

IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR SUCCESSFUL COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA

**Colonel Abdulwahab Adelokun Eyitayo, FSS, MSS, RNS, BSc,
psc, MPA, MLCJ**

Introduction

The history of men and indeed nations is hinged on power struggles, violence, confrontations and armed hostilities. In the twentieth century, numerous wars were fought which cost millions of lives while this century has witnessed more battle casualties and collateral loss of civilian lives than any other century.¹ Security threats today are on numerous smaller conflicts operating mostly inside countries and scattered about the globe but threaten to spill over into neighboring countries.² Not surprising though, ethnic warfare fragmented Yugoslavia and Georgia from Soviet Union, and civil war has brought untold miseries to Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti in which millions of people have lost their lives.³ These conflicts have created great number of casualties and refugees leading to humanitarian intervention by the United Nations (UN) in furtherance of global security.

In modern parlance National Security looks beyond the traditional approach that emphasizes the use and control of armed forces. Romm lists security from narcotic cartels, economic security, environmental security and energy security as the non-military elements of national security.⁴ Another evolving threat to global security is terrorism in which a set of angry people tried to thrust their grievances to the government and world opinion over perceived injustices using violence means.⁵ The bombing of New York's World Trade Center in 1993 and lethal gas attack in Tokyo by fanatical religious sects are

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1. Conway W.Henderson, C.W, "International Relations: Conflict and Cooperation at the Turn of the 21st Century", Printed in the United States of America, ISBN-0-07-028255-2, McGraw-Hill International editions (1998) p.4.
 2. Ibid. p.5
 3. Ibid.
 4. Romm J.J. 1983, Defining National Security; the non military aspects. Pew Project on America's Task in a Changed World (Pew Project Series). Council on Foreign Relations. P.122. ISBN 9780876091357. <http://books.google.co.in/books?id=shxDOnuVcyYC>. Retrieved 22 September, 2010.
 5. Conway W.Henderson, opcit.p.5.

vivid testimonies of terrorists' capabilities.⁶ In Nigeria, the activities of Boko Haram and Niger Delta splinter groups have constituted a great security threats to national development. It is for this reason that this study seeks to examine the challenges and prospects of counter terrorism/insurgency (CT/COIN) operations in Nigeria.

Relationship Between Regional Cooperation and CT/Coin

The focus of the UN's rules and norms has been to prohibit war and foster peace through extensive international trade and democratic governments in the modern world. World leaders and scholars are more sensitive to issues concerning socio-economic and ethnic injustices that lead to war, revolution, and terrorism. Therefore, the basis for Regional Cooperation is in adopting common policies in administering the people and resources from a particular region for purpose of achieving a meaningful development. Meanwhile, CT/COIN entails the use of national resources to defend the sovereignty in order to create a peaceful atmosphere for development. Consequent upon this, cooperation is expedient amongst countries at regional and international level to provide a greater means of arresting insurgency by joint pooling of resources. For example, an elaborate coordination in the operational planning by the member states of the LCBC is expected to safeguard the West Africa sub-region against the menace of Boko Haram, foster promotion of commerce and economic wellbeing as well as peaceful co-existence within Africa continent.⁷ Therefore, there is a direct causal relationship between Regional Cooperation and COIN.

Overview of Trends in Insurgency in Africa

Most states in Africa gained their independence in 1960s.⁸ The value of formal inter-regional trade is only about one-fifth the value of trade with Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.⁹ In 2001, per capita income for the Africa region US\$318 was only about one-fourteenth of the global average US\$4,376.¹⁰ The poor economy and severely low levels of infrastructural and industrial development in

6. Ibid, p.6.

7. Ibid.


8. Marshall G.M, "Conflict Trends in Africa 1946-2004:A Macro-Comparative Perspective", Centre for Systemic Peace, School of George Mason University Arlington, Virginia, USA.mmarsha5@gmu.edu703-993-8177. P.1

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.


the contemporary era has been instrumental to the high levels of political instability and violence.¹¹

Figure 1: Africa: Regional Trends in Armed Conflict 1946-2004



Source: Gregory Monty Marshal 2015

Figure 2: State Based Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Sub region, 1960-2012



