

“THE FALL OF LTTE”- IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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INTRODUCTION

The LTTE is a terrorist organization gradually expanded its wings internationally over the last three decades mainly through wide variety of assistance provided by the Tamil diaspora. The enormous external support base provided by the Tamil diaspora, its international networks and other international links established with terror outfits all over the world paved the way for the organization to engage in a prolonged war aiming to achieve the ultimate object of establishing a separate state for Tamils in Sri Lanka. Although, the LTTE is militarily defeated in Sri Lanka, their international arm is still intact and effectively functioning without any hindrance due to freedom extended by many western nations.

The terrorist activities committed by LTTE had a great impact on the security of the South Asian Region and International security environment as a whole in addition to its effect in Sri Lanka. The brutal assassinations, suicide bombing, drug trafficking, money and human laundering, illegal weapons transactions through their own shipping network and recruitment of child soldiers are key features of the organization which had a great impact on regional and international security. This paper will analyze the present state of the organization and to identify the threat posed on national, regional and international security.

THE RISE OF THE LTTE AND ITS “FALL”

Sri Lanka is an ethnically diverse state having total population of 19 million. Sinhalese are the most dominant ethnic group, which comprise 82% of the total population. On the other hand, only 9.4% are Tamils, 7.9% are Muslims and others are 0.7%. Out of the total population 70% is Buddhists, who are mostly Sinhalese and 15.5% follow Hinduism that involves mainly the Tamils.¹ The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was formed in 1976² under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran, and it began to campaign for a separate Tamil homeland in northern and eastern Sri Lanka.³ Thereafter, starting from the

1. Hon Wanasundara R.S., *Sinhala Commission*.17 September 1997.
2. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam. Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberation_Tigers_of_Tamil_Eelam [accessed 14 June 2012].
3. Gunaratna, Rohan., 1997. *International and Regional security implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency*. Colombo: Alumni Association of the Bandaranayke Center for international studies Sri Lanka., p. 8.

assassination of the Mayor of Jaffna by the LTTE leader Prabhakaran, a number of acts of terror have been committed by the LTTE. In 1983, the LTTE ambushed an army convoy and killed thirteen soldiers which triggered the over two decade long conflict in the island.

Prabhakaran built his military apparatus like a conventional force having infantry, artillery and logistics units. He even supplemented the ground troops with a naval wing and managed to build an air wing comprising few light aircraft. In August 2005, the assassination of Sri Lanka’s foreign minister, Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar, who himself is a Tamil reignited the conflict. Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar was a world-renowned diplomat and this barbaric act was condemned by the international community. This was one of the main reasons to intensify the ban on LTTE by the European Union.⁴

In 2006, following a well crafted strategy formulated by Mr Gotabhaya Rajapaksha, the president’s younger brother and Secretary of Defence, President Rajapaksha’s government applied Military power to weaken the LTTE to facilitate a political solution⁵. Diplomatic tools were applied to ban the LTTE overseas and prevent external support. Mr Gotabhaya Rajapaksha was a war veteran who himself fought the LTTE very bravely⁶ and retired as a colonel in the Sri Lanka Army had no fear in confronting this ruthless outfit. The initial thrust started in the eastern province in year 2006 and following a fierce, three year-long military offensive, under the leadership of President Mahinda Rajapaksha, the Sri Lankan government claimed in 18 May 2009 that it had militarily defeated the separatist group and killed its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.

It was the loss of its logistics vessels in a series of air and Naval attacks from 2007 to 2009 and the multi-pronged ground operations by several Sri Lankan military divisions marching in tandem across different axis that ultimately proved to be the LTTE’s downfall.⁷ The Freezing of Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) accounts had positive financial affect on the LTTE.

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4. *The Rise and Fall of the LTTE: An analytical observation* written by Leel Pathirana Asian Tribune available at <http://www.asiantribune.com> [accessed 25 March 2012].
 5. President Mahinda Rajapakse., 2009.” *Prabakaran Closed the Door on Me. I Wanted Peace.*” interviewed by Indrejit Badhwar. Colombo. Daily Mirror, 1 August.
 6. Author who was a SLAF helicopter pilot himself flown the officer for missions along with his troops.
 7. *The Times of India* available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-05-18/india/28207800_1_prabhakaran-ltte-coastal-districts. [accessed 25 March 2012].

Is the LTTE totally eliminated?

Although, the LTTE has been militarily defeated and most of its leaders and cadres killed or surrendered, its international network remains more or less undisturbed. There is enough evidence that the Tiger remnants are trying to regroup and take the struggle forward using this network. They are also awaiting the resettlement of displaced personnel to mix-up with civilians. Many LTTE ‘sleeper cells’⁸ that exist all over the island is another potential source of perpetuating violence.

The international wing of the LTTE requires a rationale for continued existence; to disprove the claim of the Sri Lankan government that the LTTE has been decimated; and to sustain the aura of the group among the Tamil diaspora. Irrespective of factions, the external wing has been trying to revive the Eelam movement in the island.⁹ The Sri Lankan foreign minister Mr. GL Peiris during his recent visit to Bangladesh stated that “Tamil diasporas are still ‘rigid’ against stability in Sri Lanka even after the end of 26 years of military conflict in the South Asian nation.”¹⁰ Thus, it can be concluded that there is a strong possibility of resurgence of the LTTE if appropriate safeguards are neglected by international community.

The transnational vivid terror activities committed by the LTTE previously is a clear example of greater threat posed to the national, regional and international security by way of their enhanced ideological, technological and financial interaction with overseas insurgent groups if re-emerged. Therefore, an understanding of the existing international infrastructure of the LTTE as well as their relationship with the Tamil Diaspora is vital for improving national, regional and international stability and security.

