

# **THE US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CASE STUDIES OF IRAN AND IRAQ**

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## **INTRODUCTION**

Most striking feature of the US foreign policy in Iran and Iraq during 1978-2003 is the consistent presence of contradictions. For example, on 31 December 1977, US President Carter during his visit to Tehran lavishly praised the Shah (Bourne cited from Murray, 2010, p.19). Carter's praising of the Shah was symbolic of the US support for the Shah. Soon, the Shah's Iran was stormed by Khomeini's revolution, and at this time, it was recorded that the US government was funding Khomeini (Evans, 2015). In 1981, while the war between Iran and Iraq was on, Israel, the trusted ally of the US, destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor (Guzman, 2013). On the contrary, the US and Israeli response to Iranian nuclear program was limited to non-military options. Iran-Contra affair is another example of contradictory behavior of the US. While openly pursuing anti-Iran position, the US started selling arms to Iran through Israel (Murray, 2010, p.38). Aside the contradictions, Iran-Contra affair and destruction of Iraqi nuclear facility also reveal a glimpse of Israeli connection with the US foreign policy in the Middle East.

Of all the contradictory behaviors of the US, most significant one occurred at the aftermath of 9/11 attack on World Trade Center. In connection with the 9/11 attack, the US alleged Iraq for posing threat to the US, for possessing WMD and harboring Al-Qaeda. These allegations later were proven wrong (Arnove, 2001, p.1). Despite the fact that Iraq was in no way linked to 9/11 attack and that UN, as a result, refused to approve Iraq invasion, the US along with her handful of allies like the UK unilaterally decided to invade Iraq. But for many years, successive US administrations advocated multilateralism to solve international crisis.

The discussion above brings forth some striking issues of the US foreign policy in the Middle East. There were cases of contradictions, although exact range remains a subject for study. Importantly, there remains difficulty in understanding what these contradictions really mean, unless patterns are drawn from these contradictions. Lastly, some of these contradictions indicate Israel's connection with the US foreign policy. This paper identifies seven contradictory cases of

the US foreign policy in Iran and Iraq during 1978-2003. The paper then draws patterns from these cases of contradictions. Finally, the paper examines Israel's connection with the US foreign policy.

## **THE CONTRADICTIONS**

The discussion on contradictory behaviors of the US in Iran and Iraq can get sidetracked by the claim that the US foreign policy in the Middle East was always consistent. Such claim is generally backed by the US foreign policy of persuading steady flow of oil at prices of US interest (Potter and Sick, 2004, p.193). But, a close examination rather reveals that there were number of contradictions in the US foreign policy and that these contradictions were not caused by the oil policy of the US. Following discussion elaborates seven such contradictory cases.

### **Khomeini's Revolution: The Treacherous US Support**

By the end of 1977, when Khomeini's revolution was forming, US President Carter during his visit to Tehran in 1977 said, "Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world"(Bourne cited from Murray, 2010, p.19). Carter's words of praise were symbolic of the US support for the Shah. Next year, as situation in Iran was rapidly deteriorating due to Khomeini's revolution, Mr. Sullivan, US ambassador in Iran, 'suggested that the US should start to anticipate the collapse of the Shah' (Sullivan cited from Staniland, 1991, p.90). Carter administration warned Mr. Sullivan for his pessimism of the Shah's surviving chance and reminded him that the US government's policy was to support the Shah (Sullivan cited from Staniland, 1991, P.91).

But a contradiction to such behavior, US administration supported Khomeini during the revolution. Khomeini's migration to France, as claimed by French journalist Dominique Lorenz, was a US plan. Dominique Lorenz wrote, "having picked Khomeini to overthrow the Shah, [the Americans] had to get him out of Iraq, clothe him with respectability, and set him up in Paris" (Evans, 2015). Not only that, allegedly the US government also provided Khomeini with fund while he was in Paris (Evans, 2015).

## **Iran-Iraq War: Neutrality Redefined?**

During the Iran-Iraq war, the US publicly declared policy of neutrality (Pauly cited from Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, P.119). The policy meant that the US would not support either Iran or Iraq during the war.