Source: Themner and Wallenstein 2013

The general trend line in figure 1 shows a fairly constant increase in the magnitude of warfare in Africa during the Cold War/decolonization period, 1946-1989 (each of the trends graphs is marked with a vertical line at 1989 as a point of reference demarcating the end of the Cold War). The upward trend is mainly attributable to the protracted duration of wars during the Cold War period; very few wars were ended by negotiated settlement during this period. Since 1993 the trend

11. Global Finance, "The World's Richest and Poorest Countries; 2015 Rankings", Global Data>Economic Data. Thursday, 02 June 2016. Copyright©2015, Global Finance Magazine, All rights Reserved. <https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/worlds-richest-and-poorest-countries?>

has reversed and the general magnitude of war decreased to about half its peak value by 2004. Further crisis are internally generated due to insurgents activities as shown in figure 2.

African states under the auspices of regional organizations are becoming more coordinated with their armed forces operation across borders in neighboring countries using AU Plan of Action, 2002. Specifically, it enjoins member states to develop operational guidelines to implement conflict prevention, management and resolution (CPMR), disarmament and arms controls, using articles VII and X of the MOU on cooperation in area of peace and security between the AU, Regional Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of Regional Standby forces.¹² To demonstrate greater continental security capacity concept, there is need for external support from EU and UN for funding and logistical support.

Sub-Regional Conflict and Challenges of Governance


The West Africa region comprises of 15 relatively small and less populated countries, except Nigeria. Violence erupted, leading to the collapse of civil authority in Liberia in 1989 and later Sierra Leone in 1990s. Nigeria played a key role in helping to stabilize the region, within the auspices of ECOWAS. Active international engagement in this region led to improvements in the security environment and regional stabilization.¹³ Subsequently, tensions arose due to emergence of coups d'état in Guinea-Bissau and a botched plan by al-Qaeda to destabilize Sahel countries of Mali, Niger, and Mauritania, as well as low intensity conflicts in Ghana, Senegal, and Nigeria.¹⁴

12. "Action Plan for the implementation of the African Union Strategy on the control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons".Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia.p.2. email:situationroom@africa-union.org.

13. Vinck P, Pham, PN and Kreutzer.T, "Talking Peace: A population-based survey on attitudes about security,dispute resolution,and post-conflict reconstruction in Liberia". Berkeley,CA: Human Right Center, University of California, Berkeley,2011.

14. Gilmour J.G, "The terrorist threat in North-West: Part One Journal of military and Strategic Studies 14(2).2012

Figure 3: Fatalities from Organized Violence in West Africa, 1989-2012



In proactive, Chadian Authority issued an ultimatum to 30,000 CAR rebels sojourning in Chad since 2003 to leave the country.¹⁵ Some of the rebels infiltrated the Nigerian territory through the porous borders around Lake Chad while others infiltrated LCBC states from Libya and Sudan.¹⁶

Effects of Insurgency on Nigeria

The official name of Boko Haram is Jama'atul Ahlis Sunna Lidda' awatil wal-Jihad translated as "People of the way of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and community (of muslims) in line with the earlier generation of muslims".¹⁷ Members of the movement are drawn from the Kanuri and Hausa-Fulani tribe of Nigeria.¹⁸ The prevailing neglect of the masses by the political elites in Borno State easily triggered the emergence of insurgency. Of recent, AQIM extended tactical and ideological support to Boko Haram.¹⁹ Boko Haram roams the forested porous borders of Niger, Chad, Cameroun and Nigeria, recruiting fighters.²⁰

15. Edokpayi A.O (Brig-Gen), "Brief for Defence Headquarters Team on Operational Visit to Multinational Joint Task Force" on 24 January 2013.

16. Ibid.

17. Nigeria: Maps, History, Geography, Government, Culture, Facts, Guide & Travel/ Holidays/ Cities-Infoplease.com>...>Nigeria

18. Forest, J.F, "Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria." Joint Special Operations University JSOU Report 12-5 7701. Tampa Point Boulevard. MacDill AFB. Florida.