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8. Existence of LTTE sleeper cells were confirmed by unpublished and classified sources.
 9. Dr. Manoharan, N., *Dismantling LTTE's International Network*. Article No.1424 dated 04 November 2009 Centre for Land Warfare Studies Site. Available at <http://www.claws.in> [accessed on 30 April 2012].
 10. Peiris, G.L., *Diaspora against stability in Sri Lanka*. *Colombo Gazette* On Line available at <http://colombogazette.com/diaspora-against-stability-in-lanka/> [accessed 08 Aug 2012].

THE EXISTING LTTE INTERNATIONAL NETWORK

Tamil Diaspora and the LTTE

A series of ethnic riots erupted from 1956 to 1983 scarred the memories of a substantial segment of Tamils who left Sri Lanka as victims of communal riots.¹¹ They soon established themselves as the Tamil diaspora in many Western and European countries after seeking political asylum in these countries. The LTTE having identified this trend from the very inception, made every effort to gain control over the Tamil diaspora in its efforts to establish the position that the LTTE was the sole representative of Tamils. However, less than 10% of the radicalized segments of Tamil diaspora get actively involved in promoting LTTE interest whilst majority remains neutral. Despite recent declines in overseas financing, the LTTE continues to raise an estimated USD 200 - 300 million per year through the collection from its diaspora and illegal activities.¹² The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora population in western countries is approximately 1.2 million.¹³

LTTE Front Organizations

Since the opening of the first LTTE Front Organization in London in 1984, LTTE expanded its international network through establishing number of Front Organizations across the globe in 48 countries. Initially, the LTTE International Secretariat functioned from London and Paris. In 2002, it shifted to Northern area in Sri Lanka. Since then, the LTTE international activities were coordinated by Manivannan, alias Castro, under direct supervision of the LTTE leader until its military defeat in 2009. Activities of LTTE Front Organizations could be broadly categorized into Fund raising, Procurement and Propaganda. Though their tasks invariably overlap, there is a significant autonomy of operation in each. According to intelligence sources, 90% of the money collected overseas through its Front Organizations was utilized to strengthen its war coffers.

Following the death of LTTE leader Velupillai prabhakaran, former LTTE arms procurement chief Kumaran Pathmanathan alias KP, took over the control of LTTE International Network in May 2009. However, Nediyan, a hardcore follower of Castro who was the former head of LTTE international network

11. Gunaratna, Rohan., 1997. *International and Regional security implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency*. Colombo: Alumni Association of the Bandaranayke Center for international studies Sri Lanka p. 10

12. *Jane s spells out LTTE s annual income*, August 12, 2008 available at <http://lrrp2.wordpress.com/2008/08/12/jane-s-spells-out-ltte-s-annual-income/> [accessed on 15 may 2012].

13. International Crisis Group Asia Report N°186, 23 February 2010 and information from unpublished and classified sources from Sri Lanka

challenged KP's leadership and this resulted in the formation of another faction in June 2009. Nediyanwan was backed by many extremists and radical elements namely Jeychandran of Tamil Net, Fr (sic) Emmanuel of Global Tamil Forum (GTF) and some remnants of LTTE who managed to flee the country. The key policy difference between these two factions is that the KP Faction declared they would continue their struggle through democratic means whilst Nediyanwan declared that it was only by following Prabakaran's ideology and tactics that they could achieve their objectives.

However, following the arrest of KP in August 2009, his key advisor, V Rudrakumaran, a USA based LTTE activist and the international legal head of the LTTE, took over the leadership and continued to work towards concept of establishing the so called "Government in Exile", or the Provisional Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (PTGTE) whilst Nediyanwan continued to expand his network based on Prabakaran's ideology and tactics. A brief description of existing LTTE international networks are given below:

a. Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) - Rudrakumaran Faction

The prime aim of establishing the TGTE is to lobby with Foreign Governments for the establishment of a separate state in the North and East of Sri Lanka. It has established offices in almost all European countries where the Tamil Diaspora is significant. Rudrakumaran has appointed a 14 member committee which consists of prominent Pro LTTE activists as an advisory group to study TGTE concept and in May 2010 the elections were held to elect 135 members. The Tamil Diaspora did not respond positively to the TGTE elections as more than 85% refrained from voting. Subsequently, TGTE has held three sessions in USA in May and September 2010 and February 2011 where Rudrakumaran and 22 other elected activists were appointed respectively as Prime Minister and Ministers of so-called TGTE. The latest development of this process is that 1/3 of the elected members of TGTE who are loyal to Nediyanwan faction have revolt against the policies of Rudrakumaran and wanted to remain as an independent group.¹⁴ It would be interesting to see how Rudrakumaran will proceed with TGTE concept when 1/3 of his own elected members are opposing him.

14. *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE*. International Crisis Group Asia Report N°186, 23 February 2010. p.13

b. Tamil Ealam People Assembly (TEPA) Tamil National Council (TNC) - Nediyanwan Faction. This organization was inaugurated in June 2009 by Nediyanwan based on the LTTE ideology and Thimpu Principles. The Nediyanwan faction controlled most of former LTTE assets and Front Organizations that existed prior to its military defeat. Nediyanwan is only a figure head of this organization and it is actually controlled by a group of pro LTTE activists namely Jeyachandran alias Jeya, the editor of Tamil Net based in Norway, Senathirajah Jeyanandamurthy, a former Tamil National Alliance (TNA) Member of Parliament now based in UK and Thiruchelvam and Neru from Canada.

c. Global Tamil Forum (GTF) -Fr. S J Emmanuel Faction. The GTF emerged in February 2010 following the initiative of BTF with the backing of local politicians to lobby for Eelam cause in the pretext of fighting for justice for alleged war crimes against Tamils. Fr. (sic) S J Emmanuel was selected to head the GTF due to his intellectual and religious background and his ability to reach the international community as a religious dignitary.

