



RECONCEPTUALIZING SECURITY: POST-CXIX DILEMMAS FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

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Abstract: The Covid-19 (CXIX) pandemic is the greatest socio-political tragedy of the 21st century that has significantly changed the international security discourse. The changes have led to new debates on the depth and breadth of security for the national security institutions. That means the concept of security has undergone different phases in history, from Homo Sapiens to Homo Technologicus, recreating different meanings of national security. This article seeks to examine the concept of ‘security’ through prisms of realist and liberal approaches, international politics, and security. The CXIX or the post-CXIX political landscapes may lead to a fundamental reconceptualization of security, and indeed, the dominant theories and approaches will undergo discursive changes over the period. Therefore, the understanding of the two dominant approaches – realism and liberalism – may allow Bangladeshi or South Asian security thinkers to rethink security through correlative approaches that would include a comprehensive view of what would constitute security and challenges for the state during the post-CXIX World.

Keywords: *Artificial Intelligence; bioterrorism; hegemony; neoconservatism; digital diplomacy*

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INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING THE NEW SECURITY DISCOURSE

The humankind is witnessing a paradoxical time comprising global economic crisis to ethnic wars, radical innovation, and advancement in disruptive technologies, newfound realpolitik, street revolution, blunt nationalist rhetoric, and the Internet of Things (IoT). The security discourse that we had even five years back has become significantly challenged, bearing the wildly complex developments across the regions. Even a decade is often considered primitive in the domain of technologies and the new phenomenon in geopolitics. The electoral politics in Beijing, London, Moscow, New Delhi, or Washington show that support for protective and protracted nationalism has become the new norms after the three decades of post-Cold war. The World is increasingly

returning to the age of the Cold War in which ideologies and geopolitical priorities are defining national security and global tensions. Robert Kagan labelled the post-2018 years as the era of the strongman (*Kagan, 2019*) where economics, a prime branch of intellectual inquiries that was the key to understanding the last several decades, no longer play the sole role of explaining rationality today (*Zakaria, 2019*). That does not mean that the role of economics has become any lesser, but that other elements such as cognitive behaviour, diverse source of information and misinformation, national security and popular politics have found more substantial ground in the security discourse.

Perhaps, the trends in elections, nationalism, and exposure to virtual and augmented realities are making irrationality as the real invisible hand that drives human decision making (*Ariely, 2009*). Hence, the race for Artificial Intelligence (AI) and predictive analytics have become new norms of scientific advancement for political and security supremacy. The radically different views of how people and organizations operate have further challenged the rational understanding of security for the policymakers and decision-making actors. That means we should be prepared for recurring political, social, ideological, and ecological cataclysms stemming from down-to-top viz individual to the state. These sustained changes have come along with a paradigm shift phenomenon known as the Covid-19 phenomics (hereafter referred to as CXIX). The CXIX pandemic is the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 21st century that has fundamentally changed the international security discourse and environment. Perhaps, the virus that originated in Wuhan, China, can well be seen as the World's greatest equalizer that has brought all the nations to cooperate yet renewed tensions and contradictions in hegemonic ambitions based on the politics of human security, surveillance technologies, and biotechnologies (*Khan & Sharma, 2020*). Indeed, we are at a paradoxical time. While CXIX has given the birth to global race for developing a vaccine to shape the nature of human security, parallelly the race to develop AI is gathering momentum. Harari in his well-revered article, titled *Who Will Win the Race for AI?* mentioned, "*the race to develop Artificial Intelligence (AI) gathering momentum, and as the United States and China pull ahead, other countries, especially in the developing World, are lagging far behind. If they don't catch up, their economic and political prospects will be grim*" (*Harari, 2019*). In fact, CXIX, for the Bangladeshi, or perhaps the South Asian security thinkers, has compelled to rethink the idea of national security which can no longer be seen through monolithic views of realism or liberalism. The advent of the Internet, or newly emerging concepts such as Future Integrated Soldier Technology (FIST), or even analytics to predict social and political behaviours in advance, are affecting humans on a much higher level – neural or biological levels. As technology, politics, economics and culture continue to influence human life on an interrelated scale, we should consider the possibility that current patterns, trends, and innovations may affect human evolution generations down the line (*Perkins, 2015*). What it presents then is a clear linear path of transition from Homo Sapiens to Homo Technologicus in

which international politics and national security will be dominated by intelligence marvels.