19. Kuhne Winrich, "West Africa and the Sahel in the Grip of Organized Crime and International Terrorism-What perspectives for Mali after the Elections?", Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.Zif Center for International Peace Operations. www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/vereffentlichungen/ZIF_Policy,pp.6-9.

20. Ibid.

From 2010, collaboration increased with the al-Qaeda and there were increased spate of brutality that destroyed military installations, government parastatals, UN Office, etc.²¹ The campaign hit the peak with kidnappings of Chibok girls, communities rural women and children abductions.²²

Economic Effect: Agriculture the main stay of the local economy is hampered by low productivity, cattle rustling and wanton killings of herdsmen. There has been a reduction in the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) since the inception of Boko Haram impasse.²³ The implication is that there has been a drastic reduction in government derivation from the north east.

Political and Social Effect: Following a spate of violent attacks on schools and abductions, children and wards avoid schools to stay alive. The region remain the most educationally disadvantaged.²⁴

The provision of infrastructural facilities such as electricity is restricted to cities. Health is another major challenge as many people cannot afford private health providers.²⁵

Unity on Trial: Intensified attacks on churches and taking expatriates as hostages, some of them clergy men, is promoting ill feelings among Nigerians on test of faith and reason for existence.²⁶ There are strong indications that the Southern Christians are leaving the North in mass as the Northern Muslims are leaving the South by the truckloads.²⁷

Diplomatic Relations: Nigeria has been commended for taken significant steps towards implementing anti money laundering and Terrorism Amendment Acts by FATF.²⁸ Meanwhile, there have been frantic discriminations on Nigerians in search of visa to Western Europe due to the association of young Umar Abdulmutallab a Nigerian with terrorism in the United State on 25 December 2009.

21. Ibid.p.6

22. Ibid.pp.4-10

23. World Investment Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "Nigeria loses N1.3 trillion to Insecurity in Kano-UN Report", accessed online at http://leadership.ngng.aarticles.385/020121028nigeria_loses_n13_trn_insecurity_kano_un_report.html accessed on 10 January 2013

24. Afri-Dev-Info Public Policy Brief and Editorial- on Highlights of 2015 Nigerian Multisectoral scorecard and factsheet on Education, Governance Peace and Security Social condition Facilitating Rise of Boko Haram.[www. Afro-dev.info/p.2](http://www.Afro-dev.info/p.2)

25. Ibid.

26. Jacob Zenn, Opcit. P.2

27. Ibid.pp.6-8

28. Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Published Statement, 22 February 2013. www.fatf-gafi.org/org/documents/fatf.pp.23-26.

Unemployment and Poverty: According to Peter Lewis' comparative study of economic development in Nigeria and Indonesia, Nigerian elites plundered their economy while the equally corrupt elites of Indonesia make the critical choice of investing at home.²⁹ Youth unemployment across Nigeria is very terrifying seeing that it is over 50 percent. Table 1 below shows that the incidence of poverty at national level has grown from 27.2 percent in 1980 to 69 percent in 2010.

Table 1 : Poverty Incidence and Population Trends in Nigeria, 1980-2010.			
Year	Poverty Incidence	Estimated Population(Mn)	Population Poverty(Mn)
1980	27.2%	65	17.1
1985	46.3%	75	34.7
1992	42.7%	91.5	39.2
1996	65.6%	102.3	67.1
2004	54.4%	126.3	68.7
2010	69.0	163	112.47
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, August 2012.			

The breakdown for Food Poor, Absolute, Relative and Dollar Per Day measurement of poverty in Tables 4 and 5 depicts North West has the highest incidence of poverty based on the four types of measurements followed by the North East. The North Central is the third with high number of poverty using all measurements except, Food Poor.

Table 2 : Zonal Incidence of poverty by different poverty measure/percentage change in income inequalities in Nigeria, 2004-2010.					
Zone	Food Poor	Absolute Poor	Relative Poor	DollarP/Day	%change
North Central	38.6	59.5	67.5	59.7	-5.4
North East	51.5	69.0	76.3	69.1	8.6
North West	51.8	70.0	77.7	70.4	0.7
South East	41.0	58.7	67.0	59.2	18.1
South South	35.5	55.9	63.8	56.1	12.8
South West	25.4	49.8	59.1	50.1	0.2
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Abuja, August 2012.					