d. The British Tamil Forum (BTF) - Suren Surendiran Faction. The British Tamil Forum (BTF) is an umbrella organization established in 2006 with the prime aim of mustering the support of Tamil community and local Politicians for the Eelam cause. The motive of this later action is to attempt to influence the political thinking of the British government in favour of LTTE interest, gain access to voter lists and target Tamil residents for extortion.

e. LTTE Ex-Combatants / Criminal Elements - Vinayagam Faction. This group consists of ex-LTTE combatants and criminal elements have started functioning from early 2010. In this group, Vinayagam, the senior most intelligence cadre who managed to escape during the last stage of humanitarian operation, along with Achchudan, Samraj and Shankar who operated overseas at the time of LTTE military defeat are reported to be active. At present, some of them are linked to certain other LTTE Fronts Organizations as well.

f. LTTE / Pro-LTTE Media Network. Media is one of the main tools extensively used by LTTE to propagate its ideology and raise funds from Tamil Diaspora during its military struggle and even after its military defeat. To this end, LTTE maintaining number of TV and radio stations, websites and printing presses in most European capitals where the Tamil Diaspora is significant. Some of these establishments are funded by outside parties for different reasons. The LTTE also maintain close links with certain international media establishments and journalists to promote its interests among Diaspora and International Community and some of them have come under regular payments by the LTTE and its Front Organizations.

g. LTTE Finance Network. LTTE maintained an international financial network consisting of its own money exchange offices and couriers across the Europe to ensure that money collected are channeled to meet its ultimate terror activities. Saana Chandran who is also known as Saana Group is responsible for running this financial network under the direct supervision of Castro. It is observed that since May 2009, the LTTE fundraising ability has decreased by 80%. Despite this 80% reduction, the LTTE Front Organizations still managed to spend millions of dollars monthly to meet their functional expenses and organize various public events to mobilize the support of Diaspora and international community.

h. LTTE Shipping Network. The LTTE was operating eleven vessels in Southern Asia for gun running in addition to legitimate commercial freight operations.¹⁵ Except for the PLO and the IRA, the LTTE is the only insurgent group that owns and operates a fleet of deep sea going ships.¹⁶ It is evident that today LTTE has established links with many underworld agencies in order to collect funds by transporting narcotics, weapons and other commercial goods. After LTTE lost its access to Tamil Nadu due to ban of LTTE by the Indian government, the LTTE shifted its operation to Myanmar and Pukhet area in Thailand where bulk of activities had been carried out from these destinations.¹⁷ Hence, the unchecked expansion of the LTTE fleet may pose adverse implications for regional and international security especially due to their arms smuggling activities.

Is the Security and Growth of Sri Lanka Challenged by the LTTE International Network?

a. Effect on Political Stability. The present government of President Rajapaksha managed to pursue a positive policy on the LTTE terrorism and the well crafted strategy of Defence Secretary Mr. Gotabaya Rajapaksha which finally eradicated the terrorism totally from the Sri Lankan soil. As a result, President Rajapaksa gained widespread popularity among the Sinhalese majority for ending the war and established political stability in the island after three decades.¹⁸ However, some scholars viewed that the military victory over the LTTE is only one half of the solution towards peaceful political stability in Sri Lanka (emphasis added).¹⁹

15. Davis, A., "A secret Tamil guerrilla bares embracers Bangkok". Bangkok Post, 15 Jun 2000. Also see Peiris GH, *Secessionist war and Terrorism in Sri Lanka: Transnational Impulse*, available at <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/books/global/peiris.htm> [accessed 29 March 2012].

16. Gunaratna., *op.cit.* p.27.

17. Gunaratna., *op.cit.* p.28. Also see *LTTE's flourishing shipping network*. Available at <http://www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/200003/msg00066.html> [accessed 14 June 2012].

18. Vaughn B, *Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations*-June 16, 2011 Congressional Research service available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31707.pdf> p.1 [accessed 04 May 2012].

19. Rajasingham Senanayake, Darini., *From National Security State to Human Security: The Challenge of Winning the Peace in Sri Lanka*. ISAS Working Paper No. 72 – Date: 9 July 2009. Institute of south Asian studies, National university of Singapore,p.3.

The LTTE problem not only effected internal stability but led to the intervention of regional and international actors to the internal politics of the country as well. The Indian intervention in many instances as well as deployment of IPKF in Sri Lanka can be sited as an example. The Indian food dropping in Jaffna on 04 June 1987 with two AN-32 aircraft escorted by Mirage 2000 fighters was clear violation of sovereignty of Sri Lanka.²⁰ The recent resolution passed at UNHRC also viewed as interference to the internal affairs and sovereignty of Sri Lanka by many nations.

The existence of LTTE Phenomenon will continue to provoke Tamil population and may lead to political instability in the country. India too will be involved either like it or not due to its approximately 60 million large Tamil population in Tamilnadu state.²¹ The LTTE’s strategy of leadership elimination had direct effect in country’s political stability which may again pursue by the LTTE through its underworld connections if resurgence takes place.

b. Effect on Economy. The country in order to fight a prolonged war for nearly three decades had to bear a huge amount of finances for the war effort from the annual budget. The tourism industry almost came to stand still with the LTTE terror attacks carried out in the capital city and its suburbs. The decline in tourist arrivals to the country was one of the main setbacks experienced during the war which was boosting the national revenue. Thus, if the LTTE problem re-emerges, it will have definite impact in Sri Lanka’s economy.

c. Dilemma in Foreign and Economic Policies. Another notable point was deviation in foreign policy and rapid economic growth of Sri Lanka during late 1970’s due to its adoption of open economy similar to Singapore and Malaysia had a strategic effect in economies of certain countries. This could be considered as one of the strategic aims to arm and train LTTE terrorists by interested parties. Thus, if the LTTE is allowed to regroup again, the history may repeat itself in case of an unfavourable Sri Lankan foreign policy and economic growth which affect other nations. It is a known fact that regional and international actors always consider their own economic interest over any other issues in the region.