Henceforth, debates over the meaning, nature, and scope of security and the future of security discourses are the critical streams of politics that must be critically understood by the national security institutions. The emerging and new security landscapes are firmly rooted in three theoretical approaches which include structural realism based on Waltz's rational actor argument which presents both ambiguities in and wider meaning of the idea of '*rational actor*', regional security complex, and neorealist interaction between the individual or human security and international or national security (Buzan, 2003; Waltz, 2010). The state-centric social capital approach and the market-centric social capital approach have transcended into a social dilemma leading to security challenges in both the national and societal spheres. This article will examine two predominantly contesting, often contradicting, approaches – realism, and liberalism – rather than the whole spectrum of approaches existing in security and strategic studies discourses. The scope of the paper will remain within the evolving tensions between the state and technologies, and then the state and individuals in which the impacts of new cognitive and intuitive technologies are embedded.

Therefore, changes in thinking about the concept of security may lead to a reconceptualization of realism or liberalism, but perhaps may allow understanding security through technology approaches that would include a comprehensive view of what constitutes security and threat perceptions associated with realist and liberal construction of new geopolitics. Given the evolving security landscapes and its underpinning elements, this article has been designed in three phases to understand the evolution of security. The first phase discusses the evolving nature of security since the earliest time till the cold war, complexities in the post-CXIX concept of security and the emerging new strategic landscape linking the Armed Forces, and then a brief assessment of the future of security. In this process, relying solely on the statist security discourses may lead to strategic mistakes. Therefore, the idea of security, precisely the idea of national security, has become more extensive, and challenging and needs to be seen beyond the confined binary prisms of the existing Western literature and the Eastern ideas. What if the robots and unmanned warfare tools take over first, indeed?

THE CHANGE FACTORS: THE EVOLVING NATURE OF SECURITY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The concept of security has expanded and changed over the period which now includes multiple core elements ranging from environmental and health governance to public policy to International Development along with the

traditional approaches to security which provides for national interest, sovereignty, and military preparedness. However, throughout the history of politics, security denoted multiple meanings and different definitions. The concept of security evolved from the ancient military thoughts developed by Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Chanakya among others, and philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The foundation of realism can be found in the works from Sun Tzu to Rousseau in which state and military featured prominently. Carr (1939) articulated security as an output of anarchy and the absence of power to regulate the interactions between states (Carr, 1939).

The realist and the idealist thinkers have presented multiple definitions of security in which human existence has been an inevitable part. However, they differed on the level of influence of the state on an individual. Classical philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, and Huig de Groot identified rational differences in different definitions of security by linking different magnitude of violence, conflict, and peace with the state and human behaviours. The Hobbesian approach undertakes that the World will remain violent in which anarchy will persist, the Kantian approach presents a more optimistic view in which peaceful existence is possible despite violence and conflict in society. The Grotian tradition *“views international politics as taking place within an international society”* in which *“states are bound not only by rules of prudence or expediency but also by imperatives of morality and law”* (Bull, 1977).

Lasswell (1936) has defined security as *“unavoidably political to determine who gets what, when and how in the political world”* (Lasswell, 1936). Lippman (1944) defined security as *“the capability of a country to protect its core values, both in terms that a state need not sacrifice core values in avoiding war and can maintain them by winning war”* (Lippmann, 1944) while Ullman suggested that security is primarily about *“decrease in vulnerability”* (Ullman, 1983). Walt (1991) sees security as *“study of threat, employment, and control of military power”* (Walt, 1991) based on the use of force to protect national interest and asset, the behaviour of others, domestic policies and priorities, causes of peace and cooperation, and interdependence between economy and stability. However, Walt warned that while it is possible to include multiple elements, e.g. health and poverty, into the framework of security, such an excessive expansion of definition could potentially result in a disruption in understanding threats and finding solutions arguably complex (Walt, 1991). Henceforth, from Hobbes to Walt, the concept of security largely remained confined in the traditional approaches focusing on state actors and their military capabilities to protect national security and interest. However, Thomas Paine and Immanuel Kant introduced ‘perpetual peace’ as the foundation of liberalism.

