

# **INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH AN INCREASINGLY ASSERTIVE JAPAN AND LIKELY IMPLICATIONS ON INDIA'S SECURITY POLICIES**

**Air Commodore Inderpal Singh Walia, AVSM, VM, ndc**

## **Introduction**

Japan and India have traditionally enjoyed steady good relations, singularly bereft of any of the usual complications. India is consciously seen to be widening its areas of interest, announcing an 'Act East' Policy in the Indian Ocean Region. In the recent past under PM Shinzo Abe, Japan has started to reform its national security policies, modifying the constricting Article 9, increasing defense spending, after long years of cuts, displaying assertiveness, confronting China in its policies and actions and has actively seeking out new partnerships. However, the impact and consequences of the effect of Japan's growing assertiveness on the relationship with India have not been explored. In this context, the expanding nature of the India-Japan relationship is bound to have an effect on India's existing relationships with other countries and India will have to re-evaluate and re-calibrate its foreign and security policies.

The broad objective of this study is to study the nature of the India-Japan Relationship in the context of increasing assertiveness of Japan and specifically to examine, as to how this relationship shapes India's security policies and the nature of its engagement with Japan. It will seek answers to the questions; What advantages and disadvantages accrue to India, in its engagement with an increasingly assertive Japan? How does the nature of this relationship shape India's strategic engagements with Japan and other significant regional players? What is the impact of this relationship on India's Security Policies?

It is proposed to study the problem through the template of the Theory of Defensive Neorealism in International Relations (Waltz, 1979), which derives its essence from Realism's five base theoretical assumptions.

## **Understanding Japanese Security Concerns**

India began to be accorded space in Japan's foreign-policy calculations gradually in 2000, as evidenced in Aso's essay on 'Arc of Freedom and Prosperity' (Aso, 2006). The address of PM Abe to the Indian Parliament titled, "Confluence of Two Seas" (Abe, 2007), was particularly significant. In 2012, Abe authored an article, "Asia's Democratic Security Diamond", where he argued that, "Japan's top foreign policy must be to expand the country's strategic horizon" and envisaged that Australia, India, Japan and the US State of Hawaii, form a strategic diamond to safeguard the Indo-Pacific Region. He also wrote that, "...of the two countries (other than the US), India...deserves greater emphasis" (Abe, 2012). During PM Abe's visit to India in December 2015, the 'India-Japan Vision 2025' was launched. Its 44 paragraphs set out a game-plan to achieve the objectives by 2025. (Modi, 2015). India's perspective was articulated by PM Modi, "strong India—strong Japan will not only enrich our two nations. It will also be a stabilising factor in Asia and the world" (Modi, 2016).

**Defence Engagement:** India's relationship with Japan in the defence and security field has been comparatively subdued, primarily due to the constraints placed by the Japanese constitution and their complete dependence on the US for their security needs. In 2008, PMs Manmohan Singh and Aso signed the "Joint Declaration on Security Co-operation between Japan and India" (Declaration, 2008) formalising defence and security related relations.

Japan faces many security challenges today, especially from an assertive China, compounded by the changing nature of its US Alliance. The history of the region, is also a violent struggle between the states of China, Korea, Japan and Russia, with Japan having superiority from 1890 to 1940s. Memories of harsh atrocities, subjugation, humiliation of defeats, clash

of racial and cultural superiorities and cumulative historical enmity, form the background which shapes the geo-political environment in the region today.

**Japan's Territorial Disputes:** Japan, China and Taiwan dispute the ownership of a group of uninhabited islands, called Senkaku. Japan has a territorial dispute with South Korea over a small group of islets in the Sea of Japan called Dokdo. Japan and Russia dispute the possession of four islands of the Kuril Islands chain from the Kamchatka peninsula towards Japan, lying in the Sea of Okhotsk. These islands were annexed by the Soviet Union, at the end of WW II.

