

CHINA'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA: IMPLICATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

China has emerged as the second largest economic power in the world after the United States of America (USA). According to some, she has the potential to become the world's largest economy by 2025 (Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2010:52). South Asia and the Indian Ocean are important to China for her import of raw materials and energy resources, and export of industrial products. South Asia is also important to China for striving regional stability, strengthen security and safeguard her booming economy.

China has four new concepts in her foreign strategy. The first is safeguarding the common interests of all mankind. The second is security featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination. The third is making close and friendly relations with neighbours, and the last is helping neighbours to become rich. To protect and pursue her strategic interests, China also wants to make her blue water naval presence in the Indian Ocean to secure the sea lane for importing her oil and raw materials as well as for marketing her products. China also wants to help some of the South Asian countries to build some sea ports, mostly connecting to the main land of China through roads and pipe lines.

South Asia has become a region of great interests for the global as well as regional powers. A stable relationship between China and South Asian nations certainly has a good impact on the national security and economic development of these states. Therefore, it may be significant to analyse chinese strategic interests and approaches in South Asia to find out her strategy to protect and pursue those interests, and understand its implications in the region with particular emphasis to Bangladesh.

STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF CHINA IN SOUTH ASIA

China's Strategy

As a country in the Asia-Pacific region, China places great importance to South Asia for the region's security, stability, peace and development. China's strategy towards South Asia is aimed at strengthening her economy and security. South Asia comprising India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives is a vast geographical area with a huge population. In the conduct of international relations, China is likely to maintain a pragmatic and supportive approach to share the benefits of an effective rules-based system and

relying on trade in raw materials, energy and manufactured goods to support her economic development (Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2010:51).

China considers three approaches for her strategy; building a harmonious world, go global, and become the world number one (Callahan, William A., 2010). Another dimension of Chinese strategy is to use her 'Soft Power' which is the ability to get what is wanted through attraction, persuasion, appeal and cooperation (Li, Mingjiang 2010:3-16). One more strategy of China is to keep her military expenditure and build-ups secret, which raises the security concerns for all the countries of South Asia and beyond (Karki, Brigadier General Mesbah Bikram., 2010:34). China's overall strategy is fundamentally linked to the attainment of three objectives (Clarke, Ryan, 2011:02):

- To preserve domestic order and well-being against different social discord.
- To defend against persistent external threats to national sovereignty and territory.
- To attain and maintain geopolitical influence as a major state.

China's Geo-political Aspirations in South Asia

China shares common borders with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal and Bhutan, making her almost an integral part of South Asia. China's South Asia policy is characterized by her 'India-centric' approach (Malik, J. Mohan, 2001:02). The first objective of this policy is to prevent the rise of a real Asian competitor to challenge China's status as Asia-Pacific's sole Monarchy. Secondly, China is yet to resolve the border disputes with India and Bhutan making internal security issues in one state affecting other states. Thirdly, Beijing's strong and strategic relation with Islamabad is part of China's grand strategy that shapes the South Asian security environment. Finally, China remains a major economic contributor to Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka that supplement and strengthen her military security objectives.

Pakistan has handed over the management and operation of Gwadar port to a Chinese company, a deep warm-water harbor, close to the Strait of Hormuz, a key world oil supply route. It could become China's naval base in the Indian Ocean and enable Beijing to monitor Indian and US naval activities. China appears optimistic about the future of under construction Gwadar-Kashgar energy corridor (Ali, Ghulam, 2013). The Karakoram Highway linking China with Pakistan provides shortest possible access to energy hungry China with

world's largest energy hub Persian Gulf, Hormuz and resourceful Central and North Africa. Pakistan is improving its existing historical railway through Khyber Pass up to Afghan-Pakistan border town of Turkham. This line is being planned to be extended up to Kabul. On the other hand existing railway link up to Pak-Afghan border town of Chaman is being planned to connect with Kandahar. Feasibility study of railway link between Gawadar- Chaman- Kandahar by Pakistan Railway has been completed. This track ultimately would link Pakistan with Turkmenistan through Afghanistan. This would also provide easy access to the Arabian Sea for Afghanistan as well as Central Asian Republics (Hussain, Brigadier General M Sakhawat, June 03, 2013).