The post-Cold War period witnessed an expansion in the scope of security accentuated by liberal globalization and rapid technological advancements. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) introduced human security as a new paradigm of security. OCHA defined human

security as “response to the complexity and the interrelatedness of both old and new security threats – from chronic and persistent poverty to ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, health pandemics, international terrorism, and sudden economic and financial downturns. Such threats tend to acquire transnational dimensions and move beyond traditional notions of security that focus on external military aggressions alone” (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2005). Al-Rodhan (2007) identified security as a broader concept that no longer includes states alone, but includes multiple factors such as freedom, human, health, food, environment, national, transnational, and transcultural security (Al-Rodhan, 2007). OCHA identifies that “Human Security complements state security, strengthens human development and enhances human rights” (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2005). Hence, human security as a concept aligns with non-traditional views of security in which a rights-based people-freedom approach has replaced the state-interest-based approach. However, human security has its weaknesses since human rights’ universal applicability has long been used as a matter of political preference for the state leaders. One example is the contemporary US-India relationship. President Trump’s muted response to the Indian riots or Citizenship Amendment Act 2019 exposes the extent to which realist priorities now govern the U.S.-Indian relationship. Ayres, in her article titled ‘Democratic Values No Longer Define U.S.-Indian Relations’ mentioned that, “Realists on both sides of the political aisle argue that Washington’s and New Delhi’s interests align in seeking a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region, with India’s heft and capabilities necessary for reaching that goal” (Ayres, 2020).

The rise of nationalism, Artificial Intelligence and cyber domain have shifted power to the hands of individuals which, in turn, has substantially challenged the monopoly of power by the state. Fountain (2001) argued that the state is still the leading player in the field, maintaining (although adapting) its role as the supreme provider of security, even in cyberspace (Fountain, 2001). However, Eriksson and Giacomello (2006) argued that “the emergence of ‘virtual states’ and network economies imply a decline of interstate violence, and hence that security generally plays a significantly lesser role than in previous times” (Eriksson & Giacomello, 2006). While cyberspace is seen as a ‘zone of international peace’, the information revolution has significantly increased the relevance of big data and predictive analytics firms, the geopolitics of information as a critical source of tension, technology interest organizations, social movements and street revolutions, transnational networks, networked diaspora and individuals. That has challenged the existing norms and standards of cooperation and international law, and the non-state actors have emerged as both challengers to and providers of security (Nye, 2004a; Nye, 2004b). Nevertheless, whether or not Carr’s realist or Waltz’s neorealist or Nye’s complex interdependence between state and non-state gave structural definitions of security; ‘virtual states’ and network economies will reconceptualize security during the uncertain post-CXIX period.

However, until the end of the Cold War, in International Security (as an academic discipline), the term security has been mostly associated with the theories of international relations. The theoretical discourse has primarily been dominated by the realist perspectives emphasizing national interest, national security, and sovereignty, and by the neoliberals emphasizing on rational and ethical behaviour

of states and institutions. Of course, the positioning of critical theories. i.e. from positivism to post-positivism, cannot be ruled out as key approaches, critical theories differed from epistemological and ontological propositions of realism and liberalism. The idea of national power was associated mainly with realist expansion of economic activities through multiple modes. i.e. trade, territorial presence, political manipulation, regional-sub-regional power equations, and the formation of strategic international alliances leading to hegemony -periphery relations that had intrinsic links with the balance of power. External security was perceived as an amalgamation of sovereignty, national identity, protection of borders, and geostrategic imperatives. At the same time, internal security emphasized on the reduction of violence and crime, often leading to human rights violation and state-centric repression, law enforcement, and political stability.

The period between the end of the Cold War and the CXIX phenomenon focused more on neoliberal approaches to security in which human security featured the most. The neoliberal international order emphasized on the role of integrated and international systems correlating institutionalism which in turn focused on liberal trade, human rights, ethical governance, and environmental security. During these three decades, the race for technological supremacy and the emergence of the Internet as the biggest propaganda machine that the humankind has ever seen accentuated the social development and changes across the regions. This broad spectrum of change led the securitization to comprehend various dimensions between state and individuals (*Waver, 1993*). One key feature has been the link between development and geopolitics in both the developing and the underdeveloped countries. Globalization took a forceful shape through economic and trade interdependence, and the strategic equations were shaped mainly by national power and advancement in science and technologies. For the developed countries, accumulation of wealth and the high politics of human rights and governance are supplemented by double standards in liberal international trade regimes and extraterritorial presence through multinational corporations, arms market, development aid, and media. While the respect for international law varied across the regions, international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) witnessed fractures stemming from unilateralism, strategic preferences, or superpower syndromes. The relationship between multilateralism, collective security and global powers has remained ambivalent throughout history too (*Gordon, 2007*).