But in reality, the US behaviors were altogether different. By March 1982, the US started to provide intelligence and military support to Iraq (Battle cited from Parsi, 2008, p.113). In 1984, \$2 billion worth of US commodity credits were given to Iraq. In addition, Gulf countries were also encouraged by the US to extend financial support to Iraq (Jentleson cited from Potter and Sick, 2004, p.198).

Having the declared neutrality in place, the US also supported Iran during the war. Immediately after breakout of the war, the US and Israeli official planned to sell arms to Iran through a joint venture, which later became known as 'Iran-Contra affair'. Under this venture, during 1980-1983, over \$500 million worth of arms from Israel were supplied to Iran (Parsi, 2008, p.107). Later, in 1986, President Reagan authorized US weapons sale to Iran (Parsi, 2008, p.121).

## **Iraqi Invasion in Kuwait: Change in the Known Face**

On 20 July 1990, failing to solve debt problem with Kuwait, Iraq deployed 30,000 troops along the border of Kuwait. In this high voltage situation, on 25 July 1990, the US ambassador Glaspie in a meeting with Saddam Hussein commented, "... we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait" (The New York Times International, 1993). Not only that, Glaspie further commented, "I have a direct instruction from the President to seek better relations with Iraq" (The New York Times International, 1993).

But within hours of invasion in Kuwait, a different face of the US was exposed. The US reacted with lightening speed and with series of counter measures including passing of UN Security Council Resolution 660 demanding withdrawal of Iraqi troops and imposing economic sanctions on Iraq. By November 29, upon the US pursuance, UN Resolution 678 was passed giving ultimatum to Iraqi forces to withdraw by 15 January, 1991, and authorizing "all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660". The US then quickly formed a coalition of 34 countries with 74% representation from her military to fight a war against Iraq.

## **The Uneven Sanctions: Ruthlessness versus Generosity**

The effects of economic sanctions on Iraq were manifolds. By 1995, the sanctions caused death to 5,60,000 children of under five years age (Crossette cited from Garfield, 1999, p.5). During the same period, number of deaths among all ages was 1.2million, which later increased to 1.5 million in mid-1998 (UNICEF Report cited from Garfield, 1999, p.5). Despite this dire situation, the US along with the UK used veto power to ruthlessly ensure the harshest sanctions of modern history on Iraq (Global Policy Forum, 2002, para-4).

Quite contrary to the sanctions against Iraq, the US imposed sanctions on Iran did not restrict companies registered in a third country from doing business with Iran. As a result, American companies like Halliburton, General Electric and Coca-Cola got involved in trade and investment in Iran (Katzman cited from Kozhanov, 2011). Similarly, with US administration's approval, European companies also slipped out of the sanctions and continued trade with Iran (Katzman cited from Kozhanov, 2011).

## **Human Rights Protection: Compliance versus Violation**

From the period of Carter administration, human rights as a concern of the foreign policy became a point of debate in the US. Later, in 1980s, human rights became a part of the US foreign policy as a non-partisan objective (Weiss et al. 2004, p.99). President Reagan in his second term often used the language of human rights. Senior Bush stepped further; he 'regularly and freely used the language of human rights, with apparent sincerity' (Weiss et al, 2004, p.100).

But a contradiction to such policy, serious violation of human rights by the US could be observed in the case of sanctions against Iraq. While the harsh economic sanctions were causing dire situation in Iraq, the US, along with her ally UK, did not allow Security Council to authorize even the assessment of humanitarian impacts of the sanctions. Highlighting such human rights violation, Hans von Sponeck<sup>1</sup> commented, "Every attempt that I made with the United Nations in New York to get an agreement to prepare an assessment of the humanitarian condition in Iraq was blocked" (Global Policy Forum, 2002, Chapter-7).

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1. Mr Hans von Sponeck was the UN Assistant Secretary General and UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq.

## **Nuclear Program: Iran on Course, Iraq at Gun Point**

After many ups and downs since 1957, Iranian nuclear program resumed in 1991 (World Nuclear Association, 2015). The program remained on course, and by 2000, made a significant progress, when the sophisticated enrichment plant at Natanz was established. In response to Iran's continued nuclear activities, the US action was limited to imposing sanctions (Nakanishi, 2015, p.26). Israeli response, on the other hand, was limited to criticizing the Iranian government in the most offensive manner.