20. *Indian Air force Operation Poomalai* available at <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/1022-Chapter01.html> [accessed 04 May 2012].

21. International Crisis Group Asia Report N°186, *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE* 23 February 2010 p22 (The International Crisis Group is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict).

Hence, this rapid economic growth of the country can be brought to a standstill if the LTTE resumes its activities again. However, it is a viable question to ask who's economy get effected in a scenario of vibrant Sri Lankan economy which may have indirect bearing to the LTTE factor.

d. Internal Security Situation. Although the LTTE has been defeated militarily in 2009, LTTE supporters oversee is continued to agitate to revive the group.²² The arresting of three LTTE arms smugglers in Tiruchi with the possession of over 5,000 bomb detonators in June 2010, by the intelligence wing of Tamil Nadu police is an example.²³

Dr. Rohan Gunaratna²⁴ contended that the most powerful element of the LTTE was its ideological element and thus the greatest threat to the future security of Sri Lanka stems from it in case of resurgence. Both the Government of Sri Lanka and the local media would have to do much more in countering this threat.

e. Funding and Support for the LTTE from Diaspora. Approximately one-quarter of the Tamil population lives outside the Sri Lanka. As per the U.S. State Department, the LTTE has also used charitable groups, like the Tamils Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), as a front organization for fundraising. In the January 2008 report, the Congressional Research Service said the LTTE continues to raise an estimated USD 200 - 300 million per year despite recent declines in overseas financing.²⁵ The Jane's Defence Intelligence Review also confirmed that the LTTE's sophisticated fundraising mechanism earns "some USD 200 - 300 million a year".²⁶

f. Dilemma in True Intention of World Power Bases. The western countries adopted a very suspicious new approached in all developing countries where some communal disturbance or disagreements exist. Many projects sphere headed by powerful western organizations promote and emphasis concepts such as autonomy on the minds of native people to break away from the sovereign nation states. There is a strong possibility that this may be a strategic plan to keep

22. Gunaratna Rohan *Although LTTE defeated overseas supporters carry on*, The Island April 11, 2012 on line available at http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=46705 [accessed 14 may 2012].

23. International Crisis Group Asia Report N°206, 23 June 2011, *India and Sri Lanka after the LTTE*, p31 also see "*Three LTTE cadre held*", The Hindu, 21 June 2010.

24. Head of Singapore's International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research and Professor of Security Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Prof Gunaratna also serves on the Advisory Board of International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in the Hague

25. Vaughn B, *Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations*-June 16, 2011 Congressional Research service available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31707.pdf> [accessed 14 May 2012].

26. *Jane s spells out LTTE s annual income* available at <http://lrrp2.wordpress.com/2008/08/12/jane-s-spells-out-ltte-s-annual-income/> [accessed 14 May 2012].

the developing nations in its status quo in order to find market for their products and arms trade to ensure the security of their economies. The activities of certain organizations in Chittagong Hill tracks in Bangladesh and north eastern part of Sri Lanka are an example for above hypothesis. If all countries develop and becomes self sufficient the present power bases has to face a paradigm shift.

What has been the Sri Lankan Government Response?

The Sri Lankan government presently doing its best to emphasis and convince the international community of the danger lying ahead, if the LTTE resurgence takes place through its diplomatic missions abroad. As a result of its effort many leading nations such as USA, UK, Canada, India etc. has further banned the LTTE in their countries. The Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence through its intelligence organizations working positively and tirelessly in collecting information of latest development and denying expansion of LTTE international arms with the assistance of Interpol and their counterparts in friendly countries. The arrest of Kumaran Pathmanadan alias KP abroad can be sited as one their great successes as a result of above corporation.

IMPLICATIONS ON REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Threats to Regional Security

The assassination of Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991, killing of 15 members of rival Group in Madras and the bomb explosion of Meenabakkam airport in Madras, are some of the major LTTE terrors committed in India. The LTTE is the only group to have successfully assassinated two world leaders, namely Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India in 1991 and Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka in 1993. In both instances, the Tigers carried out extremely well planned and orchestrated suicide strikes that successfully defeated the tightest security cordons of the Indian and Sri Lankan intelligence services.²⁷ When analyzing the killing of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, it is evident that either LTTE may have done so to avenge the grudge of declaring war on them through IPKF or they may have thought his existence in Indian politics is detrimental to the organization. A group of Sri Lankan Tamil militants once made an attempt to overthrow the President Abdul Gayoom’s Government of Maldives as well by military means.²⁸

27. Chalk Peter, *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) international organization and operations - A preliminary analysis*, Commentary no.77, March 17, 2000. Canadian security intelligence service publication, available at http://www.vigilonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=491&Itemid=68 [accessed 01 May 2012].