In 2018, the UN issued 27 condemnations, and 21 of them were against Israel for violating UN norms and resolutions (*TNT World, 2018*). The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has been widely debated since the UN members states questioned the legality of such invasion, and the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan mentioned: *"I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter. From our point of view and the UN Charter point of view, it [the war] was illegal"* (*UN News, 2004*), explicitly declaring that the US-led war on Iraq was illegal. Regarding the role of the UK armed forces in the 2003 Iraq invasion, the Iraq Inquiry Report, popularly known as the Chilcot Report, identified: *"Military action might have been necessary later, but in*

March 2003, it said, there was no imminent threat from the then Iraq leader Saddam Hussein, the strategy of containment could have been adapted and continued for some time and the majority of the Security Council supported continuing UN inspections and monitoring” (BBC, 2016). In the case of Yemen conflict, backed by the Saudi-led intervention in 2015 (till now), the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has accused all the parties involved in the conflict of international human rights violation. A briefing paper published by the Commission claimed: “States, individually and collectively, must take effective measures to put an end to international law violations in Yemen and ensure the accountability of perpetrators” (International Commission of Jurists, 2018). China and Russia persistently vetoed resolutions against Syrian violation of international human rights in the Security Council. In the case of grave violation of international human rights against the Rohingyas in Rakhine, Myanmar, by the Myanmar Armed Forces, the report of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar mentioned that “On the basis of the body of information collected, the mission has reasonable grounds to conclude that serious crimes under international law have been committed that warrant criminal investigation and prosecution” (The Human Rights Council, 2018). While the US and its European allies supported the UN findings, Myanmar’s neighbours, i.e. China and India, along with Russia, remained supportive of Myanmar’s causes. These recent examples are the classic cases of misuse or abuse or bypassing of international law or human rights norms.

The trends above demonstrate the continuing importance of the realist approach to security despite the growth of liberal economic interdependence across the regions. The military forces remain as an arbiter of disputes both between, and particularly within, states, as well as the perceived importance of violence by external forces and terrorist groups as a weapon to alter a status quo (Baylis, 2008). The period has also witnessed shifting trajectory of security policies toward pre-emptive action, advancement in new surveillance oriented security technologies (SOSTs), and the growing importance of traditional trade-off between security and liberty which has enabled complex and exhaustive security and legal measures concerning the overall security balance of any given society (Pavone, et al., 2016). The SIPRI report has indicated the return of geopolitical rivalries and the quest for military power between the end of the Cold War and 2019. The global military expenditure stood at USD917 billion, the highest since the end of the Cold War, with 3.6 percent higher spending compared to 2018 and 7.2 percent higher than in 2010 (SIPRI, 2020a). Notably, the military expenditure decreased steadily between 2011 and 2014 following the global financial and economic meltdowns between 2007 and 2009 in which a financial crisis proliferated from the US to the rest of the World through linkages in the global financial systems. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Australia, China, India and Egypt became the top five largest arms importers between 2010 and 2018, and US, Russia, France, Germany, and Spain remained as the top five largest arms exporters (SIPRI, 2020b).

While the global security environment did not witness significant recession in the expansion of Western influence in military decision-making, spheres of influence, ideology, and culture through globalization, China with its Middle Kingdom

syndrome emerged as a counter influence. The non-Western countries are experiencing containment by the West and the Middle Kingdom, through Indo-Pacific strategy, the Chinese-led Belt Road Initiative including maritime silk route, and now the vaccine silk route, leading toward strategic dilemmas. The imbalance in the distribution of the geostrategy benefits, resulting in more considerable gaps between the countries, has made the national boundaries weakened in which extra-regional powers are becoming influencers. The Ladakh crisis of 2020 between China and India, or perhaps the 'cartographic war' between India and Nepal, in which Nepal redrew its map by including Indian claimed Lipulekh pass, Kalapani and Limpiyadhura. Indeed, the rise of geo-economics corridors such as the China Pakistan or China Myanmar Economic Corridors is the classic examples of geostrategic imbalances which are shaping the politics of borders and liberalism.