**Japan-China Relations:** Japan-China relations come with a lot of historical baggage. The main issues affecting the relationship are :

- The Japan-US Alliance and presence of US forces in Japan, are perceived as threat to China.
- Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute.
- Memories of Nanking Massacre, colonization of Manchuria and insufficient remorse.
- Public visits by senior Japanese leaders to Yasukuni Jinja.
- Economic competition.
- Disputes over islands and reefs in the SCS and perceived Japanese meddling.
- Chinese access to the Western Pacific and irritation over Japanese and US control over the area.
- Changes in Japan's Defence Policies.
- Japan's recent assertiveness, seen as influenced by and serving US interests.

- Difference in perception of Victor and Loser in WWII. The US and its allies (which included China), defeated Japan in WWII. Japan had battled the US in a brutal Pacific campaign and strongly believes, that they fought and lost to the US Forces only. The Chinese being a part of the US Alliance, believe that they defeated the Japanese too and hence they are the victors. This perception is not shared by the Japanese, who do not psychologically accept that the Chinese had any part to play in their defeat.
- Japan's growing relations with Australia and India.
- Indian and Japanese aspirations for permanent membership of the UNSC.

**Japan-North Korea Relations:** Japan–North Korea do not have formal relations and present ties are severely strained, tense and hostile. US Forces in substantial number are stationed permanently in Japan, and in addition to the home country forces, present a very high level of threat in the North Korean perspective (OPLAN5027, 2017). In the event of any conflict with North Korea, it is evident that forces from Japan would be certainly involved, making Japan a legitimate target for the North Koreans (Johnson, 2017). The US presence in Japan is thus, both a boon and source of high concern for Japan.

**Chinese Activities in the South-China Sea:** The sea lanes from the Middle-East through Malacca Strait and the South-China and East-China Seas are strategically important for Japan, which depends on maritime trade for more than 99% of its total trade volume (MLIT, 2007). Until now, Japan has relied mainly on the US for the defence of these sea lanes. In recent years, however, the US expects higher involvement from its allies and partners in these spheres, and Japan will have to shoulder this burden to some extent.

**Senkaku:** The contest over the Senkaku islands has heated up in the last seven years. The location is strategically important, controlling Chinese access to the Western Pacific. In September 2012, Japan nationalised

these islands (Ryall, 2012) sparking off a series of aggressive actions by the Chinese and the Japanese coast guards. On 23rd November 2013, China set up the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” which included the Senkaku Islands, and announced that it would require all aircraft entering the zone, to file a flight plan (China Embassy in USA, 2013). The ADIZ overlaps with the Japanese ADIZ, (Fig 10) bringing both sides into direct conflict in the Senkaku Isles region (MOFA, 2013).

## Evolution of Japan's Security Policies

The changed security scenario in NE Asia, growing assertiveness of China and Japan's own vision for itself, has generated huge debate amongst the Japanese. Japan believes itself to be shackled by the limitations imposed by its Constitution and feels that other nations consider it weak and take advantage. In September 2015, a marked shift was made in Japan's security policies after marathon public and parliamentary debates (Japan MOD, 2016). The Diet passed a Legislation for Peace and Security (MOFA Japan, 2016) which consisted of two laws: “Act for Development of Legislation for Peace and Security”, (Japan MOD, 2016) which partially amends the Self-Defense Forces Act (Japan MOD, 2016), ten other laws so that Japan can participate as a normal military power along with the international community, and the International Peace Support Act (MOD Japan, 2016), which allows cooperation and support activities for the armed forces of foreign countries, in collective activities. At a fundamental level, it permits the JSDF to use force, to come to the aid of an ally or partner in threatening situations, which was earlier prohibited under the interpretation of the Constitution.

**Defence Budget and Acquisitions:** The defence budget has shown an increase since 2012. The budget of 2018 (MOD Japan, 2017) includes supporting stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and also improving the global security environment. The budget for FY2018 rose to ¥5.19 trillion and covers upgrades to the BMD system and procurement of long-range cruise missiles (500km range) (Enjoji, 2017). Japan also plans to deploy

two Aegis-Ashore anti-ballistic missile systems by 2023 (MOD Japan, 2017). Japan has also begun to fortify its remote islands by positioning units, intensifying ISR and building maritime and air superiority.