But Iraq's case was different. In 1975, by the French supplied Osiraq nuclear reactor, Iraq started her nuclear program. In response, the US did not adopt diplomatic measures as was adopted in the case of Iran. Instead, Israel, the US ally, used military means to destroy Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981 (Reiter, 2005, p.357).

## **Multilateralism to Unilateralism: The Malicious Swing**

The US, a proponent of multilateral approach for solving international crisis, used UN framework in number of occasions. For instance, in 1950s, with UN approval the US led a force of 21 nations in the war against North Korea. In 1990, the US again used UN platform to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation (Soh, 2004, p.48). But, in 2003, the US passion for multilateralism suddenly faded. Despite UN disapproval, the US along with her handful of allies decided to invade Iraq displaying a swing from multilateralism to unilateralism (Soh, 2004, p.54).

The discussion, as done in this part, shows that on various issues the US behaviors were either contradictory to its own policy or contradictory to a behavior on the same issue. For example, unilateralism in the case of Iraq invasion was a contradiction to the policy of multilateralism. On the other hand, harsh sanction on Iraq was a contradiction not to the policy but to the behavior on the same issue against Iran. In isolation, the contradictions- however these occurred- apparently tend to initially skip one's notice and then to make one confused at the best. Such confusion continues until patterns are drawn from these contradictory behaviors. The next part of the paper will attempt to do that- form patterns from these contradictions.

## FROM CONTRADICTIONS TO PATTERNS

Pattern in the foreign policy, as Kegley and Wittkopf (1991) defined, is a way of generalizing about and describing the overall thrust and direction of the foreign policy (p.4-5). Can patterns be drawn from the contradictory behaviors of the US? Every foreign policy behavior of a country must have an objective. This means that the US behaviors, even the contradictory ones, had definite objectives. For example, anti-Iran policy meant that the US objective was to oppose Iran's interest. But how, then, the US could supply arms to Iran? The US objective in the supply of arms to Iran was contradictory to the US objective of opposing Iranian interest. Can a country have opposing objectives on the same issue? Errors of judgment by the policy makers can be a plausible reason. But it is hard to conceive that the US policy makers- best known for their professional skill- can commit such errors over and over for a long period of time. So, it means that these opposing objectives were deliberately set.

Why the policy makers of a country should deliberately set opposing objectives, when the opposing objectives in simple mathematical rule result in zero? Was the US playing a zero-sum game in Iran and Iraq? The answer is- No. The US, in its foreign policy, was pursuing two patterns- a covert pattern and an overt pattern-, and the opposing objectives fell either in the covert pattern or in the overt pattern. A covert pattern means a pattern in the policy that is not deliberately exposed by a government. For example, although was leaked at the end, Iran-contra affair, by all means, was deliberately attempted to be concealed. A covert pattern sincerely pursues a set of objectives, which are different from those pursued by the overt pattern. The overt pattern, on the other hand, means a pattern in the policy deliberately exposed by a country and is used to disguise the covert pattern. An overt pattern pursues a set of objectives, which oppose the objectives pursued by covert pattern. For example, to act against Iranian interest through declaring anti-Iran posture was an objective of the overt pattern, which opposed the objective of supplying arms to Iran. The following discussion will attempt to describe the covert and overt pattern of the US foreign policy in Iran and Iraq by discovering and linking the objectives of the contradictory behaviors discussed in previously.

### The Covert Pattern

The US deliberately pursued two broad objectives in Iran and Iraq. The first was to enable the rise of Shiite-cum-Persian nationalist ideology based Iran, and the second was to weaken Iraq. These broad objectives were attained through series of actions.



## US Objective in Iran

Implementation of the US objective 'to enable the rise of Shiite-cum-Persian nationalist ideology based Iran' started by the incoming of Khomeini in the power. The event occurred in 1978 but it had its root in 1975, when the Shah signed Algiers Agreement. Shah's signing of the Algiers agreement started to defuse the Shiite-Sunni rivalry, ended US-Israeli support to Kurdish rebels in Iraq and signaled departure of Iran from the close relationship with Israel. As a whole, the US was alarmed by the Algiers agreement (Parsi, 2008, p.57). With that, Shah's prospect faded forever to the US.