Therefore, the idea of national power and national security has shifted in which the weaker or less developed countries are becoming critical actors. Combining the facts such as military expenditure, politics of territory, and geo-economics; it can be assumed that '*higher military expenditure*' or '*wider military power*' does not necessarily mean a higher military capability to define strategic environment or that the larger armed forces would generate a more substantial real-time military effect ([Markowski, et al., 2017](#)). In this case, the Himalayan and the Bay of Bengal regions have become another critical geopolitical flashpoint making the entire region of Kabul to Rakhine as an arc of instability. The meaning of security here is, therefore, more complex, which presents a dichotomous existence of realist and liberal approaches. The mismatch in state capabilities, human security, and political ambitions has made the region as a geostrategic complex that includes internal threats with growing existential influence of China and the US. While India and Pakistan consider each other as an existential threat, with nuclear technologies as deterrence and source of the arms race, internal challenges from their own populations and ethnic groups loom large. Tandon and Slobodchikoff (2019) identified that "*the ethnic groups have been shown to have fewer grievances when faced with external threats, internal relations between ethnic groups show increased tensions when there is little or no existential threat from abroad*" ([Tandon & Slobodchikoff, 2019](#)).

Perhaps, a paper commissioned by the Independent Commission on Multilateralism (ICM) and the International Peace Institute (IPI) identified that a new wave of technology is driving the geostrategic spheres rapidly in South Asia ([Independent Commission on Multilateralism, 2016](#)). Hence, realism and liberal international orders are increasingly the binary views of security. The potential to use the data generated by billions of people connected by mobile devices, backed by unlimited processing power, cloud computing, and access to diverse information, for (in)security has become a significant concern. In the realist context, technological investment and advancement will create both a democratic deficit in which state-individual social contract will be fragile and technology deficit in which national security will remain volatile. For the liberals, technological innovation will lead to a supply-side miracle and help in constituting a global framework in which transportation and communication costs will drop, logistics and global supply

chains will become more productive, and the cost of trade will diminish, all of which will open new markets and drive economic growth (*Schwab, 2016*).

The ICM-IPI paper has recognized that the potential use of ICTs for development, governance, and peace is unlimited. However, the concerns remain with how to govern the Internet, issues related to security and cybersecurity in particular (*Independent Commission on Multilateralism, 2016*). Moreover, the cyber domain has become more complex as the new warfare technologies such as armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), drones, biotechnologies are entering service. The concept of security has become further challenged as the use of armed drones is not illegal, but there is no legal or regulatory or institutional consensus on how to exercise international law on the use of unmanned technologies. Hence, both realist and liberal approaches tend to be inadequate in explaining this phenomenon. Cyberspace, then, constitutes ethical and normative challenges as state-sponsored cyber hacking is increasing. The cyberspace includes many and varied actors—from criminal hackers to terrorist networks to governments engaged in cyber espionage to disrupt economic and commercial activity and threaten military effectiveness. Moreover, the conflict that takes place in the cyber domain often mirrors conflict in the physical World (*Independent Commission on Multilateralism, 2016*). Therefore, cyber warfare occupies an ambiguous position in the laws of war and perhaps will set new standards and norms in security governance in future.

Along with cybersecurity, maritime security has emerged as another critical field of security discourse that links the protection of ecosystems, environment, supply routes, and strategic autonomy over maritime resources. There is a widespread discussion that the existing liberal international order in the maritime domain has become precariously competitive by China's rise and the US interests in the Indo-Pacific region – historically which was under the radar of its Pacific Command (PACOM), now Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Halford Mackinder's seminal contribution to classic geopolitics was based upon the transformative effects of railway routes, in the 21st century, China's Maritime Silk Initiative (MSRI) and its sub-branch Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) under Chinese magnum opus called BRI have generated persuasive discourse about transformative effects on the global geopolitical landscape (*Len, 2015*). Chinese projects in the South China Sea and MSRI provoked geopolitical competition in which the US and its allies – Quad states, i.e. Australia, Japan, and India, and the Philippines have become a part of realist geopolitical competition. That means the global energy transport choke points, e.g. Straits of Hormuz, Malacca, and Bab el-Mandeb, and Suez Canal will continue to remain as subject to security competition.

The lack of international governance in the cyber domain certainly questions the non-realist values as anarchic governance modalities continue to cripple the ethical use of power and a state's capabilities to protect its values and standards from the threat in the present and future. The issue of self-sufficiency and resource nationalism, i.e. energy security, strategic autonomy, against the external threats and volatilities, has long been one of the objectives of a modern state; it has become

reinforced as the prime concern for many states, e.g. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, due to the anarchic nature that is persisting in international governance. The US unilateral withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the World Health Organization, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, has further created a vacuum in international leadership. The West historically relied on US-NATO or EU-US equations for global leadership. However, the vacuum has enabled China to exercise its global vision, known as Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, that asserts Coexist well with nature with *'energy conservation and environmental protection'* policies and *'contribute to global ecological safety'* and Establish a common destiny between Chinese people and other people around the world with a *'peaceful international environment'* (Xinhua, 2018).

