



ENHANCING MARITIME SECURITY FOR TRADE AND ECONOMY: POLICY MEASURES FOR EFFECTIVE MARITIME SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN BANGLADESH

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Abstract: Security assures prosperity. This is equally applicable in securing maritime environment in the Bay of Bengal (BoB) in deriving much desired benefits from maritime trade and economy. However, Non-Traditional Maritime Security (NTMS) threats e.g. smuggling, piracy and armed robbery/ petty thefts, human trafficking etc. and maritime safety issue e.g. maritime accidents etc. remain as impediment in ensuring secured environment in the BoB. Although 28 or more number of ministries, government/ non-government organisations, private stakeholders are involved in management of these threats/ issues, lack of maritime security governance is hindering optimum outcome. In this backdrop, the research has focused on devising policy measures to address the NTMS threats and safety issue taking the maritime community of Bangladesh in cognisance. Due to pattern of subject, cross-sectional descriptive research has been conducted under non-experimental research. Primarily qualitative analysis based upon content analysis, Key Informant Interview (KII), field survey, Focused Group Discussion (FGD), case study has been conducted. Research derivative outlines that policy of designating lead ministry and lead stakeholder for each of the NTMS threats/ safety issues are expected to enhance maritime security in harnessing better output for maritime trade and economy.


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INTRODUCTION

Security assures prosperity. This is also true in maritime arena. With glorious maritime history of Bangladesh, the maritime sector offers glaring hopes of opportunities to this population burdened country with limited land resources. Establishment of jurisdiction over a sea area of 1,18,813 sq km with extended Continental Shelf in the Bay of Bengal (BoB) have raised the aspirations of the people which is also echoed in adaptation of the 'Blue Economy' by the Government of Bangladesh (Iqbal, 2019). Maritime resources are an important source of nutrition for population of Bangladesh. The BoB is considered to be rich in deposits of hydro-carbon energy. Maritime flows, representing 90% of the external trade, are the lifeblood of Bangladesh's trade and is crucial for future economic well-being (Alam, 2019). The magnitude of maritime economic activities has increased in manifold and is expected to rise exponentially with economic development of the country.

Figure 1: NTMS Threats/Safety Issues Involving Various Maritime Stakeholders in the BoB



Source: Author Generated

There are number of Non-Traditional Maritime Threats (NTMS) threats like maritime terrorism and robbery/ petty thefts, smuggling etc. which may destabilize the maritime security in the BoB. Besides, maritime safety issue e.g. maritime accident also needs to be addressed effectively. The NTMS threats and safety issues are outcome of non-state actors primarily. There are different ministries, government departments, organization e.g. Ministry of Defence (MOD), Ministry of Shipping (MoS), Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (MoLJ&PA), Bangladesh Navy (BN), Bangladesh Coastguard (BCG), Department of Shipping (DoS), Customs, maritime ports, etc. who deal above NTMS threats and safety issues. However, overlapping responsibility of stakeholders are found while vacuum of responsible agency are prevalent in case of other threats/ safety issues. These affects the good order at sea which, in turn, will remain as an obstacle in attaining much desired maritime trade and economic development.

The GoB has adopted Blue Economy to exploit the maritime resources in the BoB focusing on 26 thrust sectors in maritime trade, maritime ports, exploration of living and non-living resources, maritime tourism etc. (MOFA, 2018). It is needless to say that the sustainable economic activities in attaining vision of the 'Blue Economy' can only take place sustainably in a secured maritime environment. The much desired opening of coastal shipping routes, increase in volume of maritime trade, planned exploitation of seabed resources amidst growing dominance of NTMS threats demands proactive and coordinated approach. Maritime protection mechanism for marine fisheries, offshore installations, smuggling and maritime safety, maritime accidents needs coordinated management by the concerned stakeholders.

Since the maritime security threats and safety issues take place at sea, away from the eyes of general mass, adequate attention is yet to be paid at national level. In order to ensure unhindered economic development, the security and safety at the BoB needs to be ensured as sea is gateway of economy of Bangladesh. An effective maritime governance structure is yet to be made functional in Bangladesh to deal with the non-traditional maritime security threats and safety issues in the BoB. In this backdrop, a research has been carried out with primary objective on working out suitable maritime governance in Bangladesh perspective. The outcome of the research is expected to enhance non-traditional maritime security in the BoB which will facilitate maritime trade and economy for Bangladesh.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The nature, extent and effects of NTMS threats and safety issues of Bangladesh Maritime area as element of maritime security¹ have been analysed in various researches (Beuger, 2015). While trans-border connections are evident in few of the NTMS threats, most of other NTMS threats and safety issues which affect the good order at sea² have domestic origin and links. For transnational linked NTMS threats, cooperative engagements have been recommended. Designation of Lead agency and organisational structures have been envisaged for few of the NTMS threats on piecemeal basis while number of NTMS threats and safety issues were not discussed. In addition, creation of an apex body to coordinate the maritime threats e.g. National Maritime Division (NMD) and formulation of Maritime Policy have been discussed as part of development of better maritime security governance³ in Bangladesh. However, the NMD or the Policy has not seen light of publication in history of Bangladesh in last five decades. Regional cooperative forums e.g. the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) have developed framework to address the non-traditional maritime security threats like piracy, maritime terrorism, smuggling, and human trafficking in respective area. For example, BIMSTEC has established initiatives like the BIMSTEC Sub-Group on Human Trafficking (BIMSTEC, 2023). IORA also focus on NTMS threats like piracy, terrorism, and illegal fishing. However, not much effects of these regional initiatives can be felt in Bangladeshi maritime domain. Thus, the challenges posed by NTMS security threats and safety issues may undermine the good order at sea. Same will increase as maritime activities is expected to have exponential growth in future.