28. Hewitt., *op.cit.* p. 73.

However, Madras politicians continued to harbor LTTE cadres even though the central government of India is totally opposed it. It is no secret that India, specifically Tamil Nadu, would be the most likely and logistically convenient place for the Tigers to regroup and rearm, given the anonymity that its Tamil population provides, as well as its proximity to Sri Lanka.²⁹ The Indian Home Ministry notification, May 2010 reported, “even though the LTTE has been decimated in Sri Lanka, recent reports revealed that remnant cadres and leaders are regrouping in Tamil Nadu”.³⁰ In November 2010, testifying in a tribunal investigating the validity of the re-imposed ban on LTTE, the Indian Additional Solicitor General (ASG) A.S. Chandhikok said, “The LTTE remnant is regrouping in India”, and again “the possibilities of these remnant cadres using India, especially Tamil Nadu, as a rear base for the re-grouping activities thus cannot be ruled out”, referring to the recent arrests of LTTE cadres who had illegally entered the country.³¹ The ASG also expressed the central government’s anxiety that the various pro-LTTE groups in India and abroad, publicly organizing in support of Tamil Eelam, threatened India’s sovereignty and security.³² In December 2010, press reports cited unnamed Indian intelligence sources warning of an LTTE plot to assassinate Sonia Gandhi, the Prime Minister, the Home Minister and the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister.³³

The connection between some of the Left Extremist Groups (LEG) in India and the LTTE has often been highlighted. There is a view that the erstwhile People’s War group³⁴ or PWG. Now Communist Party of India (CPIM) had links with the LTTE and had received expertise in using improvised explosive devices from the Sri Lankan outfit.³⁵ Bandaru Dattatreya, then Union minister of State for Railways, stated in the Lok Sabha on 10th December 1991 that the group had acquired 60 AK-47s and 20 sten guns from the LTTE.³⁶ The international affiliations and fraternal ties of the extremists groups in India with the Nepalese Maoists and supposedly the LTTE add to the threat they pose to the Indian state and the region (emphasis added).³⁷

29. *International Crisis Group Asia Report N°206, India and Sri Lanka after the LTTE, 23 June 2011, p. 30.*

30. Notification of Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, Notification S.O. 1090 (E), issued on 14 May 2010.

31. Excerpts from the ASG’s testimony see J. Venkatesan, “LTTE’s unlawful activity still on, Centre tells tribunal”, *The Hindu*, 1 November 2010.

32. *International Crisis Group Asia Report N°206, op.cit. p. 31.*

33. *Ibid. p.31.* For details of the alleged plot, see “LTTE plans to attack PM, home minister, TN CM: Intel”, *Press Trust of India*, 15 December 2010.

34. PWG is one of the Left Extremist Group operating in Andhra Pradesh

35. “PWG has Links With LTTE: Advani”, *The Hindu*, October 6, 2003 New Delhi.

36. Ramana,P.V. “Internal and International Linkages of Naxalites,” http://www.asthabharati.org/Dia_Apr05/ramana.htm. [accessed 03 March 2012].

37. Singh, Amit Kumar .*The Rising Tide of Left Wing Extremism in India*. Manekshaw Paper No. 8, 2008. Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.

The activities of secret services of regional powers are another concern. In one unconfirmed article it is stated that intelligence organization of one country previously has developed close linkages with LTTE to establish bases in South India particularly in states like Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka.³⁸ The emphasis added in the article was possibility of manipulating Tamils to establish separate state initially in Sri Lanka and then to use it as launching pad for separation of Tamil Nadu as a strategic aim.

However, a victory of the Tamil diaspora and the establishment of a separate state is definitely detrimental to Indian interest. Sri Lanka’s geographical location is of strategic importance to the Indian national security and the Indian Ocean and has since the time of British, been incorporated within Indian defence policies.³⁹

A viable solution to Sri Lanka’s terrorist problem is also important in safeguarding India’s security interests due to geographical locations of two countries. Mr KM Panikkar, in his influential book *India and the Indian Ocean*, noted that Sri Lanka was intimately linked to the India’s security although he refrained from spelling out the consequences of it.⁴⁰

Threats to International Security

LTTE Narcotic and Arms Smuggling

Terrorism in Asia registered a huge rise with incidents such as movement of large quantities of explosives by land and sea in Southern Asia.⁴¹ LTTE has strong links with the arms smugglers in Myanmar, Afghanistan, Burmese insurgent groups and at least with four separate insurgent groups in India.⁴² Indian authorities have once managed to seize around two tons of weapons belongs to the LTTE. In 1994, 50 tons of TNT and 10 tones of RDX explosives were sold by a chemical plant in Ukraine to the LTTE.⁴³ It is evident that LTTE has smuggled some fraction of these explosive and weapons to the Indian terrorist groups. LTTE has been involved in illicit trafficking of weapons and drugs to South Asia and regular supplier of drugs to the European market. LTTE maintains links with

38. Jamwal NS, *Counter Terrorism Strategy*, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis. Strategic Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2003, New Delhi. Available at www.idsa.in/system/files/strategicanalysis_jamwal_0303.pdf [accessed 01 May 2012].

39. Hewitt, Vernon., *The new international politics of South Asia*, Manchester University press, Manchester 1997, p. 68.

40. Hewitt., *op.cit* p. 68.

41. Gunaratna, R., 1997. *International and Regional security implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency*. Colombo: Alumni Association of the Bandaranayke Center for international studies Sri Lanka. p. 32.

42. Kartha, Tara., “*Proliferation and smuggling of weapons and narcotics in South Asia*”, (IDSA 2000).

43. Gunaratna,R., *op.cit*. p.14. e copy available at <http://212.150.54.123/articles/articlelet.cfm?articleid=57> [accessed 23 April 2012].

insurgent groups who trade narcotic and arms in Afghanistan, Turkey, Palestine, Myanmar, and Thailand underworld. Tamil tigers have regularly accessed the black and gray markets in Greece, Cyprus, Ukraine and Turkey and are reported as having ports of call for remaining Tamil tiger ships in those countries.

The LTTE has managed to carry out its narcotic and arms smuggling with the help of other insurgents and mafia groups specially by using the LTTE shipping network. They were believed to be sailing from ports in Indonesia. Far- East destinations were always suitable places for the Tigers to smuggle arms since various terrorist groups are operating in the Far East and South Asia such as Al Queda cells in Bali Indonesia. Another key aspect is wealthy Tamil businessmen in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia who were always their sympathizers.