The dwindling features of the US foreign policy have perhaps paved the way for new international economic order in which politics of aid and financial governance is taking new shape challenging the Bretton Woods institutions – the flagbearers of international liberalism and liberal multilateralism. The new financial order has further come at the expense of eroding multilateral values in the US foreign policy. Historically, the US foreign policy embraced liberal internationalism that advocated for open markets, open polities and private sector, and multilateral institutions. Drezner *et al.* (2020) argued that the Trump presidency has repeatedly challenged *"the critical pillars of liberal internationalism, from questioning the value of NATO to ending trade agreements to insulting allies"* (Drezner *et al.*, 2020). The Chinese financial initiatives have quickly gained weight among the developing countries during the foreign policy recession in Washington.

The China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), formed in 2018, along with its flagship financial institutions such as the US \$100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in which India and Bangladesh acted as founding members, the US \$40 billion New Silk Road Fund (NSRF), the US \$50 billion New Development Bank (NDB) and the US \$100 billion Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) seek to link developing countries with its BRI strategy (Khan, 2018). These, together with CIDCA, represent Chinese backed new financial institutions that are not part of the existing Western-dominated financial architecture (Khan, 2018). The new financial order has coincided at the time when a supranational institution such as the European Union has been struggling with the rise of nationalism, Russian geopolitical ambitions, and fractured response to the coronavirus and European debt crisis. President Aleksandar Vučić, for example, mentioned, lacking any real support from the EU, that, *"Serbia now turns its eyes to China"* and *"all my personal hopes are focused on China and its president"* (Simić, 2020). Hence, the liberal institutionalism and multilateral guarantee for preserving security have once again faltered.

REIMAGINING SECURITY: THE CXIX AND THE POST-CXIX WORLD

The rise of new economic and political orders as discussed earlier, came along with extraordinary technological challenges. Technologies are unevenly divided across the region's leading to 'technology divide' – a new parameter in determining national power and capabilities. The unprecedented changes coincided with another unprecedented event e.g. CXIX. The CXIX has challenged the technological advancement, and extraordinary breakthroughs in medical science prevailed across the World. The death toll has been equally unprecedented, despite advancements, that has shaken the society, health systems, economics, and governments. Perhaps this is a defining moment in history which has presented a noodle bowl full of challenges, uncertainties, countless personal tragedies, social and political traumas, and certainly the core values in social systems. Hence, there has been a sharp rise in demand for realist solutions to manage the immediate impact of the pandemic and its consequences. While democratic systems are slow in responding to the immediate large-scale crises such as pandemics, demand for the quick fix of CXIX has put pressure on the concepts of 'state' and 'security'. The current security decisions taken by the states will determine the shape of the world order for the years to come. Woods (2020) argued that *"After COVID-19 there is a risk that the World could be yet more divided, conflictual and nationalistic. But an alternative scenario is within reach. In this scenario, collective action within communities and, where necessary, internationally, will make a more rapid and peaceful exit from the crisis possible"* (Woods, 2020). The social and consumption behaviours are likely to significantly change, leading to toxic politics of nationalism, protectionism, and racial discrimination. Woods further argued, *"some politicians will resort to a discourse combining fear and tribalism. This will exacerbate discrimination at home – as seen in some parts of the United States, China and India – and jingoistic nationalism will also make international cooperation more difficult"* (Woods, 2020).

The liberal multilateralism and supranational institutionalism such as European Union (EU) have exposed its weaknesses too. The EU has faced harsh criticism for its slow response to the pandemic and economic crisis in the Eurozone, reinforcing debates about whether it has a future without policy and political reforms. That means, the concepts of 'collective security' and 'balance of power' would require reconceptualization. Perhaps, the Chinese new form of Health Silk Road or the Mask diplomacy will gain new paradigms in security and foreign policy discourses. Escobar (2020) mentioned, *"in a graphic demonstration of soft power, so far China has offered Covid-19-related equipment and medical help to no fewer than 89 nations – and counting"* (Escobar, 2020). This covers not only the developing or least developing countries but also the high-income economies such as Italy, France, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Serbia, and Poland. *"But Italy, most of all, is a very special case. Most are donations. Some are trade – like millions of masks sold to France (and the US)"* (Escobar, 2020). Hence, the competition for post-CXIX medical supplies,

particularly CXIX vaccines and new antibiotics, will become the key features of global security.