**JSDF Outreach:** The JMSDF has begun deploying ships in the IOR at much higher frequency than earlier, developing reach. Ex-Malabar 2017, off the Indian coast, featured USS Nimitz, INS Vikramaditya (both aircraft Carriers) and deployment of JS Izumo the largest ship of the JMSDF (Steve George, 2017). Japan has also transferred five TC-90 aircraft to the Philippines for training. (Rahmat, 2018). Significantly, on 3rd October 2018, a contingent of Japanese troops and JGSDF armoured vehicles engaged in exercises with the US and the Philippines in Ex Kamandag-2 in Subic Bay. This was the first time that Japan has deployed armoured vehicles on foreign soil after WW2 (Woody, 2018).


## **Drivers that Shape Indian Security Policy**

India shares its land borders with seven countries, and has major border disputes with Pakistan and China (MEA, 2017). India's interests lie from the straits of Hormuz and Aden, the littoral states of Arabia, East Africa, through the Straits of Malacca, the countries of South East Asia, China and all the way upto Japan and Vladivostok. Pakistan remains its most hostile neighbour while Bhutan is its most benign. China is its largest and most powerful neighbour, with whom there are boundary disputes in a number of areas. Today, both countries are fast growing economies with large populations and compete in the Indo-Pacific region, jostling for influence and control. The relationships between these countries, their relationships with other major players, the strategic importance of the region, interests and activities of external powers, rivalries between nuclear capable countries, all make the security environment exceedingly complex, needing careful handling.

**Pakistan:** India has boundary issues with Pakistan and they are likely to remain. Relations are at a hostile low over issues of sponsored terrorism. India views with concern, the close China-Pakistan relationship, the huge Chinese investment in CPEC, and more ominously, the building of three nuclear reactors at Chashma in Pakistan (Reuters, 2017). The development of Gwadar Port, has the PLAN regularly operating ships on deployment in the area (Kanwal, 2018). Despite cautionary statements from PM Imran Khan, there is unlikely to be any change in outlook and Pakistan will continue to increase its dependence on China for military hardware, nuclear technology, loans and infrastructure (Jorgic, 2018).

**China:** In recent years, India's relationship with China has deteriorated on account of border disputes along the LAC. China started stapling Chinese visas in the passports of residents of Arunachal Pradesh, instead of stamping them. (PTI, 2011). Eight countries including Maldives, in India's neighbourhood, and Djibouti, which hosts the lone Chinese military base overseas, are particularly at risk of debt distress associated with BRI (CGDev, 2018). The port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka is an example of this strategy. A similar story is unfolding in Maldives, Pakistan, Myanmar and Nepal. Bangladesh too runs the risk of falling into the Chinese debt trap.

**Table 1: Chinese Investments in the Region**



**String of Pearls:** China has built a network of military and commercial facilities and relationships, along its sea lines of communication, which extend from the Chinese mainland to Sudan, referred to as “String of Pearls” (Booz Allen 2005). In its first ever Defence White Paper in 2015, China has stated, that its global influence hinges on naval supremacy, which demanded that its navy moves from “offshore waters defence” to “open seas protection” (MNDPRC, 2015). India has tried to develop the strategically important Chabahar port, to balance Gwadar, with investment of \$15 billion to help build railways, roads and fertiliser plants (Gupta, 2016). In another strategic deal, Indonesia has agreed to give India access to the strategic island port of Sabang (Chaudhuri, 2018).

**Dalai Lama:** China sees the Dalai Lama as an instigator of Tibetan separatism and views India as aiding the Tibetan cause, both by supporting the Dalai Lama and hosting the community-in-exile, in Dharamsala (Madhukar, 2018)

**Sri Lanka:** Sri Lanka’s relationship with China has strengthened, with billions of dollars of loans to the Sri Lankan government for new infrastructure projects. Sri Lanka, struggling to pay back its existing \$8 billion debt to China, made a deal leasing an 85% share of Hambantota port for 99 years to a Chinese state company, on 25th July 2017 (Basu, 2017). Chinese submarines have demonstrated capability to operate in the IOR, docking in Colombo in October 2014 (Srilal, 2014).