The infrastructure projects that aim to connect Bangladesh with south-western China, Myanmar and Mekong sub-region (GMS) consisting of Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam make much economic sense. Moreover, through the proposed Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor, China wants to strengthen her connectivity with South Asia for sustainable development in the region. Sea port development by Beijing in South Asia has been seen as part of China's rising geopolitical influence (Islam, M. Shahidul, 2012). Beijing has also developed Hambantota port and Colombo International Container Terminal in Sri Lanka and built a container port facility at Chittagong in Bangladesh. China wants strong relationship with Nepal for her favourable geographical position that links China and the whole of South Asia (Raman, B., 2011). Myanmar, though not a part of South Asia, provides easier access to China for South Asia. China has developed Myanmar naval facilities and observation posts for signal intelligence at Yangon and Sittwe which could be used by Chinese navy for frequent port calling and collection of intelligence. An oil pipeline linking Myanmar's deep sea port of Sittwe to Yunan is approved by Chinese government which would provide an alternative route for Beijing's crude imports from Middle-east and Africa (Hussain, Brigadier General M. Sakhawat, 2007:73). Beijing's massive infrastructure spending, particularly sea port development in South Asia has been seen by her arch rivals India and USA as part of Beijing's "String of Pearl Strategy," (Islam, M. Shahidul, 2012).

China's Economic Interests in South Asia

Chinese economy is becoming integrated into the global economic system by enormous forces. China is the second largest economy in the world (See Table-1) with economic growth averaging 10% per year since 1978. China's continued economic development and requirement for raw materials and energy coupled with the need for marketing her products will induce her to be involved more in South Asia (Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2010:52).

Table-1: World Economic Indicator (GDP)					
Country	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
	(Billion US\$)	(Billion US\$)	(Billion US\$)	(Billion US\$)	(Billion US\$)
USA	14,219	13,898	14,419	14,991	15,685
China	4,522	4,991	5,931	7,322	8,227
Japan	4,849	5,035	5,495	5,897	5,960
Germany	3,624	3,299	3,284	3,601	3,400
France	2,832	2,620	2,548	2,780	2,613
UK	2,649	2,184	2,256	2,445	2,435
Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries , accessed on 25 July 2013.					

China-India shares huge trade and China is the second single largest trading partner of India. Her trade with Pakistan is also rising very sharply. China is Bangladesh's largest trading partner. China imports raw materials from Bangladesh like leather, cotton textiles, fish, etc. China's major exports to Bangladesh include textiles, machinery and electronic products, cement, fertilizer, raw silk, maize, etc (Wikipedia, 2013). She has also good and rising trade relationship with Nepal, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Maldives and Bhutan. China has become an important source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in South Asia. China has given high priority to many of the development projects of Pakistan. She is helping Maldives in house construction, modernization of banking and Automatic Teller Machine for the benefit of foreign tourists (Raman, B., 2011). She has invested US\$ 3.5 billion in Afghanistan's Aynak copper fields, which is considered to be the largest FDI project in Afghanistan's history.

China's Security Interests

China's Military identifies five security strategic goals to achieve (Taylor, M., 2010). The first goal is to maintain the monopoly of Chinese Communist Party on political power. Secondly, maintaining the territorial integrity including territorial water and air space from external threats. The third goal is her National Unification focusing on the Taiwan. The fourth is China's emphasis on defending her Maritime Rights and Interests. The fifth and last military strategic goal is the need for maintaining a regional stability avoiding armed conflicts including nuclear devastation in China's periphery.

Another security strategy of China is to eliminate the ethnic separation, religious extremism and terrorism, from the region (Shahnawaz, Muhammad Shahrukh., 2010:66-78). Beijing along with Islamabad hopes to crack down on terrorist criminals through joint efforts and prevent Islamic terrorists from leaving Pakistan and undermine the stability of Xinjiang in China (Jiali, Ma., 2012:2-3). Through its non-transparent military budget, her offensive posture, tendency to dictate her terms and project power, China wants to continue to become an invisible threat to South Asia (Karki, Brigadier General Mesbah Bikram, 2010). China also wants to see a strong Pakistan who can project credible deterrence to India over its military nuclear capabilities (Raman, B., 2011).

CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH SOUTH ASIA

China-India

Sino-Indian relations remain poor, with or without risk of confrontation, despite a dramatic increase in bilateral exchange at the political, economic, military and cultural level visits, programs and negotiations. Of late, relationship between two giant Asian Neighbours China and India is better than before. Yet, territorial disputes remained unresolved raising concerns for many. In 2008, India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited China, and the document 'A Shared Vision for the 21st Century' was issued jointly with China. Then leaders of both the countries met on many occasions. Subsequently, Prime Minister Singh and Premier Wen Jiabao visited each other (Jiali, Ma, 2012). Of late, China and India have reached a clear understanding that they will not hold out threats to each other. Instead, they will adopt a variety of ways to take confidence-building measures (CBMs).

China-Pakistan

Sino-Pakistan relationship has become a shining example of time tested all weather friendship. Beijing considers that India and Pakistan should solve the problem through dialogue and negotiations (Jiali, Ma, 2012). The close relationship can be judged by the arms agreement, which was signed between China and Pakistan to construct few heavy weapons and an all-solid-fuel Shaheen III missile with a range of 3,500 to 4,000 kilometres that would allow Pakistan to target all major Indian cities. China has aligned herself with Pakistan and made heavy economic investments to keep the common enemy, under strategic pressure (Clarke, Ryan, 2011:24-25).

China-Bangladesh

China established diplomatic ties with Bangladesh in 1975. Later on, both President Ziaur Rahman and President Hossain Mohammad Ershad made official visits to China. Successive governments in Bangladesh followed the policy of building close relations with China. In March 2010, Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina visited China and in June 2010, Vice President Xi Jinping paid an official visit to Bangladesh. The two countries signed the 'Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh'.

China-Nepal

In recent years, China-Nepal relationship had significant developments. Domestic power struggles in Nepal allowed China to play against India. Nepal tightened the relationship with China and started procuring sophisticated weapons and ammunition. But Nepal's geography, history and economy dictate that it generally remains politically closer to India than to China. China has been trying to extend their road from Tibet to Nepal. Relations between two countries became very strong when Maoists headed by Prachanda was in power. Presently, both China and Nepal are maintaining good relationship.

China-Afghanistan

China established diplomatic ties with Afghanistan in 1955. But the relationship came to a suspension with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Relationship started normalizing when Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan but broken off entirely in the face of internal armed conflict eruption. Resumption of official relations began in December 2001. Since then, China has supported Afghanistan through numerous aid packages. Afghan President Hamid Karzai visited Beijing, met Chinese President Hu Jintao and agreed to continue strengthening bilateral ties (Takashi, Sekiyama, 2012).

China-Sri Lanka

China views Sri Lanka as an important ally because of her distrustful relationship with her large neighbour India and for her geostrategic location astride the shipping lanes of the Asia-Pacific. Sri Lanka expects a stronger presence of China to counter the growing and unquestionable supremacy of India in the region. Presently, China is using the military supply relationship for increasing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka (Raman, B., 2011).

China-Maldives

The diplomatic relation between China and Maldives was established in 1972. After the British withdrawal from Gan Island in 1976, the Maldivian government resisted pressure from the superpowers to get a foothold on this strategic island. Previous President Nasheed was very friendly towards India. Both the President and Defence Minister of Maldives of new government visited Beijing in 2012. China has emerged as one of the leading trading partners of Maldives.

China-Bhutan

Bhutan is the only neighbour of China with whom she has no diplomatic relations. China's annexation of Tibet has played a major role in shaping Bhutan's policy of leaning towards India. As per Article II of the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949, the small Buddhist kingdom is 'guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations'. Bilateral negotiations are going on between Bhutan and China to resolve the border disputes.