The politics of vaccine, leading to vaccine nationalism versus vaccine multilateralism, has put the countries to capitalize on the politicization of supplies of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs). World Health Organization (WHO) attested that *“The vaccine market has very distinct features, which increase the complexity of assessing and understanding pricing and procurement. It is made up of individual markets for individual vaccines or vaccine types, each with their own specificities, particularly on the supply side”* (World Health Organization, 2020). An AB Bernstein report (2020) identified that the monopolistic and oligopolistic nature of vaccine supply and production had created a fragile balance between demand and supply in many individual vaccine markets as *“the industry has consolidated to four big players that account for about 85% of the market — British drug-maker GlaxoSmithKline, French pharmaceutical company Sanofi, and U.S.-based Merck and Pfizer”* (Li, 2020). The report further mentioned that *“for every dollar invested in vaccination in the world’s 94 lowest-income countries, the net return is \$44”*. *“This oligopoly has been built through significant market consolidation driven primarily by the complexities of the manufacturing and supply chain”* (Li, 2020). While the vaccine market is 2-3% of the global pharmaceutical market, there has been spectacular 10-15% rise in demand for vaccines (Kaddar, 2012). The vaccine market has grown six-fold over the past two decades, worth more than \$35 billion in 2020 denoting that the discovery of new viruses and trends in epidemiology (Li, 2020). A report published by the Council on Foreign Relations identified that *“97 percent of all antibiotics in the United States came from China”* (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019). As a result, innovation in and demand for vaccines (and antibiotics) will continue to grow. Hence, supply and availability of new vaccines as ‘global good’ for the mass population will remain as a subject to international politics and governance at the national level.

CXIX has allowed the governments to use technologies and mappings in the form of contact tracing, and a huge database of human health profiles has become a subject to public debate. As Harari mentioned, *“many governments and tyrants wanted to do it, but nobody understood biology well enough and nobody had enough computing power and data to hack millions of people. Neither the Gestapo nor the KGB could do it. But soon at least some corporations and governments will be able to systematically hack all the people”* (Harari, 2020). Therefore, the CXIX has added another security dimension related to surveillance. The spread of CXIX has led governments to undertake and implement multiple surveillance measures including contact tracing, geolocation data to track population, health surveillance, lockdowns, social media, media, and online communication to mitigate the risks of spread and misinformation. This has enabled to government control and scrutiny over the privacy of individuals. The latest digital surveillance has further created pressure on the social contract between the state and the citizens leading to potentials for civil discontent and resistance in future. Balancing between measures to track and contain the virus or future pandemics or migration and safeguarding neoliberal modes of privacy and freedom will shape the security discourse in the post-CXIX period.

The genesis of the evolving nature of security, and the uncertain future during the post-CXIX World, the case of Bangladesh Armed Forces can be brought in here. The challenges for Bangladesh's national security will be manifold, including the expanded role of the Armed Forces in providing the surge capacity in medical facilities and personnel in future pandemics and climate infused disasters. That means, a rethinking of what procedures and policies are necessary for military preparedness and readiness to face such disasters would be essential. The Armed Forces will then have to see security from the prism of a multi-layered approach in which national security decision-making has to find common ground for balancing national security, human security, and governance. Geopolitical fault lines and national interest will continuously evolve, which would require constant calibration of defence policies, operational capabilities, and national capacities with international alliances and development. The issues related to 'strategic autonomy' over maritime and cyber domains will continue to press the security and legal discourses, which is intrinsically linked with privacy, freedom, and human rights. That calls for dynamic civil-military relation along with improved capacities to conduct comprehensive defence diplomacy. These two factors are essential in balancing public interest and public aspiration, and global outreach and regional stability. The post-CXIX uncertainty also denotes that the armed forces would require to assess cyber and biological threats, whether weaponized by state or non-state actors, on national and public security. That too will need reforms in regulatory, legal and policy frameworks.

