
UNCDF-	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP-	United Nations Development Programme
UN-	Union Nazim
UP-	Union Parishad
USAID-	United States Agency for International Development
UZG-	Upazila Government

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The number of seats in the ZDCC will vary, depending on the number of Upazilas and Class 1 Municipalities within the district. Zila government officials will also become official members of the Committee.

d. Election. ZM will be indirectly elected through the Electoral College.

e. Electoral College. The Mayor and Councilors of City Corporation, UZMs, Mayors and Councilors of Municipalities, UMs and members of the Union Councils within the district will constitute the Electors College.

f. Zila Administration. The new post of Zila Nirbahi Officer (ZNO) will be created to work as head of the ZA. He/she will also act as Member-Secretary of the ZDCC.

g. Functions. ZDCC will plan, coordinate and review development projects and maintain communication between UP and UZP as well as UZP and the Zila Administration. The ZDCC could be assigned following functions:

- (1) To plan, identify and coordinate development projects and fix area-based priorities for development.
- (2) To resolve inter-upazila and inter-sectoral conflicts.
- (3) To coordinate and consolidate area planning at the district level in accordance with the national plan.
- (4) To plan, prepare and recommend development projects for their own areas and send these to the Ministry or Local Government Commission (LGC).

h. Employment of Personnel. The Existing ZP has 25 staff members and employees divided into 4 categories that have been approved by the government. These staff members and employees could continue to work under the ZDCC to provide administrative, technical and secretarial facilities and support.

Analysis

- a. ZDCC will mainly plan, supervise and coordinate all development activities within the district.
- b. Administrative and management costs of the national government will come down significantly or will be much less if LG is two-tiered instead of three-tiered.
- c. Relationships between the two tiers will be much more congenial and effective. Confusions in regard to functional jurisdiction and lack of coordination that have been prevailing among the three layers are likely to be removed.

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UZM-	Upazila Mayor
UZP-	Upazila Parishad
ZA-	Zila Administration
ZC-	Zila Council
ZDM-	Zila Deputy Mayor
ZDCC-	Zila Development and Coordination committee
ZG-	Zila Government
ZM-	Zila Mayor
ZN-	Zila Nazim
ZNO-	Zila Nirbahi Officer
ZP-	Zila Parishad

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d. As the number of LG tiers will be two instead of three, so LG will be in a better position to receive more funds and grants from the national budget. Therefore, the allotted funds and resources could be utilized in a the best possible manner for the infrastructural and socio-economic development of the district.

e. Tendency of the national government to reach the local community by-passing the LGs is likely to be curbed and the role/function of the national government could be taken over by committee members through their active engagement and participation in the development planning, supervision and monitoring of development activities within the district.

f. An elected ZM is going to head this ZDCC and the senior most-civil servant in the district i.e. ZNO would act as its Member-Secretary. ZDCC will work as an excellent interfacing institution where elected representatives, bureaucrats and technocrats can meet to formulate the development vision and plan of the district.

g. As ZM would not represent any particular constituency within the district, it is most likely that he or she is not going to challenge the existing power/political base of a MP. Therefore, it could be logically presumed that ZDCC is unlikely to face any resistance and opposition from stakeholders (political leaders and political parties and, top bureaucrats of the administration).

CONCLUSION

Over the decades, it has been seen that the provincial bureaucrats of Pakistan were the designated 'controlling authorities' of the LGs, and tended to undermine and over-ride them. This bred a colonial relationship of 'ruler' and 'subject' (Alam, 2004). It has been empirically been proved beyond any doubt that these structural and systemic disjoints, coupled with the absence of horizontal integration and the consequent inadequacy of functional coordination between the line departments, lead to inefficiency, corruption, lack of transparency, and was the root cause of the crisis of governance at the grass root level. Current reforms have changed the formal administrative structure by assigning responsibility and power to elected representatives of the people (Ayaz, 2003). A reorganized and restructured district administration has been tailored with monitoring to be done through specialized committees of the ZC and citizens (GOP, 2006). An effective and transparent system of distribution of resources between the provincial and district governments has been one of the cornerstones of the new system which has removed disparities and inequalities regarding resource allocation (Khan, 2006a).