29. Peter M.Lewis, *Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2007. Amazon.com:Books. www.institutions.africa.org

Table 2 shows the percentage change in income inequalities broken down by geopolitical zone over the period 2003/2004 to 2009/2010. Income inequalities increased by 0.7 percent in the North East and fell lower in South West by 0.2 percent. Also, the North Central experienced unprecedented decrease in income inequality with -5.4 percent. On the whole, the North East in particular has the worst indicators.

Small Arms Proliferation: There is attendant proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), and militarization of society which hampers national cohesion and stability. The quantum and various calibers of weapons and ammunitions collected from the militants in the ongoing CT/COIN depicts abundance arsenals of weapons.³⁰

City Slums and Displacement Camp: Rural dwellers have relocate to cities in search of physical security leading to the springing up of slums or Ghettos with little or no provisions been made for convenience. Displacement camps occur where government have been able to confine the fleeing populace to a temporary recognized facility.³¹ The rate of urbanization in the north east has been estimated at over 4 percent annually.³²

Challenge of Rebuilding the North East: The North East Nigeria Recovery and Peace Building Assessment Team (RPBA) while assessing the impact of the conflict stated that it will cost USD \$9 billion out of which \$6 billion will be required to perform recovery efforts.³³ Borno was worse hit by the crisis with a loss of \$6 billion.

Security Challenges: There exist along the roads a sizeable number of check points and road blocks through which vehicles and passengers are subjected to checks in a laborious exercise.³⁴ There cannot be public assemblage without permit in Abuja and some northern part of Nigeria due to perceived insecurity.³⁵

30. Nancy Annan, "Violent Conflicts and civil strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges and Prospects" 3(1), P. Art.3.DOI://doc.org/10.5334/sta.dawwww.stabilityjournal.org/article. Published on 28 Jan 2014.

31. Marc Alexandre, Verjee Neelam and Mogaka Stephen, "The Challenge of Stability and Security in West Africa" <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2150>.

32. Ibid.

33. The News, "Boko Haram insurgency costs Nigeria's North East USD \$9 bln", Wednesday 31 March 2016. [Thenewsnigeria.com.ng/2016/03/book-haram-insurgency-costs-nigerias-north-east-9bln/](http://thenewsnigeria.com.ng/2016/03/book-haram-insurgency-costs-nigerias-north-east-9bln/)

34. Author's direct experience as security personnel.

35. Ibid.

Challenges of Counter Insurgency Operations

Geography of the North East: The area is semi-desert in nature with Sahel savannah type of vegetation and total land mass is about 157,000 square kilometer.³⁶

The lake provides an important gateway into the contiguous countries. It is interspersed with numerous islands used for training and recruitment of the locals by the insurgents.³⁷ The hottest month of the year is April when temperatures can be as high as 48 degree centigrade.³⁸

There is strength increase subsequently by foreign mercenaries, sympathizers and sponsors of the insurgents who reside along the porous borders.³⁹

Concept of Operation: The concept is to defeat the insurgents in order to achieve the desired end state of restoring peace to the north east and allow socio-economic activities to thrive across the country.⁴⁰ Basically, there will be a conduct of joint patrols, raids and escort duties, mounting of road blocks, cordon and search operations and conduct of plain cloth surveillance by intelligence operatives using local assets and informants.⁴¹ However, these efforts are not yielding the desired results due to inadequate manpower to police the ungoverned areas and logistics constraints.

New Force Structure in the North East: The establishment of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 1998 to conduct operations was mainly to checkmate banditry activities hence the expansion of the mandate in April 2012 to cover the fight against terrorism.⁴² The region now has three divisions deployed under a unified command known as the 'Theatre Command'.⁴³ There is the complementary role from LCBC states in Contiguous zone whose command is situated at Ndjamen- Chad under a Force Commander.⁴⁴

36. Nigeria-Geographical Features of Nigeria-Online.comwww.onlinenigeria.com>geography.

37. Ransome-Kuti E.A (Brig-Gen), "Brief for Chief of Army Staff on the conduct of operation Zaman Lafiya within MNJTF Area of Operations. 22 February 2014.p.4.