The CXIX has further exposed security paranoia of the state and politics. The institutional structures and the monopoly of power which were once the sole domain of the state or the government, e.g. law, trade and commerce, national security, state ideologies, or micro governance has shifted to uncharted territory and anarchic digital and cyberspaces. This diffusion of power will accelerate the process of an intermingling of technological and social systems while encoding inequities and cleavages therein (*Saran, 2020*). Therefore, two security narratives have emerged: first, the CXIX has demonstrated the necessity for multilateralism and exposed that nationalism, isolationism are doctrines such as Make America Great Again or Make in India or Anti-Islamism will continue to pose threats to civic coexistence. Second, Social media, cyberspace, and globalization will continue to create vulnerabilities to pandemics and transborder terrorist threats. The CXIX lockdowns and stagnant logistics supply systems of life-saving materials require the countries to priorities their national and public interests over collective mitigation of the crisis. That means the populations of conflict-affected countries will likely remain vulnerable to pandemics, financial debts, and civil strife. International crisis management, conflict resolution mechanisms and risks to social and collective orders will require new standards and norms based on the reconceptualized concept of security.

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF SECURITY FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Irving Kristol saw security as an outcome of neoconservatism which can be guaranteed by republicanism in the forms of bipartisan politics, oligarchy, and even popular sovereignty. He said that a *“neoconservative is a liberal who has been mugged by reality”* (Kristol, 1995). The neoconservative reality is a complex one which propounds the need for liberal supply-side economics as the basis for economic and social growth. Liberalism is perhaps *‘a sine qua non’* for the survival of modern democracy, political and moral philosophy, and even religious ideologies (Kristol, 1995). Michael Fuchs added to Kristol’s thoughts by linking CXIX, *“It is time, liberal internationalists must move quickly to define a new order—not least because illiberal forces are already doing the same”* (Fuchs, 2020). Fuchs and the neoconservatives have realized that Liberal institutionalism can perhaps strengthen global security in the post CXIX era for which Washington and its allies must work together to strengthen multilateral institutions such as WHO, UN and the Bretton Woods system. Multilateralism can provide platforms to reduce inequality among countries, and within them, it positively can promote safe migration, global climate agreements, and efforts to ensure stability in the conflict areas. While the pandemic has paved ways for rigid orthodoxies in both political and societal levels, it has also widened the windows of opportunity for political optimism. Fuchs argued, the pandemic may have intensified the U.S.-Chinese rivalry, but it has also driven home the importance of preserving some space for cooperation between great powers (Fuchs, 2020).

The post-CXIX World can well demonstrate an unpredictable nature of security and security threats, new security strategies and frameworks will seek to further control unpredictability through *‘preventive’*, *‘pre-emptive’*, and *‘precarious’* actions. Even foreign policy is now conducted with the assistance of technology, big data, crowdsourced information, and predictive analytics. Algorithms are being developed for cognitive interceptions for superiority in negotiations and to predict the behaviours of the state leaders and diplomats. Digital diplomacy, use of algorithms to spread narratives, online disinformation and propaganda, and consular affairs are increasingly becoming prominent features in state and foreign affairs. Hence, the use of information technology and data analytics have reduced time in developing diplomatic and military responses. The strategies and frameworks will then continue to significantly rely on the implementation and advancement of new technological gadgets and resources, ranging from nuclear to biometrics, biological to biotechnological, deep packet inspection to unmanned surveillance. The challenge will be in bridging gaps in technological advancement and ethical limitations in science. The technology industry, arms market, and the strong relations between economic and political interests will redefine the concept of security among the public. The national security institutions will continue to face the dilemma between public perception of security and the security of the state. The military and civil security markets have

already created social paranoia and public fear that can be exploited by political forces as well as the radical extremist entities. Hence, the concept of security will require the national security actors to balance between the practice of mass surveillance and pre-emptive technologies and the legal and cultural provisions that guarantee civic rights and freedom.

Interestingly, security is now assessed through the tensions between individual rights and national security imperatives. What remains as unaddressed factors are the complex interdependence between security and technology and between national security and societal security. In each case, security denotes different meanings and priorities. As a result, the national security institutions will require to develop defence policies, foreign policies, human security policies and technology policies corresponding with each other. While the security agenda has expanded, the meaning of security has expanded too. A reductionist concept of security perhaps may encourage neglecting the importance of technologically empowered units such as individuals, families, societies, and media. As this article has discussed the realist and liberal perspectives and its limits in explaining the post-CXIX world system and international politics, one should expect deeper conundrum between national security and supranational security, and hard choice between statist approach to security and human security based on universal values and norms. As such, relying solely on the statist security discourses may lead to strategic mistakes. Therefore, security and security policies need to be reconceptualized, at least for Bangladeshi or South Asian thinkers, to facilitate international and regional security by setting new norms and standards and mutual reinforcement among freedom, innovation, and human security.

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