**Maldives:** India’s ties with Maldives have been impacted by China’s growing footprint, evinced by a rushed FTA with China. (Varma, 2017) and its backing for China’s BRI. Maldives had cancelled a deal with an Indian company for the upgradation of Male Airport and awarded it to a Chinese company during President Xi Jinping’s visit in September 2014 (Reuters, 2014) The relations became particularly bad in April 2018, when the Yameen regime asked India to take back two Dhruv helicopters gifted to Male in 2013 (Pandit, 2018)



**Bangladesh:** The real benefit for India of “neighbourhood first” approach is that Bangladesh has provided great strategic opportunity to change South-Asia’s geopolitical situation. During PM Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India, a credit line of \$4.5 billion with an additional \$500 million was extended, for defence hardware purchase (Janardhanan, 2018). Bangladesh has emerged as a key gateway for India’s sub-regional initiatives, the BIMSTEC and BBIN.

China has however made significant inroads into Bangladesh. Loans worth over \$24 billion have been given to build power plants, a seaport and railways (Blanchard, 2016). China has promised to step up defence ties, including personnel training and cooperation in equipment technology (MND, 2015). In addition, it plans to provide a significant \$9 billion low-interest loan to build six rail projects, including one close to the Indian border (Paul, 2016).

## **Summary of Indian Security Policy**

The competition within the IOR simplistically speaking, is one for access, use of ports and the securing of bases. China is trying to secure energy resources and reduce its dependence on the Strait of Malacca, and has laid forth its “BRI” initiative. India has the capability to build up its own capability as a “net security provider.” (Gates, 2009). Specifically, it has supported capacity building for Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles, and Mauritius and has invested in ports at Sittwe and Chabahar.

The foundational principles of Indian approach comprise a policy of non-alignment, autonomy in security, flexibility in choosing one’s partners, and caution in working with bigger powers (Bajpai, 2017). As China inches to becoming one of the great powers, India is presented with a great power at its doorstep, which has competitive and hostile intent. This does not permit India the luxury of being non-committal or un-involved. India has adopted a pragmatic and realist approach, conducting its foreign policy on most occasions with caution and prudence, deterrence, keeping primacy

of sovereignty over interventionism in international affairs; working within existing frameworks rather than reshaping international institutions, a gradual accumulation of military power and engagement with neighbouring countries. India's priorities and strategic objectives could be prioritised as :

- Prioritising an integrated neighbourhood; "Neighbourhood First."
- Leveraging international partnerships to promote domestic development.
- Ensuring a stable and multipolar balance of power in the Indo-Pacific; "Act East."
- Dissuading Pakistan from supporting terrorism.
- Avoid Alliances of any kind, especially any military alliances.
- Form Bi-Lateral groupings compared to multi-lateral groupings.
- Maintain Strategic autonomy, but demonstrate pragmatism in keeping with national interests.
- Counter growing Chinese influence in the IOR

## **Impact on India's Security Policies Towards Japan**

India's security and foreign policies are intertwined to a very large degree and its gestures and actions towards one nation, have far reaching implications on its relationships with others. Whilst there are many factors that shape the Japanese perception towards India, the major ones are worth recalling.

- China has become as a major actor in international economics and politics.
- Aggressive Chinese actions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the associated overlapping ADIZ over area claimed by Japan.

- Criticality of security of the SLOCs of the Indo-Pacific, as over 85% of Japan's crude oil comes from the Middle-East region. (Statista, 2018).
- The ongoing disputes over the island territories in the SCS affect peace and stability for transit through the Straits of Malacca, an extremely important requirement in Japan's perspective.
- China's ability to fragment the cohesion of the ASEAN Nations.
- China expanding dual-use infrastructure projects and political influence in the IOR.
- Uncertainty of US support as a long-term guarantor of Japan's security and a perception of decreasing US influence and interest in the region, as evident from withdrawals from the TPP, JCPOA. (Sidhu, 2017)
- Assessment that India has the economic, military and political potential to be an independent regional power, capable of countering China.
- Tapping the emerging market potential of India.