Research Gap. Effective maritime governance for Bangladesh to enhance maritime security in the BoB in mitigating the NTMS threats and safety issues to facilitate maritime trade and economy is yet to be worked out.

¹ Bangladesh faces many maritime security challenges that have both traditional and non-traditional characteristics such as great power rivalry; piracy and armed robbery/petty theft; trafficking of arms, drugs and people; illegal fishing and poaching; marine accidents; and finally, resource management (Islam, 2019).

² Good order at sea ensures safety and security of shipping and permits countries pursue their maritime interests and develop their maritime resources. Threats to good order at sea includes piracy and armed robbery, maritime terrorism, illicit trafficking in arms and drugs, people smuggling, illegal fishing, natural hazards, pollution etc. (Bateman, Ho & Chan, 2009).

³ Maritime security governance refers to the management and administration of relevant stakeholders of maritime security, including the development of policies and procedures, allocation of resources, and oversight of operations. The goal of maritime security governance is to ensure that the stakeholders operate in a safe, secure, efficient, and sustainable manner, while also contributing to the economic development of the region.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Broad Objective. The broad objective of the research is to identify effective maritime governance for Bangladesh to enhance maritime security in the BoB in mitigating the NTMS threats and safety issues for maritime trade and economy.

Specific Objectives. The specific objectives of the research are as follows:

- To study the nature and extent of NTMS threats and safety issues in the BoB.
- To analyse the existing maritime security governance structure in dealing the NTMS threats and safety issues.
- To ascertain the policy measures to develop effective maritime governance in enhancing secure maritime environment in the BoB in mitigating NTMS threats and safety issues.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Primary Question. What are the policy measures to develop effective maritime governance in Bangladesh to enhance maritime security in the BoB in mitigating the NTMS threats and safety issues for maritime trade and economy?

Secondary Questions. The Secondary Questions of the research are as follows:

- What is the nature and extent of NTMS threats and safety issues in the BoB?
- How is existing maritime security governance structure dealing the NTMS threats and safety issues?
- What are the policy measures to develop effective maritime governance in enhancing secure maritime environment in the BoB in mitigating NTMS threats and safety issues?

RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS

Designation of lead agencies for each NTMS threats and safety issues will improve effectiveness of maritime governance in Bangladesh to enhance maritime security in the BoB.

METHODOLOGY

Due to pattern of subject, cross-sectional descriptive research has been conducted under non-experimental research. Both primary and secondary source materials are used. Case study on the NTMS threat has also been carried out. Statistical data on the NTMS threats and safety issues has been collected from various government organizations, websites to analyse current trends and effects on maritime environment.

Content Analysis. Available books, journals, periodicals, research papers on related subjects from various sources has been extensively analysed. Relevant Government and Non-governmental documents have been consulted.

Interviews and Lectures. Ten relevant government officials, organisational heads/ officials who were working at maritime security policy making and execution level had been consulted/ interviewed as Key Informant Interview (KII). Information from various lectures, seminar, and symposiums on subject has been used as sources.

Field Survey. Opinion of 79 maritime professionals and security practitioners who were working on ground in BN, BCG, marine fisheries and had been studying maritime security issues at mid-level e.g. Armed Forces War Course (AFWC), Staff course has been taken following Stratified Sampling under Probability Sampling Method. The sample size has been calculated following formula:

$$n = \frac{z^2 pq}{\epsilon^2} \times d.e$$

Where, n = Sample size

z = z score at 95% is the confidence level = 1.96

p = Proportion of respondents who have adequate knowledge of port operations and have the urge to respond to the survey = 0.5 (Since this information is not available, the study considers the proportion to be 0.5 which will give the maximum sample size requirement)

q = 1 – p = 0.5

€ = Maximum error consideration = 10% = 0.1

d.e = Design Effect = 0.82 (Since the interclass correlation coefficient value is not available; the study considers a moderate effect 1.71)

$$n = \frac{1.96^2 \times 0.5 \times 0.5}{0.1^2} \times 0.82 = 78.7528 \approx 79$$

n = 79 (Sample size for this research)

Focused Group Discussion (FGD). FGD has been conducted through semi-structured questionnaire. The sample group was nominated from security experts/enforcement practitioners/ planners, BN/BCG staff officers and member of the Armed forces who are studying NTMS threats. The BN survey group consisted of planners and senior staff at NHQ who participates in policy discussion, decision making process and planning. In addition, Commanding Officers (CO) of BN fleet and BCG has been included as they are the stakeholders on ground.

Case Study. Causal analysis of rise of piracy off the Horn of Africa is presented in short. Case study on 2008 Mumbai Attacks and subsequent measures taken by Indian authorities to develop maritime security mechanism has been carried out in this regard. Thus, development of maritime security governance structure in regional level has been studied to analyse what is being done in similar background of socio-politico-economic- security situation.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Ethical considerations e.g. voluntary participation, non-disclosure commitment, informed consent, privacy, objectivity and research integrity has been followed in conducting the research.

LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

Reliable data on the NTMS threats and safety issues in the BoB perspective have conflicting interpretations as data and definitions accepted by few of the international organisation e.g. ReCAAP is not accepted in Bangladesh parlance. Besides, assessing the efficacy of recommended policy measures are also limitations of the research as the issues are related to security and not every aspect can be quantified by numerical figures.

NTMS THREATS AND SAFETY ISSUES IN THE BOB

Non Traditional Security (NTS) threats are the challenges to existence and well-being of citizen and states that arise from non military sources e.g. Non-State Actors due ideological variations, limited enforcement, resource paucity, human rights violation, climate change, and transnational crime. These NTS issues on land frequently transgress into the maritime domain. Such transgressions have facilitated widespread proliferation of NTS threats across the BoB. These include maritime terrorism, piracy and armed robbery/ petty thefts, smuggling, gun running, drugs trafficking, illegal immigration/ human trafficking, poaching, threats to offshore installations, maritime assets and port security etc. (Yasmin, 2021). Besides, various maritime safety issues e.g. maritime accidental also challenges the survival and well-being of the population.

NATURE AND EXTENT OF NTMS THREATS AND SAFETY ISSUES IN THE BOB

Maritime Terrorism. Although there is no record of incident related to maritime terrorism in Bangladesh waters, such incidents at global and regional sphere indicate that the merchant ships and offshore installations of the BoB may fall prey to maritime terrorism. An attack on such soft targets is likely to cause widespread casualties, undermine the national maritime security governance structure, and may increase the insurance of shipping. A case study on 2008 Mumbai Attacks demonstrates severe implications of maritime terrorism on security at land.

Figure 2: Route of LeT Attackers from Pakistan to Mumbai



Source: Marinebuzz, 2018

Case Study on 2008 Mumbai Attacks. According to the sole attacker captured alive after the Mumbai attacks 2008, Ajmal Kasab, the attackers started from Karachi onboard ship AL HUSSEINI, and then seized an Indian fishing trawler named KUBER in the Indian waters to take cover to reach Indian coast in Mumbai (D'Souza, 2018). The attacker informed that KUBER had been noticed by an Indian Navy or Coast Guard vessel, but was not stopped. The sighting of KUBER by law enforcing agencies prompted the attackers to leave the trawler and begin their final movement to land of approximately 6 km distance on small inflatable boat. Local police/ intelligence agencies did not notice the incursion.

They divided into small teams and moved for their own targets on reaching shore. At least 174 people died, including 20 security force personnel, 26 foreign nationals and 9 attackers, and more than 300 were injured in next 04 days mayhem caused by them (Britannica, 2025). This maritime terrorism incident exposed the lacuna in surveillance gaps in maritime security agencies, lack of intelligence coverage and coordination gaps in dealing the incident by the related stakeholders ashore.

Gun Running. Although there is no incident of gun running in recent days, there were reports of links between the traffickers and several crime quarters in the coastal areas for inland transportation of the illegally trafficked arms. These reports suggested that the port city of Chattogram and its adjoining areas, mainly the hill districts of Bandarban, Khagrachhari and Cox's Bazar are used by the underworld criminals as the major shipment point of illegal arms trade and smuggling (Independent, 2019).

Piracy and Armed Robbery/Petty Thefts. The Merchantmen and artisan Bangladeshi fishermen fall prey to occasional robbery and dacoity in Bangladesh water. There are debates whether this type of armed robbery or dacoity at sea are to be recorded as 'Piracy' as per definitions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and International Maritime Bureau (IMB) (Azad, 2009). Statistics on Piracy and Armed Robbery as per BN and BCG indicates declining trend. However, the artisan fishermen of Bangladesh are facing grave consequences off coastal area. A risk assessment by Enodoglobal.inc reported that over 2000 piracy incidents took place in Bangladeshi waters with pirates attacking over 1,000 fishing boats, kidnapping more than 3,000 fishermen, murdering over 45 of them and collecting more than \$1.28 million in ransoms between 2012-14 (Enodoglobal, 2019).


Drug Trafficking. Different literature indicates that proximity of Bangladesh to opiate producing centres like the 'Golden Triangle', 'Golden Crescent' makes the country a viable transit place. Besides, reports of drug addiction by the Bangladeshi youths indicate the ingress of Yaba, Phensedyl etc. from the neighbouring countries over the sea and the rivers in the confluence (Business Standard, 2024).

Human Trafficking. According to the office of the UNHCR, human trafficking business worth around Tk 800 crore is run through the BoB (Daily Star, 2015). In addition to poverty and unemployment, racial violence against the Rohingyas in Rakhine state in Myanmar are root causes of increased rate of human trafficking

in the BoB (Benson, 2020). Prevention of human trafficking has become a multi-sectoral, multi-national affairs as causes of trafficking lies in migration, social-economic-political structure in country of origin, law enforcement at land-sea and various issues.

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing and Poaching⁴. Traditional artisan boats (non-mechanized and mechanized) as well as the trawlers affect marine eco-system as they illegally use bottom trawling extensively damaging the habitats of marine ecology in coastal and offshore waters in the BoB. Poaching activities also takes place in south-western, south and south-eastern boundaries of Bangladesh maritime area by fishermen from few of the neighbouring countries (banglanews24.com, 2014). IUU fishing and poaching cause irrevocable socio-economic damage to concerned coastal communities and their states.