Shah's fading prospect brought Khomeini into the spotlight. Khomeini, a hardcore Shiite religious leader, was a strong advocate of *Ulema* controlled Islamic government (Jasim, 1984, p.179). On Ulema's or in other word, Imam's jurisdiction, Khomeini's followers later illustrated that 'there is no geographic border for the Imam [Khomeini]' (Washington Post cited from Jasim, 1984, p.180). In this illustration existed veiled aspiration of the Shiite influenced Persia. Persia- the old day's Iran- was conquered by the Arab Muslims in 7th century. Although most Persians converted to Islam, in reality, there existed a distinct identity difference between the Arabs and the Persians. Later, this difference was further widened in 16<sup>th</sup> century, when the Safavid Persian dynasty accepted Shi'ism as the state religion. Since then, Ottomans, the guardian of the Sunnis, and Persia, the guardian of the Shiites, constantly struggled over number of issues. One such issue was the control of Iraq- once a rich province of Persia, and later, a place of holy Shiite shrines (Jasim, 1984, p.229). When Iraq emerged as an independent country, the old Persian aspiration became the key factor in Iran-Iraq relationship (Jasim, 1984, p.230). The Shah, after Algiers agreement, was seen to have departed from materializing the Shiite Persian aspiration. As a result, door was opened for Khomeini, who, the US thought, would serve the US interests better than the Shah by reviving the Shiite-Sunni rivalry and by extending Shiite dominance in the Middle East.

So, from mid-70s, as Houshang Nahavandi<sup>2</sup> noted, the US administration officials like Henry Kissinger started campaigning to depose the Shah from power (Perloff, 2009). The campaign reached at the peak during Khomeini's revolution. The US administration, during the entire revolution, stood inactive ensuring the incoming of Khomeini. To justify such inaction, the US administration officials like Brzezinski<sup>3</sup> fed Carter with surprising assessment of CIA. Ten months after

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2. Minister and closest adviser of the Shah. Nahavandi is the author of the book, *The Last Shah of Iran*.

3. Brzezinski was national security adviser to Carter.

street protests against the Shah had begun, CIA's assessment was- 'Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation' (Cooper, 2015).

When the Shah was gone and Khomeini was seated in the highest position of Iran, there was still problem for the US. New Iran needed protection, especially once Iraq initiated war against Iran. Protection of Iran became so important to the US that the Reagan administration in collaboration with Israel wasted no time to extend vital military support to Iran. During the early 80s, such US behavior was unimaginable for two reasons. Most people, even in the US, believed that Khomeini was hated by the US administration and that Iran crossed the red line by taking hostage in US Embassy of Tehran. How crucial the US support to Iran was for its survival against Iraqi invasion remains a subject of a separate study; nevertheless, eight years later when the war ended, the US objective was achieved. Iran not only survived, its military took the war inside Iraq. In the next decade, while Iraq was strangled by the harsh sanctions, the US objective was to ensure steady economy of Iran. Although sanctions were in place- just as an overt action-, Iran was given opportunity to exploit the loopholes of sanctions. As a result, while Iraqi economy was ruined, Iran's was steady. The US objective to enable the rise of Iran could also be observed by the way successive governments in the US and Israel dealt with Iranian nuclear program. While offensive rhetoric exchange among the leaders of Iran, Israel and the US continued, nuclear program of Iran remained on course.

## US Objective in Iraq

The US objective of weakening Iraq began through destroying Iraq's nuclear facility in 1981, within four months of taking over the White House by Reagan-Israel's chosen<sup>4</sup> candidate. A year after, from 1982, the US started to implement new objective; it was to let Saddam Hussein gain confidence on the US. Under this objective, the US administration started providing financial and military support to Iraq, even when Iraq was engaged in the war against Iran. Having the declared neutrality in place, the US support to Iraq could be seen as part of dual contradictions, as the similar support was also given to Iran. Therefore, support to Iran and Iraq is often called as the US policy of dual containment. Dual containment was only a partial truth, for the support to Iraq was also an attempt to win Saddam's confidence that would be so vital for the US to let Saddam Hussein invade Kuwait. In the attempt to win Saddam's confidence, Reagan's special envoy Donald Rumsfeld paid two visits to Iraq during 1982-84.