## **Benefits to India**

- India looks for investments from Japan at convenient rates for infrastructure development.
- Access to civil nuclear technology.
- Support for its territorial disputes.
- Support for freedom of the seas, peaceful settlement of disputes, including in the SCS (George, 2015).
- The prospect of support from an influential partner nation, while attempting to balance Chinese pressure.

**The China Factor:** The biggest factor in the calculations of both countries is obviously the growth and intentions of China. The prominent factors are :

- China strives to gain influence in South Asia, while India vies for the same in East Asia. The rivalry is apparent in the efforts of both countries to join and direct various regional organizations, while limiting the influence of the other.
- India is attempting to gain a seat on the UN Security Council and membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
- China has bolstered Pakistan's military capabilities and accelerated development of Islamabad's nuclear weapons and missile programs (FAS, 2002). China has deepened its engagement with Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, on the economic and strategic front (Dutta, 2017).
- India engages with Russia, Japan and US, all countries that China perceives to be working to contain it.
- India's provision of sanctuary in 1959 to Dalai Lama, who continues to be politically active in exile, along with approximately 130,000 Tibetans in India (Madhukar, 2018).
- Russia's perceived favoritism toward India, since the Soviet Union split with China and backing of India in the Sino-Indian War. But China's recent military cooperation with Russia has altered this dynamic (O'Connor, 2018).
- India's growing nuclear capabilities and modernizing missile force are perceived as a threat to China (Tao, 2018).
- Possibility of two-front conflict pitting India against China and Pakistan simultaneously, a concern accelerated by the CPEC (Katoch, 2018).

## **The Shaping of India's Security Policies**

China will remain India's neighbour, economic competitor and largest trading partner. China has boundary disputes with India and has brought them centre-stage by aggressive actions over the past five years. It has strategically indulged in predatory economics, to develop dependencies in the Indo-Pacific region and exert influence (Tillerson, 2017). China continues to actively support Pakistan in all its ventures and is actively pursuing a geo-economic expansionist policy with its BRI. Japan has felt threatened by both Russia and China and feels that it may not be completely able to depend on the US, for all its security needs. China has carried out massive development of the disputed islands in the SCS and East China Sea. Japan has modified its erstwhile pacific constitution becoming more militarily assertive and seeks partnerships and alliances with India and Australia, as also with other ASEAN nations.

There is the fact, of the growing relationship between India and US. In 2016, the relationship was elevated to a "Enduring Global Partners in the 21st Century" (MEA, 2017). There is increasing military engagement and co-operation, purchase of arms and support at all levels like the MCTR, NSG, STA-1, notwithstanding the friction over issues of tariffs and trade with Iran, that have emerged recently (Stacey, 2018).

The question does arise; is the present closeness between India-Japan and India-US, a form of reaction to the Thucydides trap, where these nations are coming together to tackle the fear generated of a growing China? This paper does not outrightly reject the idea. Since all countries play the game at a strategic realist level, the desire to partner, is probably inevitable. It is the degree to which this factor is taken into consideration, that ultimately determines a nation's policies. It is the paper's assessment, that in case of Japan, there is a larger probable, that the China factor is driving Japan closer to India.

India should continue to develop its strategic partnership with the US and India has much to gain from this relationship, especially as it grows

economically and stabilises militarily over the next decade. Next, India must stabilise its relationship with China, while demonstrating strength and resolve in safeguarding its core interests, simultaneously demonstrating concern and accommodation over other minor issues. It must build its relations with the other actors in the IOR region, creating a more localised form of balancing, by increasing defence partnerships with other regional powers (Pant, 2016).