CHINA'S STRATEGY TO PROTECT AND PURSUE HER STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA

General Strategy

South Asia is not only the close neighbour of China but also the wrestling field full of geopolitical competitions, while it is also more of a breeding ground for terrorism in current years. China has huge strategic interests and security concerns in this region. Therefore, China aims to foster the relationship properly with South Asian countries to ensure her own strategic and security interests (Jiali, Ma, 2012). Beijing's current policies are directed towards non-intervention and non-interference. But this trend is likely to be superseded by a more interventionist approach with the increase of her power and influence. China is in the process of developing political, economic and military strategies to secure her trade and communication lanes of Indian Ocean region. This trend is likely to influence China to have better political, economic and social cooperation with South Asia.

To strengthen her security, China made significant expansion in the numbers of attack submarines and large replenishment ships, developed space-based ocean surveillance system, acquired aircraft carriers, invested in large fleets of tanker and transport aircraft, and developed new type of bomber. All these are the potential indicators of her shift towards attainment of great Military Power. China's desire to continue its economic development and establish her influential

power in South Asia. China's so called 'string of pearls' strategy to encircle India from the south may be seen as her expansionist attitude, which may appear plausible due to Beijing's growing need for protecting her land and sea trade routes.

China's Strategy for India

China's strategy is to secure her oil route in the Indian Ocean from the Gulf through Malacca to China. In this respect, China considers India to be the best bet to restrict a future strong China. However, Indian strategy for dealing with China is generally to avoid picking rhetorical, political or military fights with the Chinese and build confidence; improve relations in areas where rapid improvement is possible, such as bilateral trade and fighting terrorism; protect itself against the worst should relations sour; and revitalize relations with peripheral Asia states in Southeast and East Asia (Tellis, Ashley, 2004:141-142).

China's Strategy for Pakistan

China's strategic interest in protecting Pakistan, strengthening its capabilities remains as strong as ever. The Sino-Pak alliance is meant not only to fight India on two fronts in case of war, but also meant to collect intelligence in peace time (Raman, B., 2011). Sino-Pak strategic relations became very close with the opening of Kara-Koram Highway connecting China and Arabian Sea through Pakistani Port of Karachi and new port of Gwadar. Additionally, through Gwadar Beijing will try to monitor US and Indian naval activity in the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and in the Indian Ocean.

China's Strategy for Bangladesh

China wants to strengthen relations with Bangladesh through investment in some mega projects, including the deep-sea port. Chittagong has the potential to become a connectivity hub since it may be the gateway to landlocked eastern India, southern China, Nepal, Bhutan and northern Myanmar. China is willing to help Bangladesh in building the Deep Sea Port near Chittagong which may also serve her strategic purpose of denying the naval facilities to USA or India to it which would be the nearest sea point from China's main land to the Bay of Bengal. It may also serve the following Chinese strategic purposes (Kapila, Dr. Subhash, 2003):

- China gets a strategic foothold in Bangladesh on India's Eastern flank.

- India will be strategically encircled by China.
- China may plan to develop Chittagong Naval Base similar to Gwadar in Pakistan.
- China could get naval base facilities in Bangladesh.

China's Strategy for Nepal

China's strategy is to give due priority to its relations with Nepal not only because of her potentials for being used against India during peace and war, but also because of its potential to India for being used to create instability in Tibet. China wants to take advantage of the Maoists of Nepal for strengthening its political, economic and military influence in Nepal. China also wants a passage to South Asia through Nepal for her greater presence in the region.

China's Strategy for Afghanistan

China is positioning herself to be a major player in Afghanistan after the withdrawal US Troops by 2014 as it fears a possible civil war or escalation of proxy battles in the neighbourhood. The recent shift towards trilateral ties among Afghanistan, China and Pakistan are visible signs of Beijing's intent to play a greater role in the coming years (Small, Andrew, 2012).

China's Strategy for Sri Lanka

China is strengthening her foothold in Sri Lanka by taking the opportunity to build sea port cum naval base like Hambantota, which may also be used for Chinese Navy. In this way China is helping the countries of South Asia as well as ensuring her needed security of her energy supply from West Asia and Africa (Raman, B., 2011).

China's Strategy for Maldives

China is trying to make inroads into the Maldives to fulfil its strategic objectives though the regime of President Nasheed was friendly towards India. Reportedly, Beijing convinced Abdul Gayoom government to construct a base in Marao of Maldives. (Kumar, Amit, 2013). China has continued to expand its soft power influence in Maldives to keep her reliant on China.