38. Ibid.

39. Abubakar Y.M (Maj Gen), "Theatre Comd Operations Directives for Op Lafiya Dole-Phase 2" p.4.

40. Ibid.pp.6-9.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Abubakar Y.M.Op.cit.

44. Lake Chad Basin Commission Operation Level Concept, Op cit..

Troops were organized into three sectors with Nigeria, Chad and Cameroun providing a brigade each.⁴⁵ There is need for the Formations to work as a team for maximum benefits.

Logistics Constraints: There is lack of spares for T-72 Tanks, support weapons, inadequate ammunition re-supply, mobility and lack of resources to fix damaged bridges impromptu.⁴⁶ Others include lack of equipment for identification of buried explosive ordinances within the vicinity, inadequate communication equipment and, etc.⁴⁷

Increasing Proliferation: There is influx of SALW across the international borders into Nigeria. The volumes of arms that entered the region are from North Africa.⁴⁸ Recently, there was a report on Bongor, a town in Chad, where weapons are sold without hindrances.⁴⁹ This act as base for ammunition and technical support.

Overaged Weapons and Ammunitions: The weapons mounted on the platforms are fraught with stoppages while the bombs often fail to explode.⁵⁰ Usually, it sets a bad signal in the minds of soldiers by making them feel insecure and speedily succumb to the temptation to withdraw from battle in a haphazard way.⁵¹

Lack of Magazine Facilities/Weapon Technicians: Many formations do not have standard magazines facility to keep arms and ammunition. Therefore, troops only move with their first line scale in which in event of sustained fire-fight replenishment becomes difficult.⁵² A peculiar trend is for the weapon technicians to reside in the big towns and direct that damaged equipment be back loaded.⁵³

Water Transportation: A substantial portion of north east is covered by Lake Chad, which is interspersed with numerous islands referred to as “Tumbus”. The practice of hiring commercial boats for operations is unsafe and highly

45. Ibid.

46. Adeosun L.O (Maj Gen),”Brief for the Chief of Army Staff Lt Gen TY Buratai on the update of implementation of COAS Directives for OP LAFIYA DOLE”, 15 August 2015.p.13

47. Ibid.

48. Ministry of Defence: Strategic Guidance for 2013, Printed by Megapress Limited. P.3.

49. Ibid.

50. Eyitayo A.A (Col), “Brief for the COAS Lt Gen KTG Minimah on his visit to Headquarters MNJTF, Mile 4 Baga”, 25 February 2015.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

uneconomical.⁵⁴ Fabrications of gun mounting and inbuilt fuel tanks on the fiber boats will be a best option to conduct of own operations.

Poor Terrain/Need of Helipad: The terrain is sandy and dusty with adverse effect on personnel during takeoff and landing. The air craft usually utilized state airports often too far from the action spots in critical operations.⁵⁵ For this reason and logistic considerations like casualty and medical evacuation construction of helipad or air strip is sought.

Insufficient Air Support: The problem of inadequate platforms and lack of night fighting capability is a great menace.⁵⁶ This has necessitated the collaboration with Technical Partners for the provision of close air support, casualty evacuation, and limited resupply.⁵⁷

Synergy of Efforts with Neighbors

The Summit on security in Nigeria held on 17 May 2014 in Paris set up a Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit to promote and coordinate intelligence and proposed a committee to identify the resources required to develop a joint strategy (non-kinetic measures) to combat terrorism.⁵⁸ Follow-up meetings were held from 22-23 July and on 6 October 2014 respectively.⁵⁹ Activities were later ratified by the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government on 7 October 2014 for operationalizations with support from strategic partners France, USA and Britain.⁶⁰

Joint Strategy/Non Kinetic Approach to Combat Terrorism

Strategies to Eliminate Terrorism: Members are enjoined to initiate national and sub-regional programmes that promote dialogue, tolerance and understanding between regions and cultures.⁶¹ They are to design and carry out development

54. Eytayo A.A (Col), "Brief by Commander 7 Div Task Gp for GOC 7 Div on the ongoing operations and plans for the post Sambisa Operations", 31 May 2015,p.5.