### **Most Probable Shape of India's Engagement with Japan**

India's relationship with Japan will adopt the contours of a form of regional balancing. An alignment with Japan, in a way automatically includes US. Pure calculations would indicate that Japan has more to gain from a strong relationship with India, than India would gain from Japan.

North Korea figures very high in Japan's security calculus and hence India's relationship with North Korea has implications on the Indo-Japan relationship. India has had long standing, but low intensity diplomatic relations with North Korea (DPRK). It has not isolated the country, even when it remains convinced of the existing nexus between DPRK, Pakistan and China for nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology (Rao, 2017).

The most serious disadvantageous consequence of a closer partnership with the US and Japan, is the potential problems posed for India's relationships with Russia and China. It would be of great benefit, if India could count on both the goodwill of US and Russia, to balance China. Though Russia also has concerns about China, increasing animosity with the US, has created co-operation and closer ties with China, complicating India's choices.

India and Japan desire similar strategic objectives, however not through identical methods. Both countries seek to manage the effects of the rise of China and limit its impact in their areas of interest. Japan is worried about a direct confrontation and will actively gather partners and allies

to present a strong and strident resistant front. India is concerned, but is relatively more economically engaged with China and less worried about its immediate physical threat, compared to Japan. As a result, India will be probably be less vocal in complaints about Chinese actions, preferring to handle the situation through other less confrontationist measures, when not directly threatened. Though, if directly confronted on boundary issues or similar core issues, India is likely to take a strong military stand and marshal all support from its partners. Both these aspects were visibly evident in India's handling of the Doklam confrontation.

In this context, in which India's choices are limited, regional balancing with caution (China and Russia factors) represents a necessary supplement to its other strategic efforts. Getting too close to the US has a strategic disadvantage in that, while the US gets a strong balancing partner, and so does India no doubt, but India gets a more determined enemy, in its immediate neighbourhood. India recognises only UN sanctions and does not consider individual country sanctions as legal or binding. In this context, even now, despite negotiations, no concessions are being granted to India for trade with Russia under the CAATSA (Rajghatta, 2018). Russia has been a relatively reliable strategic partner for decades and India has decided to go ahead with the purchase of the S-400 system despite US sanctions (Pandit, 2018).

Regional balancing is a possible strategy, India could pursue to align with Japan, Vietnam, Australia and other ASEAN countries, in order to balance against China. There are many advantages from such an approach. It gives India the option of balancing China without the disadvantage of aligning with another great power such as the US. This is also domestically convenient, as the Indian population are very receptive to the idea of enhancing ties with Southeast and East Asia. Also, unlike an alignment with another great power, India would likely be the more significant partner in regional alignments and relationships in Asia, where only Japan is of comparable power.

India has to be able to maintain a viable and constructive dialogue with China at all levels, so as to seek a resolution to its boundary disputes. India has to demonstrate resolve and restraint, strength and pliability, compromise and firmness all at the same time with China, during this period of engagement. Russia is India's major international partner and continues to be the largest unconditional arms supplier. India also has to assuage Russian sentiment and reassure it of the strength of its relationship. Therefore, India must partner Japan at all levels, but not to the extent that it affects or compromises its other relationships.

## **Conclusion**

India has an immensely favorable geo-politically strategically important location in the Indian-Ocean Region and has gradually assumed the status of a regional power. India has good relations with Japan, US, Russia, Australia and most of the ASEAN nations. It has a difficult relationship with China, but has engagements and inter-dependencies at various other levels. Japan under PM Abe has managed to make significant alterations in the interpretation of its Constitution, passing important Acts and Laws, that allow its forces to use force when required.

India has shown steady trajectory of economic growth and has begun acting out its "Act East" Policy under PM Modi. India is engaging increasingly with China, whilst having a military standoff over its boundary issues. It is increasingly engaging economically with all ASEAN countries and China. Japan feels increasingly threatened with the growing power of China and the apparent reduction in US presence and involvement in the Indo-Pacific. Consequently, Japan has become assertive and has taken specific military tactical steps to deal with Chinese activities in the region.