China's Strategy for Bhutan

China emphasises more on establishing diplomatic relations with Bhutan than resolving the border disputes. She wants to settle border disputes with Bhutan through the principle of mutual understanding.

IMPLICATIONS

General

China, being an economic giant in today's world, is tracking a strategy to make South Asia receptive to her influence. She has excellent construction engineering assets and willingness to invest in her neighbouring countries. China also has substantial modern military technology and cheaper military hardware, which can be shared by South Asian countries. Beijing will not allow any South Asian nation to come on the way to challenge her freedom of economic activities worldwide.

For India

China seems to follow a strategy for South Asia, mainly focused on the encirclement of India and confine her within South Asian territory. The bitter strategic reality for India is that it has no friends in South Asia. This may allow China to form an anti Indian alliance in the region. China's growing soft power influence is likely to be critical considerations for India (Ranasinghe, Sergei DeSilva, 2011). Chinese defence cooperation with other South Asian countries may affect India's strategy.

For Pakistan

China's strong tie with Pakistan is likely to make India weak by diverting her resources on two fronts. She is likely to continue investing heavily in Pakistan and Afghanistan's infrastructure development for greater road, rail and energy connectivity aiming better linkage and cooperation with West and Central Asia. However, Pakistan may receive added confidence of Beijing needs to exert more control over fundamentalist groups to present in order to receive more economic and military support from China.

For Nepal and Bhutan

China's growing relation with Nepal is likely to bring changes in the security, military and economic situation between them. China is now closer to the Indian

border through Nepal. Nepal is becoming a buyer and user of sophisticated Chinese military hardware. Nepal's friendly relations with China will make a tricky balance of Nepal's relationship with India and China. Beijing's closer ties will help Nepalese resentment against India to grow. Beijing will exploit the Nepalese economic resources and capture some Indian market in Nepal. China wants to establish diplomatic relations with Bhutan. Beijing wants to use her soft power to attract Bhutan for better economic relations. Her interest lies in keeping Bhutan under her influence without allowing India to form an alliance against China basing on common border issues.

For Afghanistan

Remaining at the juncture of US and NATO troops withdrawal, Afghanistan needs to maintain very conducive and cooperative relations with the economic and military giant China to strengthen her security, avoid civil or proxy war and develop her economy. Afghanistan should take the advantage of Chinese strategy to eliminate the ethnic separation, religious extremism and terrorism and seek both military and economic assistance to curve those three evil forces from the country. With the departure of United States, China can be Afghanistan's most important mediator and investor.

For Sri Lanka and Maldives

Sri Lanka enjoys good ties with China and derives a considerable amount of military and economic benefits out of her cordial relations with China even in the context of Indian discomfort. She can take the advantage of Chinese soft power strategy to expand her relations in the fields of economic and military development. The Maldives has considerable dependency on India in her national security matters. China cannot assist Maldives as rapidly as India can in an emergency to internal security or any natural disaster. As such, Male should not depend completely on China ignoring India. She needs to weigh a balance to derive maximum economic benefits out of the relationship with both the countries.

For Bangladesh

Bangladesh can be benefitted out of Chinese soft power strategy by receiving assistance for the infrastructural development and FDI, enhancing military cooperation and acquiring science and development technology. However, it would not be wise for Bangladesh to make strong alignment with China against India. But a cordial relation with China would help Bangladesh in getting support

from China as well as avoid hegemonic attitude of India. Bangladesh may take the advantage of the massive economic growth in East Asia, centring China and enhance its “Look East Policy” to bring itself closer to the new global centre of economic gravity.

RECOMMENDATIONS

South Asian countries should take the advantage of China's soft power diplomacy and her giant economic and military strength to accelerate their own economy. It might be of interests to the South Asian countries, excepting India, to create a political and strategic environment where the spectre of substantial intervention by China and if possible, USA, keeps India sensitive to maintain cooperative, rather than confrontational posture towards her neighbours.

India should make all out effort to utilize the advantages of geographical proximity with China by capturing economic, political, and strategic opportunities. She should maintain cordial diplomatic relations with her neighbours to reduce anti-Indian feelings, employ economic cooperation to counter Chinese presence in the region.