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4. Details will be discussed in part-3.



To compliment Rumsfeld's visit, the US also started to grant cash to Iraq. In 1983-84, the US provided \$2.365 billion loan/commodity credit to Iraq. Between 1987 and 1989, Iraq again received another \$3.1 billion loan from the US (Coleman, 1993, p.46 & 49). All these US financial supports aimed at, in James Kelly's<sup>5</sup> statement, not to let Saddam Hussein "swing against us" (Coleman, 1993, p.49).

Why in 1989- one before the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait- the US was so desperate to ensure that Saddam Hussein did not swing against the US? The US desperation was linked to the objective it had set for Saddam Hussein. This objective was to encourage Saddam Hussein to commit a blunder such as invading Kuwait. In 1990, while Saddam's military was pouring along the Kuwaiti border, the US, instead of warning, directed encouragements one after another towards Saddam government. A net result of these encouragements finally was Iraq's invasion in Kuwait- a landmark event that actually opened the door for the US to repeatedly use her military against Iraq in the subsequent years.

The US objective to weaken Iraq by crippling its economy through prolonged sanctions was a well-calculated US foreign policy. This had a cost; the human right violation by the US seriously injured its image. But the US administration was happy to pay that price for a simple reason- the price was worth for what sanctions had done to Iraqi economy. The sanctions, as was aimed, turned Iraq into an impoverished country by 2000. Even after that the US objective in Iraq was half-achieved. At this point, if Iraq was let out of the US grip, it could revive its past. In other way, weakening of Iraq had to be permanent in nature. For that, Iraq had to be reshaped and that needed an invasion in Iraq. Such an invasion needed an initiator, and thus, 9/11 came up. However, still the US had to connect Iraq with 9/11 attack and had to get UN approval. Unfortunately, the US plan doomed when UN disapproved the US plan to invade Iraq. In that situation, the only way to achieve the US objective was to use 'unilateralism' and the US administration exactly did that.

As discussed above, the objectives of the covert pattern clearly aimed at enabling the rise of Shiite-cum-Persian nationalist ideology based Iran and weakening of Iraq. However, these objectives also had risk. If these objectives were exposed, Sunni dominated Middle East could be united to counter the rise of Iran, and such unity in the Middle East could be dangerous for the US. More importantly, Saddam Hussein would not fall a prey of the trap set by the US. So, the overt pattern was designed to conceal the covert pattern.

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5. A lawyer for the New York Federal Reserve Bank and an US appointee for the operation of the BNL ( Banco Nazionale de Lavoro), through which loan credits to Iraq were regulated.

## **The Overt Pattern**

The overt pattern of the US foreign policy was designed to conceal the covert pattern. The overt pattern was designed based upon carefully chosen objectives: first, display a strong anti-Iran posture, and second, display support to Saddam regime in order to build a positive image of the US to the Sunni Arab countries.

## **US Objective in Iran**

The US objective of displaying anti-Iran posture was manifested through number of actions or behaviors. One of these was the exchange of tough criticisms between the governments of the US and Iran. For example, after taking over power as the president of the US, George W Bush commented, “Iran’s a destabilizing force” (Draper cited from Murray, 2010, p.116). The Iranians reciprocated to this kind of US rhetoric in the same manner. For example, Khomeini commented, “America is the number-one enemy of the deprived and oppressed people of the world...Iran has tried to sever all its relations with this Great Satan” (Khomeini cited from Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008, p.81). However these words sounded, in reality, Khomeini’s Iran, in 1980s, purchased arms from this ‘Great Satan’ to fight Iraq. Similarly, since Khomeini came in power, Iran showcased an urge for ‘liberation of Jerusalem’, which was indirectly tied to anti-US manifestation. But in reality, as Parsi (2008) noted, Iranian cry for ‘liberation of Jerusalem’ was never acted upon (p.103).

Exchange of criticism was duly complimented by other US actions such as putting Iran in the list of sponsors of terror. As a result, the US was successful in creating an artificial image to the world, and specially, to the Sunni countries of the Middle East that US-Iran relation was as bitter as one could imagine. To add with this, the sanctions were imposed only with adequate loopholes so that Iran’s economy was steady while the Sunni Middle East continued to believe that the US was harsh at Iran.