From 1980s onward, the LTTE developed a global network with cells in over 50 countries which are still intact despite their military defeat. In addition to furthering the LTTE's objectives through the conduct of a propaganda war, this network engaged in a number of illegal activities. These activities include human trafficking, narcotics and arms smuggling etc in order to raise funds for the LTTE to procure arms. Hence, even after the demise of the LTTE's military organization in Sri Lanka, the LTTE's global network remains strong and continues to pose a significant threat to law and order around the world.⁴⁴

Money Laundering and Extortion

In a report released by the European Police Office (Europol), the 2011 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) highlights the LTTE's 'rejuvenation' not in the area of actual terrorism but the collection of funds through numerous legal and illegal means.⁴⁵ The question is why should the pro-LTTE elements in the European Union region need to raise funds and for what purpose as singled out by the TE-SAT report of the Europol.

44. *Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis July 2006 – May 2009*, published by Ministry of Defence, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, July 2011

45. Gamage, Daya., "Wake-up call for Sri Lanka from EU 2011 Terrorism Report: LTTE fund raising identified". *Asian Tribune Foreign News Desk*, Washington, DC. 16 October 2011 available at <http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2011/10/15/wake-call-sri-lanka-eu-2011-terrorism-report-ltte-fund-raising-identified>[accessed 20 may 2012].

The PKK/KONGRA-GEL (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan or Kurdistan Workers’ Party)⁴⁶ and LTTE also collect money from their members, using labels like ‘donations’ and ‘membership fees’, but are in fact extortion and illegal taxation. In addition to organized extortion campaigns, there are indications that the PKK/KONGRA-GEL and the LTTE are actively involved in money laundering, illicit drugs and human trafficking, as well as illegal immigration inside and outside the EU.⁴⁷

The immediate objective of the remnants of the LTTE is to haul Sri Lanka before an international court for alleged human rights violations, violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and crimes against humanity in order to create favourable environment for them to re activate their struggle with the international sympathy. But the long term target, as Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran is currently involved in, is the bifurcation of Sri Lanka into a separate independent state for the minority Tamil.

International Crimes

The LTTE has committed few crimes in the European countries too. The LTTE Canadian Leader Suresh Kumar was deported from Canada due to illegal activities committed. At the 19th session of the United Nations Human Right Council on March 2012 in Geneva, Sri Lanka with deep concern noted that remnants of the defeated Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) international network continues its criminal activities and its secessionist agenda. Referring to the resolution passed against Sri Lanka, External Affairs Minister Prof. G.L. Peiris said passing of the resolution could be precedent setting to pave the way towards resurgence of the very terrorism that was eliminated as a consequence of Sri Lankan Government action and policy and something the world should praise.⁴⁸

Illegal Collection of Ransoms

The LTTE, evidently in order to ensure a regular minimum inflow into its coffers, made an appeal (backed up where necessary by compulsions) to the Tamils living in Europe, USA, Canada and Australia, for commitments to regular monthly donations on a per family or per capita basis. An estimate by the Sri Lanka embassy in Ottawa placed the monthly contribution of the Tamils

46. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*), commonly known as PKK, also known as KGK and formerly known as KADEK (Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan) or KONGRA-GEL (Kurdistan People’s Congress), is a Kurdish organization which has since 1984 been fighting an armed struggle against the Turkish state for an autonomous Kurdistan which is sharing similar ideology with LTTE.

47. Gamage, Daya., *op.cit.*

48. The Passing of US Resolution At Geneva A Mere Response To Sri Lanka’s Bickering Adversaries Mostly To Appease Them But There Are Dangers, LankaWeb Weekly Editorial March 28th 2012. Available at <http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2012/03/27/>

living in Canada at the equivalent of about US\$ 730,000.⁴⁹ The average monthly collections from other countries (whether entirely from donations is not made clear) as estimated by Davis in 1996, work out in USD equivalents to 660,000 from Switzerland (this probably includes transfers from other countries), 390,000 from the United Kingdom and 200,000 from Germany.⁵⁰ Another estimate, made in 2008 by Jane's Defence magazine, placed the LTTE annual income world-widely between 200 and 300 million US Dollars through collection of money from Tamil Diaspora and illegal businesses.⁵¹

Techno-Terrorism

As a terrorist group, LTTE acquired cutting edge technology in many areas. Today LTTE suicide bomb technology is used by the Hamas, Algerian FIS, Kurdish and PKK. The LTTE suicide body suits were more advanced than the body suits used by any of the other groups. The expansion of the LTTE network overseas had brought them closer in contact with other insurgent groups. The LTTE had developed ideological, financial and technological linkages with other insurgent groups.⁵²

Cyber Threat poses by LTTE Online Network

The LTTE has also ventured into cyber crime on many occasions. The LTTE has used the Internet to hack into Sri Lankan government networks in 1997, the first recorded use of internet terrorism in the world by any conventional terrorist group⁵³. A wing of the Tamil Tigers calling itself the Internet Black Tigers bombarded the Sri Lankan embassies and consulates with junk e-mails, up to 800 per day. This cyber-terrorist attack, which swamped embassy computers for two weeks, is reputedly the first ever reported as per the US intelligence officials. The LTTE is also reported to have used the Internet for criminal profit, as evidenced by the University of Sheffield case⁵⁴, which exposes the more serious issue of internet identity theft by terrorists.

49. Davis, A., *Tiger International: How a secret global network keeps Sri Lanka's Tamil guerrilla organization up and killing*. *Asia week* Cover Story 26 July 1996. Available at <http://www.lankalibrary.com/pol/tiger%20international.htm> [accessed 24 June 2012].