55. Eytayo A.A (Col), "Brief by the Commander 7 Div Task Group for the Chiefs of Defence Staff of member countries of LCBC with the ongoing operation and breakdown of personnel and equipment of units under command", 9 June 2015,p.6.

56. Adeosun L.O. Op cit.p.13.

57. Ibid.p.14.

58. LCBC: Preserving Peace and Security in the Sub-region, report of the Secretariat Office of the Military Adviser, N'Djamena. November 2014,pp.2-3.

59. Ibid.

60. Agreed Report of the 4th Meeting of Ministers of Defence, Chiefs of Defence Staff and Heads of Security/Intelligence Organizations of LCBC Member Countries and Benin. Abuja, Nigeria 24-26 November 2014, pp.3-10.

61. LCBC: Report of the Workshop on Joint Strategy, Opcit,pp.2-3.

projects that will eradicate hunger and illiteracy, and reduce youth unemployment which is a primary cause of marginalization/ extremism and terrorism.⁶² Additionally, members are to promote welfare through delivery of good health services, provision of drinking water, electricity and promote humanitarian action of reintegrating victims of terrorism and repented terrorists.⁶³

Strategies to Prevent and Counter Terrorism: All members are to prevent the use of their territories as training grounds by terrorists.⁶⁴ They are to strengthen cooperation on land and air border surveillance; ensure coordination and information sharing through a secured inter-operational communication network and possess operational ability to gather and share intelligence with regional and international partners.⁶⁵ Members shall build national / regional capacities on ICT in order to counter terrorism on internet, strengthen national and international cooperation to improve border and customs controls to prevent and detect terrorist movements.⁶⁶

Reinforce Capabilities by Strengthening From Strategic Partners: All members are to improve working conditions of their contingents through proper equipping, solicit different and multidimensional support from strategic partners both technical and material.⁶⁷ They are to prioritize police and judicial cooperation between members, capacity building through joint trainings and intelligence sharing.⁶⁸

Fundamental Measures to Counter Terrorism: Members are enjoined to respect resolution 60/158 of 16 December 2005's legal framework for protection of human rights and freedom by the UN General Assembly.⁶⁹ Members are to set up and control an effective national organ for criminal justice to prevent infringing on human rights and freedoms.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.pp.4-6

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.p.7.


68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.pp.8-9.

Kinetic Approach and Reinforcement of MNJTF

At its 484th meeting convened at the level of Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa on 29 January 2015, the PSC authorized the deployment of the MNJTF for an initial period of twelve months with a strength of 7,500 troops and other personnel.⁷⁰

Figure 4: Organogram of the MNJTF



MNJTF Mandate and Area for Cooperation by Members

The AU PSC has authorized the MNJTF consisting of military, police and civilian components within its area of operation to achieve the following mandate;⁷¹

- Create a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the activities of terrorism by reducing violence against civilians, sexual and gender-based violence in full compliance with international law, international humanitarian law and the United Nations Human Right Due Diligence Policy (UN HRDDP).
- Facilitate the implementation of overall stabilization programmes by the LCBC member states and Benin in the affected areas, including full restoration of state authority and the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.
- Facilitate humanitarian operations and the delivery of assistance to the affected populations.


70. Ibid.p.2

71. Ibid.p.4.

Operation Environment and Need for Cooperation

Deployment and Staffing: The operational Headquarters of the MNJTF is in N'Djamena, Chad.⁷² It comprises of liaison officers from relevant bilateral and international partners.⁷³ At tactical level, MNJTF comprises of contingents pledged by LCBC countries. The combat units are to conduct joint coordinated patrols and any other types of operations.