## **US Objective in Iraq**

While anti-Iran display was on course, the US orchestrated a display of support to Saddam regime. Such display aimed at building a positive image of the US to the Sunni Arab countries. Accordingly, talking points of Rumsfeld for his visit to Iraq included message that the US ‘would regard any reversal of Iraq’s fortune as a

strategic defeat for the West' (Murray, 2010, p. 45). Similar message was reiterated by the US administration number of times in the subsequent years. In 1982, the US also removed Iraq from the list of sponsors of terror with an attempt to change Arab's impression that US policy was tied to Iran (Murray, 2010, p.45).

## THE ISRAELI CONNECTION

Discussion in previous two parts shows that in number of occasions Israel was seen connected with the US foreign policy in Iran and Iraq. This part of the paper examines this connection in three steps: first, identification of Israeli objective in Iran and Iraq, and of connection between Israeli objective and covert pattern of the US foreign policy; second, identification of Israeli instruments for influencing the US Foreign Policy; and third, examination of Israel's influence on the US foreign policy.

### The Israeli Prism

In early 1980s, an Israeli official said, "ideally we'd like to see Iraq disintegrated into a Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni community, each making war on each other" (Jasim, 1984, p.214). The bigger Israeli plan into which this statement was fitted came from Israeli think tank Yinon, who in 1982 'called for Israel to use military means to bring about the dissolution of Israel's neighboring states' (Sniegowski, 2004, p.50). Yinon's call was tied to Theodore Herzl's vision. Herzl, the founder of Zionism, in 1896 defined future Jewish state<sup>6</sup> as '*From the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates*' (Shahak, 1982). In fact, Herzl's vision became the early source of Israeli thinking of dissolution of the Arab states, and therefore, Yinon's call was the proof of a long time nursed Israeli objective in the Middle East. In the dissolution plan of the Arab states, as Yinon viewed, Iraq was the top state to be targeted (Shahak, 1982). While Iraq earned the top position in the target list of Israel, Iran was altogether different. Ever since the Persian King Cyrus liberated the Jews from Babylonian rule in 6th century, Persia became a trusted ally of the Jewish people (Jasim, 1984, p.57). This alliance was renewed at different points of the history just as it was done in 1950, when Iran accorded *de facto* recognition to the state of Israel (Jasim, 1984, p.57). With this contrast Israeli view of Iran and Iraq, the Israeli objective was- partnership with Iran, an old and trusted friend, against Iraq, a common enemy.

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6. In his Complete Diaries, Vol. II, p. 711, Theodore Herzl, the founder of Zionism, says that the area of the Jewish State stretches "From the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates" (cited from Shahak, 1982).

Relating this finding with discussed previously on the covert pattern of the US, it can now be realized that the US foreign policy in Iran and Iraq actually reflected Israeli objective in the Middle East. In other words, it was the Israeli prism that directed the US foreign policy in Iran and Iraq.

## **The Israeli Instruments**

To implement the objectives discussed above, Israel's major weakness was her alarming inferiority to the Arab neighbors in terms of land mass and population. Therefore, Israel's only option was to ride on a world power. In that equation, the US became Israel's choice for two reasons: post WW-II geopolitical scenario, in which the US was one of the super powers, and the Jewish influence in the US. In the subsequent years, Israel purposefully mastered the art of using all its instruments to influence the US foreign policy in order to achieve its objectives. These instruments included the Neoconservatives, the Zionists and the Israel Lobby. Founded mostly by the Jews in the US during 1960s, the Neoconservative's key objective always was, and still is, to ensure 'support for Israel' (Boot cited from Sniegowski, 2008, p.26). The Zionists, according to its founder Theodore Herzl, are the "people who support the establishment of a Jewish state in the land of Israel" (Yehoshua, 2013). The Israeli Lobby, on the other hand, includes those of the Neoconservatives and the Zionists, who have any means to influence the US foreign policy.