50. Davis, A., *op.cit.* Also see Peiris, G.H., *Secessionist war and terrorism in Sri Lanka: Transnational impulses*. Available at <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/books/global/peiris.htm> [accessed 24 June 2012].

51. Jane's spells out LTTE's annual income, August 12, 2008 available at <http://lrrp2.wordpress.com/2008/08/12/jane-s-spells-out-ltte-s-annual-income/> [accessed on 15 May 2012].

52. Gunaratna, R., 1993. *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka*, South Asian Network on Conflict Research. Colombo. p.44.

53. Tekwani, Shyam. January 2006. The LTTE's online network and its implications for Regional security. Paper No.104, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore. P. 24

54. Perera, J., *LTTE a trend setter in cyber terrorism*. *Asia Tribune*. Colombo, 29 October. Available at <http://www.asiantribune.com/node/8018> [accessed 19 September 2012].

“Madrasa’ type schools in West to spread LTTE ideology

A total of 420 pro -LTTE schools are functioning in five European countries operated by the Tamil Diaspora with the aim of passing views and beliefs of the LTTE to the next generation and to keep alive the separatism ideology, according to information received by the Defence and Urban Development Ministry of Sri Lanka.⁵⁵ These schools are functioning in Germany, Switzerland, France, Netherlands and Denmark. Approximately 20,000 Tamil students between the age of 4 to 20 are studying in these schools.

According to sources, there are 145 schools in Germany, 133 schools in Switzerland, 65 schools in Denmark, 52 schools in France and 25 schools in the Netherlands. LTTE front organizations use most of these students not only to promote LTTE interests’ overseas but also as a source of income as well.

LTTE, a Threatening Force to the Global Peace

The expansion of LTTE had taken place beyond India and South Asia. The Western Intelligence and Security agencies had confirmed that LTTE had established links with Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) since LTTE had purchased vessels that could cross the Atlantic or the Pacific and reach Latin America. Further, the LTTE had exchanged and procured weapons from the Khmer Rouge and maintained links with Namibia’s South Western African People’s Organization (SWAPO), Eritrea’s Eritrea People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and Ethiopia’s Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and very little is known about its Middle Eastern connections, except for the fact that Tamil insurgents had trained at least in Lebanon with Fatah, with Militant Wing of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and with Popular Front For the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in Bekka Valley.⁵⁶ At these training camps, Tamil groups came into contact with a number of other groups, including the Japanese Red Army, Kurdish PKK, and Afghan mujahidin and the Kashmiri mujahidin, which LTTE had had substantial technological links. These interactions of LTTE with many foreign insurgent groups contribute to the instability and insecurity of nation-states beyond Sri Lanka and purely acting as a destabilizing force in South Asia.

55. *The radicalization of children-An insight into LTTE administered Tamil schools in Europe.*2011. Published by Ministry of Defence and Urban development, Sri Lanka.

56 Gunaratna, R., 1997. *International and Regional security implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency.* Colombo: Alumni Association of the Bandaranayke Center for international studies Sri Lanka. p.33.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Hence, in order to arrest the resurgence of this terrorist outfit following national, regional and international responses are recommended.

Recommendations at the National Level

a. Development with Good Governance. This should be the key area for any counter strategy to be effective and productive. The perception of neglect and underdevelopment brought frustration and a feeling of alienation among the local population, which could be exploited by LTTE and other interested parties. During interactions with the civil population in the terrorism-affected areas, it is invariably reported by them that the civil administration seldom pays them any visit to listen to their grievances and sort out their problems. Such complaints are more in remote areas where the youth join militancy as a source of livelihood.

b. Utilization of Development Funds. Development of the affected areas is the cornerstone of any counter terrorist strategy. It is observed that the funds released for development purposes are not utilized properly due to wide spread corruption. The government should find an alternative way of utilizing these developmental funds for tangible effects. One of the ways could be their utilization through NGOs or through the security forces operating in remote areas.

c. Dealing with Surrendered Militants. Surrender of militants to be encouraged and given opportunity to join the mainstream after rehabilitation. The militants are to be offered jobs or incentives to lure them to surrender. It has also been seen in some cases that militancy becomes a means to get a job on surrender. In some cases militants have either rejoined militancy or become informers. It is recommended that before such persons are given jobs, the law must take its own course on such cases.

d. Counter Terrorism Institute. Even though the LTTE is militarily defeated in the island, all agencies involved in fighting terrorism are now operating in their own watertight compartments or on a need to know basis. As a very important step towards formulation of strategies and also to act as a source of expertise, it is imperative to establish a Counter Terrorism Institute in Sri Lanka (CTI) where research work is to be carried out on projects ranging from institutionalization of lessons learned, improving the ability to respond to future terrorist incidents, upgrading the ability to detect and respond to the threats in advance specially in international arena etc.

Recommendations at the Regional Level

a. Coordinated Actions. There is a requirement of cooperative security in which the region as a whole must be built up to face threats to its security. The following measures are the most prominent recommendations.

(1) Confidence Building and Cooperation. Today cooperation is the generalized norm and interstate military conflict increasingly an abnormal phenomenon. In South Asia, there is a need to build bridges of trust and friendship. There is a need for new framework to re-examine and solve the bilateral problems in a spirit of accommodation and mutual trust. The states should rise above transient political perspectives to inspire greater confidence building and bilateral cooperation.

(2) Military Cooperation. With military cooperation between the South Asian states, the routes for small arms smuggling, narcotics trafficking and cross border insurgent movements will come under pressure. Building of database, exchange of information, regular meetings and joint border management are some of the areas of cooperation for effectively dealing with these trans-border activities. Regional military cooperation is particularly necessary in preventing destabilizing activities from each other’s territories.