Figure 3: The Somali Piracy Threat in the North-Western Indian Ocean



Source: Ramos, 2017

Case Study on IUU Fishing and Impact on NTMS. A case in point is the beginning of piracy in Somalian waters due to damage of local coastal subsistence economy based on traditional fishing practices by large scale unregulated commercial fishing in fish rich Somalian waters after the collapse of Somali central government in 1995 (Mahmood, 2024 and Business Standard, 2024). Thus, it

⁴ Poaching has been defined as the illegal hunting or capturing of wild animals, usually associated with land use rights. However, poaching at sea means the illegal fishing by fishermen from other country.

demands that the fishing regulations on overfishing, marine activities affecting fish habitat and spawning grounds, poaching etc. need close cooperation between marine fisheries researchers, concerned ministries, fishing population and the Law Enforcing Agencies (LEAs).


Smuggling. There is large scale confiscation of smuggled goods by the BN and BCG in the BoB (BN & BCG, 2025). It can be assumed that number of items also go unnoticed in the BoB considering limited resources and capacity of the LEAs at vast space of the sea. There are limitations in information gathering and sharing.

Security of Offshore Installations and Maritime Ports. Bangladesh has installed two Floating Storage and Re-gasification Unit (FSRU) at sea at about 7 km off Moheshkhali for supplying 1000 MMSCFD (Million Standard Cubic Feet Per Day) of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). Three more FSRUs are expected to be installed at Kutubdia, Moheshkhali and Payra port in future depending upon requirement (Petrobangla, 2021). Once completed, these offshore installations will be vital to the energy security of nation and will require protection. These will necessitate new security mechanism demanding designation of competent Law Enforcing Agency and other necessary measures. Besides, security of existing 03 maritime ports has to be also planned within framework of National Maritime Security.

Maritime Accidents. IMO has allocated Search and Rescue Region (SRR) of Bangladesh in 1996, which include the whole of Bangladesh Land area, its EEZ and a portion of Myanmar waters. Since the unveiling of Global Maritime Distress Signaling System (GMDSS), establishment of a national SAR organization has become essential. In case of failure to attain adequate capacity to ensure maritime search and rescue, re-allocation of SRR to another state may take place. This will permit the warships of other states to enter Bangladesh waters without prior notice either on real or on synthetic calls for rescue, both, during war and peace. Such a situation will have serious implications on national security. Apart from this, the coastal and inland vessels fall victim to maritime accidents frequently due to various reasons. Thus, SAR issues needs to be coordinated at national level to address maritime accidents and SAR in Bangladesh waters.

Result on Survey on State of Governance in Maritime Area. A Survey had been carried out among the maritime professionals and security practitioners on their opinion on present state of maritime security governance in dealing the NTMS threats and safety issues in the BoB. It is evident that maximum is in opinion that the measures are inadequate and more needs to be done.

Figure 4: Survey on State of Governance in Dealing NTMS Threats and Safety Issues



MARITIME SECURITY GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE IN BANGLADESH

Although the maritime area seems to be vast area of water body with no tangible appearance of anything to general mass, it is, indeed, workplace of many stakeholders who contribute to the maritime domain. Many of these stakeholders have specific responsibilities although they may not have sea going capacity to perform their responsibilities at sea. Responsibilities of different Government organisations are specified in “Rules of Business - 1996” of Government which has been updated in 2017. Moreover, the role and implied tasks have also been assigned to different stakeholders by the Government time to time.

Maritime Security Governance Structure. There are approximately 28 different ministries, department/organisations working in the maritime sector in Bangladesh. Ministry of Shipping (MoS), Armed Forces Division (AFD), Ministry of Defence (MoD), Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources (MoPEMR), Ministry of Fisheries & Livestock (MoFL), Ministry of Finance (MoF) and Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF) are operating at the ministerial level. While the Department of Shipping (DoS), Directorate of Fisheries (DoF), Mercantile Marine Department (MMD), Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Authority (BIWTA), Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Corporation (BIWTC), Bangladesh Shipping Corporation (BSC), Chattogram Port Authority (CPA), Mongla Port Authority (MPA), Payra Port Authority (PPA) etc. are the regulating departments at different sectors; BN, BCG, BGB, Nou Police, RAB, Department of Fire Service & Civil Defence (FS&CD), Ansar and VDP, Customs etc. are the Law Enforcing Agencies (LEAs) and working bodies on ground in the maritime arena.

Analysis of Maritime Security Governance Structure. Study of the Rules of Business and responsibilities of different Ministries and other stakeholders show that their focus remains primarily on administrative and economic issues. The security factors do not receive due level of attention and resource allocation by the concerned, primarily due to lack of security awareness at maritime sector. A few of the NTMS threats and safety issues are dealt by concerned ministry/ stakeholders, mostly, on individual basis. Thus, the NTMS threats and safety issues are not coordinated by any apex maritime regulatory body at higher level. However, the maritime issues, as the nature is different from land based issues and takes place beyond presence of the general mass, demands a different approach to deal them in coordinated manner. Overall, it is evident that vacuum in maritime security governance persists in the BoB.