## **Israeli Instruments in Action**

Use of the Israeli instruments for influencing the US foreign policy has been systematic and well-planned. For a long time, Israel and its Lobby had been putting special emphasis on posting their chosen candidates in influential positions of the US administration. For example, Reagan came in power being a choice of Israel. Evidence suggesting such conclusion include 1980's election's voting pattern, which revealed that 'Israel and its US backers' supported Reagan (Curtiss, 1987). There is also argument that the hostage crisis was cleverly manipulated by Israel and its Lobby in collaboration with Iran to off-balance Carter ahead of 1980's election. The hostage crisis overtly, and in the background, Israel Lobby's dissatisfaction caused defeat to Carter in the election (Curtiss, 1987). Once elected, Reagan played significant role in materializing Israeli objective in the Middle East. Beside the appointment of US president, iconic figures in the US administration such as Henry Kissinger, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Douglas Feith were among many of the chosen candidates of Israel and its Lobby.

Action of the Israeli instruments can be dated back to mid-70s, when Henry Kissinger- a born Jew and an influential member of the Israel Lobby- started his campaign to remove the Shah from power (Perloff, 2009). Later, Kissinger's campaign was complimented by Israeli Prime Minister Begin, who tried to convince Carter at the Camp David meeting that the Shah was no longer worthy (Souresrafil cited from Parsi, 2007, p.78). The concerted effort of the Israeli government and the Israeli Lobby influenced US administration to ensure fall of the Shah.

Israel and its Lobby were directly involved in Iran-Contra affair. One of the pioneers in this affair was Israel's ambassador to the US, Ephraim Evron, who lobbied with the US administration for arms sale to Tehran (Parsi, 2008, p.105). Iran-Contra affair later was operated by the hardcore personalities of Israeli Lobby such as Michael Ledeen, Elliot Abrams and Robert M Gates (National Security Archive, 2006). They all held sensitive positions in the US administration. Israeli Lobby played a crucial role in influencing US foreign policy to continue with the harshest sanctions against Iraq. An example of such influence was the US ambassador to UN, Madeleine Albright's comment. When asked about high figure of child mortality rate in Iraq, Albright, a Jew by birth, replied, "...we think the price is worth it" (Global Policy Forum, 2002, Chapter-5). While the sanctions were killing Iraqi people, the Israel Lobby, specifically the Neoconservatives were unhappy that the US administration did not invade Iraq in 1991. In early mid-90s, they started a new campaign to shape the US public opinion. To lead in this campaign was a prominent figure of the Bush administration, Paul Wolfowitz. A born Jew and a hardcore personality in the Israel Lobby, Wolfowitz along with his Neoconservative team advocated that the US should use pre-emptive strike against the hostile countries possessing WMD (Sniegowski, 2008, p.81). The term 'hostile countries' was made more specific later by the Neoconservatives through a paper titled 'A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm', written by an Israeli think tank. Behind this paper worked an influential panel of the top Neoconservatives such as Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and David Wurmser (Sniegowski, 2008, p.89). To secure the Realm or Israel, the paper echoed what Yinon said in 1982- reshaping of the entire Middle East with Iraq being the first to be dissolved.

To boost Perle, Feith and Wurmser's effort, another group of devoted Neoconservatives led by media personality Rupert Murdoch and the intellectuals such as William Kristol, Bernard Lewis and Robert Kagan played an important role. Murdoch's media empire deliberately contributed in the campaign of regime

change in Iraq. Murdoch in 1995 also financed Kristol for founding the Weekly Standard, which quickly became a leading publication to advocate for regime change in Iraq (Sniegoski, 2008, p.87).

Despite Israel's and its Lobby's concerted effort for regime change in Iraq, US administration and common people in the US remained short of convinced. In that situation, 9/11 worked as a stimulus- it angered the American people. Israel and its Lobby instantly exploited the American sentiment for aligning Israel's enemy as a common enemy of the US. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon quickly came in the scene to define this common enemy as 'forces of evil' (Bennet cited from Sniegoski, 2008, 139). In short time, the US Deputy Secretary of Defence, Wolfowitz, added more meaning to Sharon's 'forces of evil' by saying, "I think one has to say it's not just simply a matter of capturing people and holding them accountable, but removing the sanctuaries, removing the support systems, ending states who sponsor terrorism" (Knowlton, 2001). The Israel Lobby then appealed to the US President through a letter that 'even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq' (Sniegoski, 2008, p.144). By 20 September 2001, Israel and its Lobby had expressed clear meaning of Sharon's 'forces of evil'; it was Iraq.