(3) South Asian Peace Force. A wave of ethnic conflicts has swept across the South Asia during recent past. An alternative step towards ethnic conflict resolution could be to build regional organizations which would take care of the ethnic conflicts and solve them. The instruments to deal with the conflicts could be implemented by a “South Asian Peace Force” a force comprising of troops from different South Asian states using African Standby Force⁵⁷ (ASF) as a model.

b. Role of SAARC. There is a compelling need for strengthening of regional mechanisms and intensifying intelligence sharing in order to secure the region’s collective prosperity, peace and stability in combating terrorism.⁵⁸ Some of the problems of the states of South Asia, like those dealing with drug trafficking, arms smuggling and illegal movement of people are not national but regional problems. SAARC conventions on eliminating terrorism and drug trafficking are very important steps forward in evolving regional mechanism to tackle these problems. The countries of the region need to make the supplementary mechanisms like the SAARC Terrorist Offence Monitoring Desk, SAARC Drug Offence Monitoring Desk etc operational to make the existing arrangement efficacious.

57. See <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AUC/Departments/PSC/Asf/asf.htm> [accessed 01 June 2012].

58. Abeyratne, Dr. Ruwantissa., *Role of SAARC in combating terrorism, ensuring regional peace*. Daily News 04 December 2008, on line. Available at <http://www.dailynews.lk/2008/12/04/>

c. Economic Cooperation. Many of the security problems of the South Asian states are linked with economic under-development and hardship of the people. The problems of insurgency, social unrest and political extremism can be addressed through economic means. What is needed is serious economic cooperation for mutual growth of the states. South Asia has tremendous economic potential. Therefore, all efforts should be focused on poverty alleviation, accelerating socio-economic and scientific progress in the region to pave the way for ushering in an era of prosperity on wider dimensions.

Recommendations at the International Level

a. Security and Intelligence Cooperation. Transnational networks cannot be fought by domestic governments without a transnational capability and capacity, both to monitor and operate. The lack of global intelligence network had been a boost for the LTTE to operate freely without being noticed. The LTTE had built up a strong support base through Tamil Diaspora to raise funds to support the prolonged war. Development of an integrated and a unified intelligence strategy is seen as a major requirement for nation states to combat terrorism.

b. Advancing Global Security and Countering Terrorism. The threat posed by terrorism and violent extremists emanating from one state impact beyond the region. Therefore, resolute and credible steps must be taken to eliminate safe havens and sanctuaries that provide shelter to terrorists and their activities. The safe havens and sanctuaries provided to terrorist organizations by certain countries undermine security and stability in the region and the world at large. Necessary measures are to be decided on a Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative to expand collaboration on counterterrorism, information sharing, and capacity building and finally imposing ban on those organizations.

c. Counter Propaganda Network. The current counter propaganda machinery of the governments to fight the terrorism overseas is weak. The governments can make this machinery strong by allocating more resources and personnel.

d. Freezing of Overseas Assets. Terrorists need funds for multiple purposes. It acts as a lifeline for any terrorist movement. Funds reach militants through banking and non-banking channels. Though a bulk of the funding is carried out from abroad, where funds are generated, collected and sent through non-banking channels like money laundering etc. Money received officially as “Aid” may also be channeled for funding some of the militant organizations, if proper checks are not carried out. As a result of strong protest made by the Sri Lankan

Government, certain countries housed LTTE assets took immediate measures to freeze them and that had positive impact on their activities.

e. Deterrence on Proliferation of Arms and Light Weapons. The weapons are proliferated into the hands of terror groups through a network of organized crime and other transnational actors. Since the domestic routes for weapon induction are under pressure due to action of the security forces, it is alleged that the weapons are transferred through neighbouring countries. The territories of neighbouring countries offer transit point and storage area for weapons. Therefore, careful check and balance of all cargo flow through borders or sea are to be closely monitored by the respective authorities concerned.

CONCLUSION

The three decade long conflict had claimed over 80,000 human lives and destroyed the key infrastructure facilities thus bringing far reaching consequences to the political, economic and social stability of Sri Lanka. It would not have been possible for the LTTE to survive as a terrorist organization for such a long period, if not for the un-hindered support received by its Front Organizations and radicalized segments of the Tamil Diaspora both in the terms of procurement, propaganda and fundraising. Unfortunately, today the same Front Organizations together with pro LTTE activists and less than 15% of the radicalized segments of Diaspora population who helped to sustain the LTTE terrorist campaign over many years, are still engaged in carrying out same activities as they did in the past in the pretext of “safeguarding the rights of Tamils” and using the human rights banner. These developments as well as LTTE’s links and interactions with many international criminal and terrorist groups in the past provides sufficient evidence to determine, how dangerous it could be, if the LTTE Front Organizations were allowed to rebuild and strengthen their networks overseas. Finally, the sophistication of the LTTE and its impact on Sri Lanka and outside world should serve as a lesson to all Governments facing terrorism today including the countries those who are wittingly or unwittingly permitting their soil to be used to nurture or condone terrorism thus leaving a fearful challenge for the world tomorrow.

Therefore, Regional and International community should assure continuous assistance to Sri Lanka to crack down LTTE covert international operations of fund generation, human smuggling, arms smuggling, money laundering and propaganda operations through a strict network of legislative and judicial remedies. Further, they should strengthen greater cooperation to enhance the intelligence services to curb LTTE global activities across borders and using maritime resources. Complete paralysis of LTTE international networks will

have a direct impact on political and economical stability of Sri Lanka and its neighbours which would ultimately pave the way for peaceful region and a lasting peace and harmony between all ethnic communities in Sri Lanka.

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