Maritime Security Policy Framework. Sustainable Blue Economy and blue growth for sustainable development can not be ensured without ensuring maritime security, protection and preservation of marine environment, conservation of marine living resources and prevention of marine pollution. A national level policy framework on maritime issues encompassing maritime security; preservation and protection of marine environment etc. can provide necessary guideline to all concerned stakeholders. However, there is no such national maritime security policy in vogue in Bangladesh. Number of South-east Asian countries e.g. the Philippines, Indonesia are working to develop policies to improve upon the maritime security at national and regional level (Clerc & et al., 2023). These Maritime policies mostly focus on sustainable use of the resources of the sea and coastal areas with a holistic approach to involve and encourage the participation of relevant stakeholders through cooperation. Survey conducted among the maritime professionals indicate that requirement of National Maritime Policy for Bangladesh is also felt. Such Policy is required to be developed at national level which had been echoed by the Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh during the workshop titled “Blue Economy National Coordination” held in June 2018 (Dhaka Tribune, 2018).

Responsibilities of Concerned Stakeholders as per ‘Rules of Business’/ Functions/Role in dealing NTMS Threats and Safety Issues. The Foregoing discussion has shown that vacuum of maritime security governance structure exists at present in maritime arena in Bangladesh. At this juncture, study is required on responsibilities of the concerned stakeholders to find out whether adequate responsibility is allotted to stakeholder to address the NTMS threat/maritime safety issues and whether any of the stakeholders are taking ‘lead’ to coordinate among themselves. In addition, it is important to identify whether duplication of

efforts or vacuum of responsibility persists in addressing any particular threat/safety issues. Reference for this Study are ‘Rules of Business’ of the Government of Bangladesh 2017, Charter of Duties of stakeholders as per websites/other authentic references etc. Outcome of the Study has been described in sequence of the NTMS threats and safety issues in subsequent paragraphs.

Maritime Terrorism, Piracy and armed robbery/petty thefts and Gun Running.

Responsibilities of the concerned stakeholders in dealing these NTMS threats are:

Table 1: Responsibilities in Curbing Maritime Terrorism, Piracy and Gun Running

Serial	Departments	Responsibilities
1.	MOHA	Anti-smuggling and related matters.
2.	MoD	Nothing mentioned.
3.	MOFA	Piracies and crimes committed on the high seas.
4.	BCG	1. Piracy control. 2. Prevent trafficking of illegal arms. 3. Operation against armed robbery at sea. 4. Prevention and suppression of subversive and extremist activities. Support other concerned authorities in this regard.
5.	BGB	1. Piracy control. 2. Counter Terrorism operation.
6.	Police	Crisis management against terrorist attacks
7.	RAB	Conduct Counter-Terrorism Operation.
8.	BN	1. Conduct Anti-piracy operations. 2. Conduct counter gun running operations.
9.	Customs	Nothing mentioned.
10.	DoS	Focal point in Bangladesh for ReCCAP agreement (Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia).
10.	Sea Port Authorities e.g CPA, MPA, PPA	To protect the interest of maritime shipping and port facilities against security threat and incident in light of ISPS code.
11.	NSI, DGFI	Collect, collate, evaluate and disseminate intelligence to concerned stakeholders to counter terrorism.

Source: Generated by Author from Concerned Organisation/ Websites

Analysis. Number of stakeholders are given with function to act against maritime terrorism, piracy and armed robbery/ petty thefts and gun running. Some of these stakeholders have been assigned with responsibilities without possessing necessary resources and capabilities. On ground, high intensity anti-piracy drives are conducted by BN and BCG patrol teams. However, specific intelligence on maritime terrorism and gun running are required to conduct effective drive against these threats in vast sea area. More coordination amongst the stakeholders will enable enforcing the ‘zero tolerance policy’ of Government against terrorism.

Drug Trafficking. Responsibilities of the concerned stakeholders in dealing drug trafficking are:

<i>Table 2: Responsibilities in Curbing Drug Trafficking</i>		
Serial	Departments	Responsibilities
1.	MOHA	Prevention of trafficking of Narcotics and Drugs.
2.	MoD	Nothing mentioned.
3.	AFD	Nothing mentioned.
4.	Department of Narcotics Control	1. Intelligence gathering, conducting raids and search, seizure, arrest. 2. Trial of drug offences.
5.	BCG	Operation against drug trafficking.
6.	BGB	Counter drug trafficking operation across International Boundary (IB).
7.	Police	Nothing mentioned. However, Police conducts Anti-drugs trafficking drive on regular basis.
8.	RAB	1. Intelligence collection on Drug trafficking. 2. Conducts Operations to counter drug trafficking.
9.	BN	Conducts Operations to counter drug trafficking.
<i>Source: Generated by Author from Concerned Organisation/Websites</i>		

Analysis. Good number of stakeholders are assigned with responsibility to conduct counter drug trafficking operations in land and in maritime area. However, the propensity of the problem of drug addiction at national level indicates that the drives cannot fulfill desired goal. Information gathering and coordinated operations by the stakeholders is expected to bring better output.