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EXTERNAL FORCE PROJECTION IN THE GULF OF GUINEA AS A THREAT TO REGIONAL SECURITY: ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN MILITARY

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INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War was assumed to usher in an era of peace, stability and development. However, such hopes had been dashed. The post - Cold War era has been confronting a highly dynamic security environment far more complex, uncertain and threatening than anything nations had experienced before. While this is a time of promise and developing partnerships, it is also an era of irregular and increasingly intermittent conflicts. Adversaries unable and unwilling in some cases to face nation states have increasingly resorted to whatever means available to wreak havoc and destruction, physically, economically and psychologically, unhindered and unconstrained by conscience and civilized norms.

The changing security landscape that has emerged since the end of the Cold War continues to evolve in ways that were largely unforeseen just a few years ago. An increasingly inter-connected world is shaping our economic, political, and social realities in a manner that is in stark contrast to the previous century. The wide scope and unpredictable nature of this new landscape has compelled nations to develop new strategies that require the harmonization of the full spectrum of national power.¹

Regional co-operation has acquired increased importance with the end of the Cold War. The need to strengthen regional co-operation in Africa has also become imperative. While pursuing the goal of strengthening overall co-operation in Africa, priority may be accorded to the prospects for sub- regional co-operation. The Gulf of Guinea Commission by the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) states and the Joint Development Zone (JDZ) between Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe are examples.

Today, the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) states require the capacity to respond to threats to their maritime environment. Their ability to achieve optimum success in this security environment requires three essential elements: timely intervention to unanticipated challenges that will help mitigate or prevent crisis that are harmful to the nations' interests; the need to work closely with sub- regional partners to

enhance regional security; and institutional innovations that contribute to comprehensive coordination throughout the interagency and within the framework of the international community.²

The geo-political area referred to as the GoG lies between latitude 20°N and 45°N on the African coast. The region is a diverse mix of eight energy-rich South Atlantic littoral states. They are: Nigeria, Angola, the Republic of Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo Brazzaville, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Gabon, and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe. These countries form the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). This wide expanse of water has, on the one hand, facilitated the free movement of vessels but it has, or the other, also enabled drug and small arms trafficking, illegal oil bunkering, and kidnapping and armed attacks on coastal oil facilities. In addition, asymmetric attacks on oil facilities, hostage taking and infiltration of terrorist cells and mercenaries into the area have tarred this region of relative peace and security into a cauldron of instability.

It will therefore, be instructive to find out if any instability in the region negatively impact on the economies of not only the countries of the region, but also the economies of the industrialized world that has made the oil of the region part of their wider national security objectives.³ As global demand for energy continues to rise, major players like the United States, the European Union (EU), and Japan are facing a new competitor in the race to secure long-term energy supplies China. China is intent on getting the resources needed to sustain its rapid growth and has thus turned to Africa to look for oil and other raw materials.

Given this, situation it can be argued that the security of the GoG will guarantee the economic survival of member states. This implies that security in the GoG is of paramount importance not only the member states, but also to the United States and its allies in the western world as well as some Asian countries. However, the GoG has to cope with numerous challenges, both exogenous and endogenous, before it can fully benefit from its riches. One of these problems stems from the weak institutions and governance seen in the countries of the region which add to the risks of "natural resource curse" which fits the theory of the Paradox of Plenty.⁴

² Dokubo, C., Africa's 'Security in the 21st Century' in Akintidele, R. and Bassay, A, eds Beyond Conflict Resolution: Nnamdi Publishers, 2000, p.84

³ East and Central Africa Division, Africa 1 Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Gulf of Guinea and the Challenges Ahead, 2008, p.1

⁴ Damian Ondo Mutie, Emergence of Gulf of Guinea Economy: Prospects and Challenges, IMF Office of the Executive Director, 2005.

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