In furthering its relationship with an assertive Japan, India accrues the advantage of having strong relationship with an economically strong and influential partner. It serves to counter-balance China when required. The peripheral factors and consequences of the strong US-Japan alliance can



also be taken advantage of, when required. Too strong an alliance with Japan, would probably serve to give China a feeling of being cornered and may result in increased animosity. Being clubbed with Japan for a permanent seat on the UNSC, invites a definite Chinese veto, which is not to India's advantage. India's approach to its relationship with Japan will be steady and strong, however may not be at the pace that Japan desires.

India's long term strategic objective would be to have a predominant influence in the Indian Ocean region enforceable with a strong all round military capability, a seat on the United Nations Security Council, a strong economy, resolution of its boundary issues with China, a reasonable status quo with Pakistan and good relations with all its other neighbours.

India would have to continue its engagements with all players and shape them so that they match our requirements. It will have to clearly identify its long term strategic objectives and orchestrate its military economic and diplomatic capability to achieve them. India cannot afford to display narrow stances or abstract idealism. It will have to be pragmatic, realist, balance its options, hedge selectively when it must and handle each relationship and event, case by case, keeping the actions in consonance with its strategic long term objective.

## **Bibliography**

1. Abe, Shinzo Aug 2007 "Confluence of the Two Seas", PM of Japan Speech at the Parliament of India on 22 Aug 2007 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html>
2. Blank Jonah, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Angel Rabasa, Bonny L, 2015, "Look East, Cross Black Waters: India's Interest in Southeast Asia" RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California
3. Brands, Hal 2018, "American Grand Strategy in The Age Of Trump", Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C.

4. Danner, Lukas K. 2018, "China's Grand Strategy Contradictory Foreign Policy?" Palgrave Macmillan, Pub Springer International Publishing AG, Switzerland
5. Horimoto, T and L Varma 2013, India Japan Relations in Emerging Asia, Manohar Publishers, UK.
6. Izuyama Mari 2015, "India: The Foreign and Security Policy under the Modi Government," NIDS East Asia Review 2015, Chap 5, pp 170-202
7. Malone, David M. 2011, "Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy", Oxford University Press, New York
8. Menon, Shiv Shankar 2016, Choices : Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy, Penguin Random House, Delhi.
9. Mohan C Raja 2008, "India's geopolitics and Southeast Asia Southeast Asian Affairs", Volume 2008, pp. 43-60 (Article), downloaded from <http://muse.jhu.edu/article/257252> on 21 April 2017.
10. Mukherjee, R and A Yazaki 2016, Poised for Partnership : Deepening India Japan Relations in the Asian Century, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
11. Satake, Tomohiko 2017, "Japan: Expanding Strategic Horizons", NIDS East Asia Review 2017, Chap 8, pp 236-263
12. Shamshad, Ahmad Khan 2017, Changing Dynamics of India Japan Relations : Buddhism to Special Strategic Partnership, Pentagon Press, Delhi.
13. Sisodia, NS(ed) and GV Naidu(ed) 2007, India-Japan Relations : Partnership for Peace and Security in Asia, Bibliophile South Asia, New Delhi.
14. Swaine Michael D, Tellis, Ashley J, 2000, "Interpreting China's Grand Strategy