Human Trafficking. Responsibilities of the concerned stakeholders in dealing Human Trafficking are:

<i>Table 3: Responsibilities in Curbing Human Trafficking</i>		
Serial	Departments	Responsibilities
1.	MOHA	1. Immigration, 2. Passports, visa, permits, etc.
2.	Ministry of Expatriate's Welfare and Overseas Employment	Welfare of Bangladeshi expatriates and protection of their rights.
3.	BCG	Prevention of illegal immigration through the sea and human trafficking.
4.	BGB	Check human trafficking including women and children and other cross border crimes.
5.	Police	Combating human trafficking, especially women and children.
6.	BN	Interception of illegal immigrants at sea.
7.	Ansar and VDP	Mass awareness to counter human trafficking.
8.	RAB	Counter human trafficking operations.
9.	NSI, DGFI	Nothing mentioned specifically. However, the agencies remain concerned with the issue.
<i>Source: Generated by Author from Concerned Organisation/ Websites</i>		

Analysis. Different LEAs work on respective domain e.g. Police/ RAB on land, BCG/ BN at sea, although the human traffickers traverse over each of the domain having strong network. Close coordination between the LEAs working at land and sea are required. Close monitoring of vicious circle of traffickers at land is missing at present as Human Trafficking originates at land. Besides, intelligence gathering and sharing of information on the traffickers with BCG/ BN are required to receive pinpoint information of location and time of human trafficking.

Poaching and Fisheries Protection. Responsibilities of the concerned stakeholders are:

Table 4: Responsibilities to Counter Poaching and Fisheries Protection

Serial	Departments	Responsibilities
1.	MoFL including Marine Fisheries Department (BMFD)	Fishing and fisheries beyond territorial waters (including deep sea fishing), fish harbour, fish quality-testing, laboratories and other ancillary organizations.
2.	MOFA	Questions of fishery rights in the high seas.
3.	BCG	Fisheries protection.
4.	BN	Protection of the Bangladesh fishing fleet and prevention of illegal fishing.
5.	Bangladesh Fishing Trawlers Association	Nothing mentioned.

Source: Generated by Author from Concerned Organisation/Websites

Analysis. BN and BCG are given with specific responsibility for fisheries protection as LEAs. BMFD has also responsibility to monitor operations of fishing vessels as Regulatory Body. Necessary coordination between the Regulatory Body and the LEAs need to be done through concerted effort to prevent poaching.

Smuggling. Responsibilities of the concerned stakeholders are:

Table 5: Responsibilities in Curbing Smuggling

Serial	Departments	Responsibilities
1.	MOHA	Anti-Smuggling and related matters.
2.	BCG	Prevention of smuggling.
3.	BGB	Prevent smuggling and other trans-border crimes.
4.	Police	Conduct anti-smuggling operations.
5.	BN	Counter-contraband operations mounted to combat smuggling of a wide range of illicit goods.
6.	Customs	Prevention of smuggling of any goods within the territorial waters of Bangladesh.
7.	NSI, DGFI	Collect, collate, evaluate and disseminate intelligence to concerned stakeholders.
8.	Sea Ports	Nothing mentioned.

Source: Generated by Author from Concerned Organisation/Websites

Analysis. Different LEAs work on respective spheres e.g. Police/ RAB, BGB on land and BN, BCG at sea, although the smugglers have roots at land which traverse to coast and to the sea. Thus, close coordination between the LEAs are required. Intelligence gathering and sharing of information among concerned stakeholders is necessary on the anti-smuggling effort to pinpoint the location and time.

Threats to Offshore Installations and Maritime Ports. Responsibilities of the concerned stakeholders are:

Table 6: Responsibilities for Threats to Offshore Installations and Port Security

Serial	Departments	Responsibilities
1.	BCG	Security assistance to sea ports and offshore installations.
2.	DoS	1. Coordinate maritime security. 2. Ensure safety of offshore fixed or mobile oil/ gas exploration installations. 3. Ship and port facility security matters under ISPS Code.
3.	MPA, PPA and CPA	To safeguard port facility against security threat and incident under ISPS code.
4.	BN	Sea ports of Bangladesh to be kept open for shipping during war.
5.	MoEPMR	Nothing mentioned.

Source: Generated by Author from Concerned Organisation/Websites

Analysis. CG and DoS is given with responsibility to provide security of offshore installations while BN is not having task of providing the same. Considering potential threat of maritime terrorism having trans-border connections, the protection mechanism should also include BN.

Maritime Accident. Assessment on allocation of responsibility of maritime accident indicates that BIWTA and DoS of MoS are designated as the regulatory bodies for ensuring safety of vessels plying in inland and in maritime waters respectively. Accidents in inland water and at sea indicate requirement of better professional training and rigorous enforcement of law in this aspect. Multiple stakeholders/ agencies have the responsibilities of providing SAR in the Bangladesh waters simultaneously. Except BN, no other stakeholders

have adequate resources to conduct maritime SAR in entire maritime area of Bangladesh. As such, area wise delineation of such responsibilities need to be worked out based on capacity of stakeholder's reach at sea.

POLICY MEASURES TO DEVELOP BETTER MARITIME SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN MITIGATING NTMS AND SAFETY ISSUES

Analysis of the maritime security governance threats structure in maritime environment in the BoB has shown that different maritime regulatory bodies function in isolation in respective fields of NTMS threats and safety issues. Vacuum in maritime security governance exists in Bangladesh. Besides, absence of Maritime Policy is also contributing to the overall vacuum. Thus, study on finding policy measure to develop better maritime security governance in mitigating NTMS threats and safety issues needs to be carried out. The policy measures are:

Policy Measure 1. Developing a prudent National Maritime Policy.

Policy Measure 2. Designating a National Maritime Regulatory Body who will coordinate relevant maritime issues including those of NTMS threats and safety issues.

Policy Measure 3. Designating a lead stakeholder for each of the NTMS threat/safety issues so that the particular issue is coordinated.