Communication: The Headquarters of MNJTF will provide communication services, with the support of LCBC-AU Channels.⁷⁴ All communication from Sector Headquarters (Brigade) to Tactical Units (Contingents) will be the responsibility of Troops Contributing Countries.⁷⁵



Force Capability Requirements: Each of the Troops Contributing Countries (TCC) pledge to provide troops as follows:⁷⁶

- Benin Republic: 750.
- Cameroun : 950.

72. Ibid.pp.15-16

73. Ibid.pp.16

74. Ibid.p.21

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.pp.15-16

- Chad: 3000.
- Niger Republic: 750.
- Nigeria: 3,250.

Air Assets requirements: To fulfill all mission requirements, the following capability is required;⁷⁷

- **Fixed Wing Aircraft Support:** Fixed-wing ISR, Fixed-wing Close Air Support, Fixed-wing Medical Transport, Fixed-wing Troop Transport/Logistical Transport.
- **Helicopter Support Requirement:** Attack Helicopter, Transport Helicopter, Medical Evacuation Helicopter.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

- Nigeria should adopt a non-kinetic warfare strategy that will consolidate on the military gains in the liberated areas in order to help win the hearts and minds of the locals.
- There should be no negotiation with the terrorists in any form; rather the strategy should be to annihilate by intensifying decisive actions.
- Nigeria through LCBC should continue to solicit for support of the Strategic partners this would help win the war without post war consequences and avert negative publicity.
- Nigeria and LCBC states should continue to mount pressures on UN/AU to persuade nations to assist Africa contain terror by curtailing arms sale. This should be preceded by regular reports of activities in order to win the world bodies support.
- Nigeria and LCBC members to consolidate democracy and good governance through rapid transformation of society in order to weaken the terrorist motives of starting rebellion.

Conclusion

The premise of regional cooperation remains premier for successful counter insurgency operations in Nigeria and the LCBC countries. There is the need

77. Ibid.pp.16

therefore for Nigeria to seize initiative on renewed efforts by UN/AU to stamp out terrorisms in her domain using LCBC as an interface. Pooling of resources by LCBC members to combat the common threat is essential to ensure effectiveness of CT/COIN measures. This calls for cooperation among countries to initiate and implement non-kinetic and kinetic measures in the war torn areas through proper coordination of plans. Addressing the problems of insurgency in the LCBC has gone beyond mere convention and treaties. The task ahead is on application of the synergies and other collaborative mechanisms among countries of LCBC. Also, the strategic partners have to continue to build the intelligence capacity of the LCBC, while UN/AU makes good efforts at dissuading the advanced countries from selling weapons to the insurgents. The LCBC will have to forward report on its activities to the UN/AU in order to enable the regional bodies and world leaders make a better arrangement. Therefore, effective communication, good coordination and planning are essential commitment for successful CT/COIN operations at regional level.

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Author

Colonel Abdulwahab Adelokun Eytayo, FSS, MSS, RNS, BSc, psc, MPA, MLCJ was born on 06 January 1966. He was commissioned into the Nigerian Army Infantry Corps on 19 September 1992. He is a Jump Master and Specialized Warfare expert. He served in various Command and Staff appointment. He was appointed as Company Commander in Operation UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone), an Instructor in Depot Nigerian Army, a premier institution for training recruits. Prior to joining the NDC, he was commander 7 Division Reinforcement Group Konduga/Dambo and Commander 7 Division Task Group/7 Brigade Baga-Nigeria in commando missions for the protection and liberation of Nigerian border communities from the nefarious Boko Haram insurgents and was conferred with gallantry award (River Niger Star). He attended various courses both military and civil. Colonel Eytayo obtained his Bachelor of Science Degree in International Relations/Defence Studies and also bagged 2 masters degrees: Masters in Public Administration, and Masters in Law Enforcement/Criminal Justice from University of Ilorin and ABU Zaria respectively. He also attended National Defence Course at National Defence College, Bangladesh. For his active participations in military operations both externally and within the country, he received medals for OP Liberty/ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, AMIS/UNAMID, Harmony IV, Zaman Lafiya and Lafiya Dole. He is decorated Forces Service Star, Meritorious Service Star, Passed Staff Course and River Niger Star.