Israel and its Lobby now concentrated full energy on selling this to the US administration and the US public. Douglas Feith established the Office of Special Plans to fabricate lies to justify the war (Petras, 2006, p.62). Until the invasion in 2003, Feith and his team from this office supplied manufactured evidences to the US administration and the media for supporting invasion in Iraq. Prominent Neoconservative Journalists such as Judith Miller, David Frum and Ari Fleisher propagated false evidences produced by Feith's office through articles, interviews, press conferences and even speech writing for President Bush (Petras, 2006, p.62). The coordinated effort of Israel and its Lobby was so powerful that eventually Iraq was invaded on 19 March 2003.

## CONCLUSION

A closer look at the US foreign policy in Iran and Iraq, especially during 1978-2003, turns one's attention on a list of contradictory behaviors of the US. This list starts with the overt display of US support for the Shah government while providing support to Shah's rival Khomeini. When Iran-Iraq war started, the US contradicted its declared policy of neutrality by providing military support to



both Iran and Iraq. In 1990, when Saddam government signaled its intention to invade Kuwait, the US allegedly encouraged the invasion. Once Iraq invaded Kuwait, the US quickly responded with a comprehensive set of counter measures against Iraq. In imposing and observing sanctions against Iran and Iraq, the US again contradicted. While Iran had space to maneuver, Iraq was strangled by the harshest sanctions of modern history. Amidst the horrific situation of Iraq caused by the sanctions, the US manifestation of human rights protection remained dead, although, for many years, successive US administration claimed to be advocates of human rights protection. In the case of nuclear program, Iran received rhetoric and ineffective sanctions while Iraq faced precision military response. And, finally, the unilateral US decision to invade Iraq was a contradiction to its sponsorship of multilateralism.

The contradictions of the US foreign policy surfaced as a result of the existence of two patterns in the US foreign policy. One of these two patterns was a covert pattern and the other was an overt pattern. The covert pattern was designed deliberately to pursue two broad objectives: first, enable the rise of Shiite-cum-Persian nationalist ideology based Iran to counter balance Sunni Arab dominated Middle East, and second, weaken Iraq. The overt pattern of US foreign policy was designed to conceal the covert pattern. The overt pattern was designed based upon two broad objectives: first, display a strong anti-Iran posture, and second, display support to Saddam regime in order to build a positive image of the US to the Sunni Arab countries.

The covert pattern of the US foreign policy actually pursued the Israeli objective of establishing Jewish state 'from the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates' by disintegrating the Arab states into ethnic and sectarian groupings, and by reshaping of the Middle East. The Israeli disintegration plan of the Middle East targeted Iraq as the first country. Why was Iraq first? It was because of the convergence of Israeli and Iranian interests. But why the US pursued Israeli objective in the Middle East? Because Israel successfully influenced the US foreign policy by her instruments, of which the Israel Lobby, consisting of the Neoconservatives and the Zionists, was the most effective. The Lobby's influence in the US foreign policy making ranged from posting its chosen candidates in the appointments of the US administration to drafting crucial foreign policies. The Lobby's effort was complimented by the Neoconservatives' propaganda in the main stream media. By such concerted effort, Israel and its Lobby in the US shaped the US public opinion, and in turn, influenced the US foreign policy for waging unjust invasion of Iraq.

The contradictions and the covert pattern of the US foreign policy, and the Israeli connection with the US foreign policy raise serious issues. Foremost of these issues is the unchallenged rise of the Neoconservatism in the internal politics of the US. From this issue emerges bigger one- the alarming phenomenon of wholesale submission of world's lone superpower to the state called Israel. The most alarming issue is the future of the Middle East, where countries one after another are disintegrating according to Israeli plan. 'How worse this situation will be' remains a question for further study; but for now, it is not irrational to say that the US remains responsible for allowing Israel to misuse its foreign policy for the implementation of an evil objective in the Middle East.

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