Concept and Analysis of the Policy Measures

The Concepts of different policy measures will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs. Analysis for suitability of the policy measures will also be carried out.


Policy Measure 1 - Developing National Maritime Policy. Sustainable development can only take place when it is driven by a well conceptualised Policy which is yet to be accepted in Bangladesh. A comprehensive Maritime Policy needs to be formulated which should be inclusive of all maritime stakeholders. The policy should encompass the prospects and challenges in maritime commerce and trade, maritime security, maritime development primarily. Marine pollution, conservation and preservation of marine resources, marine scientific research, technology transfer, marine environmental protection, global climate change etc. should also be encompassed in the policy.

Suitability and Acceptability of Policy Measure 1. Bangladesh Navy had formulated a National Maritime Policy (Alam, 2014) which is yet to be recognized by the other maritime authorities. It is needless to explain the requirement of a national level strategic guideline for holistic development and management of any sector. However, lack of awareness results in such vacuum of a policy guidance. The National Maritime Policy needs to be developed as mid-term measure (within 05 years) taking all concerned stakeholders onboard for better cooperation and coordination among all the stakeholders.

Policy Measure 2 - Designation of National Maritime Regulatory Body. Such Regulatory Body is contemplated to function in ensuring effective, participatory, well-coordinated maritime security governance by the stakeholders. All efforts and resources should be channeled to achieve synergy.

Designation of National Maritime Regulatory Body. Bangladesh Navy had proposed such National Maritime Regulatory Body in form of ‘National Maritime Division (NMD)’ in 2014 (Alam, 2014). This body should be central to every action initiated, promulgated, implemented and monitored with respect to governance of maritime domain in Bangladesh. The NMD was contemplated to have three broad aspects, namely: security, economics and development to take care of different maritime areas of interest/ importance.

Figure 5: Proposed NMD Organizational Structure



Source: Alam, 2014


Suitability and Acceptability of National Maritime Regulatory Body in Bangladesh Perspective. Prior to BN proposal for NMD, the Government of Bangladesh had constituted the 'Bangladesh National Maritime Council (NMC)' to coordinate and to implement the various international regulations (Bangladesh Gazette, 2006). This Council was supposed to be the National Maritime Regulatory Body in Bangladesh perspective. However, NMC did not come into being due to absence of dedicated structure and authority. In Bangladesh, maritime affairs have traditionally been dealt with by a number of separate sectoral policies which had been discussed earlier. Such compartmentalisation of maritime governance remains to dominate pragmatic wishes to change the situation. Almost 19 years and 11 years have elapsed since supposed NMC should have been formed and proposal for NMD had been sent respectively. Both of these have not seen light of materialization. Given state of bureaucratic practice and departmentalized approaches of prime stakeholders in Bangladesh, it can be assumed that no effective apex Maritime Regulatory Organisation can be formed in near future. It can be easily presumed that sectoral maritime governance is not conducive for sustainable growth where different decision makers may adopt differing approaches. Thus, considering obvious requirement of such apex maritime regulatory body, NMD or such body may be formed as long term measures e.g. within 07 years, provided this is supported by the Maritime Policy.

Policy Measure 3 - Designation of a Lead Stakeholder for each of NTMS Threat/ Safety Issues. As formation of Maritime Regulatory Body appears to be bleak in near future, coordination among the stakeholders working in same NTMS threat or safety issues under overall guidance of one designated stakeholder can be a suitable option to overcome vacuum in maritime leadership. This entails that for every NTMS threat and safety issues, there will be a single ministry and a stakeholder under that ministry will be responsible, termed as "Lead Ministry/ Department". The other relevant ministries/ departments will assist the lead ministry/ department in that field as 'Participatory Ministry/ Department'. The relation between the lead and participatory ministries will be a coordination relation.

Suitability of Concept of Lead Stakeholder for each of NTMS Threat/ Safety Issues. Such concept of lead stakeholder is being practiced by different ministries/ departments in Bangladesh Government for number of other issues. For example, National Plan for Disaster Management (NPDMD) 2021-2025 has notified that the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR) will be the lead ministry to deal with the disaster management with other stakeholders

(GoB, 2020). Similarly, this concept of Lead Stakeholder for each of NTMS threat/ safety issues is expected to develop working solution to existing maritime security vacuum in maritime governance as immediate measure till a Maritime Regulatory Body comes into being. In regional perspective, India had embarked upon such lead stakeholder policy option where Indian Navy (IN) had been made responsible to ensure coastal security and to coordinate with all other stakeholders e.g. government organisations, civil bodies etc. as lead stakeholder after the Mumbai Attack, 2008.

Figure 6: Agencies Involved in Coastal Security in India



Source: Indian Navy, 2015

Designation of Lead Stakeholders in Addressing each of NTMS Threats and Safety Issues. Assignment of IN as lead stakeholder in ensuring coastal security in India by Indian Government aftermath of 2008 Mumbai Attacks demonstrates the practical viability of this concept. Survey conducted among the maritime professionals indicate overwhelming requirement of designation of lead stakeholders as this is expected to bring considerable improvement in maritime governance. As such, proposal to designate capable stakeholder as lead

stakeholder for each of the NTMS threat and safety issue is made considering the GoB assigned responsibility, intelligence gathering capacity, patrolling coverage in the BoB, capacity to enforce law and capacity of apprehension etc. This can be enacted in short term (03 years).