Pakistan should continue to maintain closer ties with China together with USA for her political stability and actively seek security cooperation from both the countries under bilateral, regional and global security framework. Sri Lanka should fully utilize the advantages of Chinese cooperation of already constructed Sri Lankan sea port cum naval base at Hambantota and carry it forward to other economic development activities.

Afghanistan should exploit Chinese fear of regional instability and seek more security and military cooperation from Beijing for a stable region to help economic development especially, after the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014. Maldives should continue to focus on economic issues and rely on China's trade, goodwill and investment in house construction, development of banking infrastructure and tourism without hampering the cordial relationship with India.

Nepal should further strengthen her relationship with China to reinforce her security as well as economy reducing the dependency on India. Bhutan should start diplomatic relation with China, solve her border issues amicably and develop economic ties to lessen her full dependency on India.

Bangladesh should further strengthen its security and military cooperation with China under bilateral security framework to reduce disadvantages arising from uneven power balance with giant neighbour India and grab maximum possible economic, political, and strategic opportunities. It should go ahead with the proposed BCIM economic corridor and seek Chinese cooperation to establish the deep sea port at Sonadia Island near Chittagong after realistic judgement of security issues. It should pursue its 'Look East Policy' to get closer to China and South-East Asia, the new global centre of economic gravity.

CONCLUSION

China places great importance to South Asia as her neighbour. Her strategy towards South Asia is aimed at strengthening her economy, security, regional stability, peace and development. Her new concepts of foreign strategy are to maintain a pragmatic and supportive approach, safeguard the common interests of all mankind, stress on security, make friendly relations with neighbours and help neighbours to become rich.

Strategy of Beijing has three approaches: building a harmonious world, go global prescribing selfless global unity and become world number one. Her strategy is to use 'Soft Power' and keep her military build-ups secret. Another strategy is to make South Asia receptive to her influence. She intends to grow her influence in the Indian Ocean mainly to secure her SLOCs.

China's South Asia policy is 'India-centric', preventing the rise of India to challenge China's growth. Beijing's strategy is to continue close relations with Pakistan to shape the South Asian security environment nullifying India's exclusive dominance. Chinese economic interests in South Asia are to maintain a steady growth in bilateral trades and infrastructural development. Beijing is trying to move towards long-range force projection.

China maintains a diversified but harmonious relationship with South Asian countries. Beijing wants stable relationship with India and strategic relationship with Pakistan. China wants to make Pakistan stronger to prevent Indian hegemony in South Asia. China-Bangladesh relationship is very friendly with a lot of opportunities of further development specially, in economic fields. China also maintains very friendly and economic relations with Sri Lanka, Nepal, Afghanistan and Maldives.

China's strategy to protect her strategic interests in South Asia is driven by her security, economic and strategic gains. Her strategy is to strengthen economic ties with South Asian countries through FDIs, infrastructure development, boosting

trade and extending military cooperation. South Asian nations should avail this opportunity of Chinese assistance for their economic and strategic gains.

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Brigadier General Hasan Mahmud Taiyebur Rahman was commissioned in the Corps of Ordnance on 21 December 1984. He commanded two of the field units and two Ordnance Depots of Bangladesh Army. He also commanded a sub-unit of Para Military Forces in Chittagong Hill Tracts. He served in different appointments at Directorate General Forces Intelligence. Twice he served as Instructor at Ordnance Centre and School. He also worked as Purchase Officer in different capacities and finally served as the Director General of Directorate General Defence Purchase. He is an Ammunition Technical Officer and attended a number of courses at home and abroad. He is a graduate of United States Army Logistics Management College and United States Army Quartermaster School. He completed Unit Command and Staff Course from School of Infantry and Tactics of Bangladesh. He served in UN Guards Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI). He also served as Chief Logistics Officer and Assistant Director of Ordnance Services at Sector Headquarters in United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). He obtained his Masters in Business Administration from Southeast University, Bangladesh. He visited many countries across the globe. He is married to Sharmin Aktar Choudhury. Brigadier General Taiyeb is the father of two sons, both of them are students. His hobbies are travelling, reading, browsing internet, playing Billiards and Snooker and spending quality time with family.