15. Past, Present, and Future”. Rand Corporation, Santa Monica California
16. Tanham, George K, 1992 “Indian Strategic Thought- An Interpretive Essay” published by RAND Corporation Santa Monica downloaded on 16 May 2018 from <https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R4207.html>
17. “China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation”, First Edition 2017, released by The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, January 2017 downloaded on 17 Apr 2018 from [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2017-01/11/c\\_135973695.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2017-01/11/c_135973695.htm)
18. “Defense of Japan 2017” (Annual White Paper), MOD Japan Website downloaded 11May 2018, [http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w\\_paper/2017.html](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2017.html)
19. Abe, S., 2016. Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry Government of Japan. [Online] Available at: [http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2016/0523\\_01.html](http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2016/0523_01.html) [Accessed 24 May 2018].
20. Bosack, M., 2017. The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/what-did-japan-learn-in-south-sudan/> [Accessed 24 July 2018].
21. Cai, P., 2017. The Lowy Institute for International Policy. [Online] [https://www.loyyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/documents/Understanding%20China%E2%80%99s%20Belt%20and%20Road%20Initiative\\_WEB\\_1.pdf](https://www.loyyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/documents/Understanding%20China%E2%80%99s%20Belt%20and%20Road%20Initiative_WEB_1.pdf) [Accessed 10 June 2018].
22. China Embassy in USA, 2013. Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in the United States of America. [Online] Available at: <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/dhfsbq2> [Accessed 20 May 2018].
23. CRS Report for Congress, 2012. Congressional Research Service. [Online] Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf> [Accessed 01 Aug 2018].

24. Desai, S., 2017. The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/revisiting-asean-india-relations/> [Accessed 20 May 2018].
25. Dutta, P. K., 2017. India Today. [Online] Available at: <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-encircle-india-string-of-pearls-982930-2017-06-15> [Accessed 12 May 2018].
26. DWP Japan, 2016. Annual Defence White Paper “Defence of Japan” 2016. Tokyo: MOD Japan.
27. Gancheng, Z., 2004. “China-India Ties: Simultaneous Rising and Peaceful Coexistence”. International Review, Vol. 35,, Summer.
28. Gilani, S. Y. R., 2010. Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. [Online] Available at: <http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbqx/t779919.htm> [Accessed 18 June 2018].
29. Govt of PRC, 2015. The State Council The Peoples Republic of China. [Online] Available at: <http://english.gov.cn/beltAndRoad/> [Accessed 23 June 2018].
30. Izuyama, M., 2017. Security in the Indian Ocean Region: Regional Responses to China’s Growing Influence. East Asian Strategic Review 2017, Issue 2017, pp. 38-64.
31. Jaishankar, D., 2017. Diving into the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN Focus, December 2017(7/ 2017), pp. 8-9.
32. Japan MOD, 2016. Development of Legislation. In: M. Japan, ed. Defense of Japan 2016. 2016 ed. Tokyo: Ministry Of Defence Japan, pp. 208-214.
33. Japan, M., 2000. Minsitry of Foreign Affairs. [Online] Available at: [https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0008/india\\_s.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0008/india_s.html) [Accessed 15 June 2018].

34. Japan, M., 2006. Joint Statement Towards Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership, s.l.: s.n.
35. JDF, 2018. Ministry of Defence Government of Japan. [Online] Available at: <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no101/activities.html> [Accessed 25 June 2018].

## **Author**

Air Commodore Inderpal Singh Walia, AVSM, VM, ndc was born on 2nd November 1967 and schooled in various institutions in different parts of India. He graduated from the 72nd Course of the National Defence Academy. He earned his pilot's wings and was commissioned into the Indian Air Force on 11 June 1988. He has flown a variety of fighter aircraft during his active career and is operational on all variants of the MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-27, Jaguar and Su-30 MKI. He is a Fighter Strike Leader from the prestigious Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment IAF (TACDE) and had graduated with top honours. He has also had the distinction of serving two tenures as Directing Staff at TACDE, during which he was responsible for conduct of training. He is also a qualified Instrument Rating Instructor and Examiner. He has undergone the Advanced Command and Staff Course from JSCSC, Shrivenham and MA from Kings College, London. He has commanded a frontline Fighter Squadron and served in the Directorate of Air Staff Inspection (DASI) at Air HQ IAF. He has also served on the personal staff of two Chiefs of Air Staff, IAF. He has been the Defence Attaché to Japan and South Korea was the Commandant of TACDE, IAF. He has commanded an operational frontline fighter base which had a large number of air assets. He has been awarded the Vayu Sena Medal for distinguished flying and the Ati Visihist Seva Medal for distinguished service of a high order. He is a voracious reader and plays most games.