Table 7: Proposed Lead Ministry and Lead Stakeholder

Serial	NTMS Threat/ Safety Issue	Lead Ministry	Lead Stakeholder/ Agency
1.	Maritime Terrorism	AFD	BN
2.	Gun Running, Piracy and armed robbery/ petty thefts	MOHA	BCG
3.	Drug Trafficking	MOHA	DoNC
4.	Human Trafficking	MOHA	Bangladesh Police
5.	Poaching and Fisheries Protection	MoFL	DoF (Marine)
6.	Smuggling	Ministry of Finance	Bangladesh Customs
7.	Threats to Offshore Installations	AFD	BN
8.	Threats to Maritime Port Installations	MoS	CPA, MPA PPA
9.	Maritime Accidents	MoS	DoS

Source: Developed by Author

Example of Coordination Mechanism of Lead Stakeholder in Combating Maritime Terrorism. In order to bring synergy among the various maritime

stakeholders, coordination between concerned are of vital importance. Accordingly, coordination relationship between various stakeholders is suggested keeping BN as the main coordinating organization in dealing maritime terrorism (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Suggested Coordination Relationship for Combating Maritime Terrorism



Source: Developed by Author

CONCLUSION

Bangladesh is a population burdened country with limited resources at land. The establishment of maritime rights over a sea area on 1,18,813 sq km in recent years has offered new hopes of additional resources from sea for the resource starved economy. The GoB has undertaken 'Blue Economy' to rip benefits out of living and non-living resources of the BoB. This also includes sea transportations, maritime trade, marine tourism etc. The projected rise of economy of Bangladesh and soaring requirement of use of Bangladeshi maritime ports by land locked countries like Nepal, Bhutan, 07 Indian North-eastern states indicate that activities at sea will have exponential growth in future. Such economic activities can only take place in a secure maritime environment in the BoB.

Existence of number of NTMS threats e.g. maritime terrorism, piracy and armed robbery/ petty theft, smuggling, drug trafficking, poaching etc. in the BoB pose challenges to establish secured maritime environment. In addition, maritime safety issue like maritime accidents, also affect the secure environment in the BoB. Although number of land based and maritime stakeholders/ agency have responsibility in mitigating these security and safety challenges, both overlying of responsibility and vacuum of responsibility has been found in subjective analysis. It is also evident that more coordination is required between the stakeholders. This state of maritime security governance affects the good order in maritime environment which, in turn, will remain as an obstacle in attaining much desired national economic development.

Different policy measures have been discussed and analysed in details to weigh out overall suitability to enhance maritime security in the BoB amidst existing level of vacuum of maritime security governance in the BoB, specially, in respect of NTMS threats and safety issues. Policy Measure 1 and research outcome specifies that National Maritime Policy is a call of time which needs to be formulated as midterm basis (05 years) keeping different maritime stakeholders onboard. The Policy should encompass much longed Blue Economy aiming for maritime secured environment for sustainable development in maritime sector while balance of conservation of resources and maritime ecology is given due importance in backdrop of effects of climate change. The Policy Measure 2 envisaged for establishment of an effective maritime regulatory body to usher all stakeholders in developing coordinated mechanism to work in maritime sectors to address NTMS threats and safety issues. At present, there is no singular maritime regulatory body who addresses all NTMS threats and safety issues. Different bodies e.g. MoS, MOHA, MOFL, Ministry of Finance etc. focus on respective sectors and are rigid in maintaining respective departmental interests. Previous proposals for establishing of an all-encompassing maritime regulatory body has not seen light of implementation in compartmentalized system of Bangladesh. Thus, it is less likely that an effective singular maritime regulatory body can be established in Bangladesh perspective at present, but will be required on long term basis (07 years). Policy Measure 3 prophesies for designation of lead stakeholder for each of NTMS threats and safety issues who will coordinate with rest of stakeholders for achieving an effective and working level of maritime security governance. Study of recent Indian approach to solve maritime security issues has also demonstrated that such lead organization is contributing effectively and can be made functional in existing bureaucratic parlance. Thus, designation of lead ministry and lead stakeholder is proven to be the optimum solution to the

NTMS threats and safety issues under existing scenario in Bangladesh. Different ministries and stakeholders have been worked out as the Lead Ministries and Lead Stakeholders for each of NTMS threats and safety issues considering government assigned responsibility, respective capacity etc. This was also substantiated by survey report of maritime professionals and security practitioners.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on research findings and discussion done so far, followings are recommended to enhance maritime security in the BoB for maritime trade and economy in addressing the NTMS threats and safety issues.

- Concerned Ministry and Stakeholder may be designated as lead ministry/ agency as proposed in this research to deal each of the NTMS threats and safety issues as short term measure (03 years). Functional responsibilities of each of the lead stakeholder may also be specified.
- Information gathering and sharing regarding NTMS threats and safety issues may be enhanced between the intelligence agencies and the LEAs.
- Coordination may be enhanced amongst different LEAs in NTMS threats for economy of efforts and better output.
- National Maritime Policy may be formulated as mid-term measure (within 05 years) in coordination with all concerned maritime stakeholders to address the maritime issues including the NTMS threats and safety issues holistically.
- NMD or similar national maritime regulatory body may be formed to address the maritime issues including the NTMS threats and safety issues as long-term measure (07 years).

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